

# LUKANKA: From the Editors

After fifteen years, the Fourth World Journal is now being published in digital form for those who have access to a computer. This publication is free to those who register to read the ideas and thoughts of authors writing from the Fourth World perspective. This issue will become available in hard copy and therefore available to individuals and libraries the world over. We are happy to make this issue available online. We look forward to your comments and constructive suggestions.

The contributors to this issue are as diverse as the subjects of their essays. From the ancient knowledge of Minoan culture and the Anishnabe to the more contemporary commentaries on current events in Africa, the Northwest United States and Europe, and discussions of Fourth World theories in the world of globalisation our contributors pack a great deal into a very small space.

Allen Gabriel (Carleton, Canada) of the Anishnabek Nation shares his views on Anishnabe as a way of life and reality. His insight reveals the power of this ancient people and thus allows us all to know the way one many knows his culture.

Rodney Bobiwash (Toronto, Canada) the Director of the CWIS Forum for Global Exchange Program (and a Anishnabek scholar) examines the extremes of positions taken in universities and colleges and the difficulty of establishing a mutually beneficial relationship between native peoples and the European model of higher education. Bobiwash proposes steps that can be taken to define a "middle ground" that could lead to a constructive rather than a destructive relationship between native peoples and institutions of higher learning in North America.

Joan Stanley-Baker (Tokyo, Japan) offers scholarly commentary on ideas of consciousness drawn from the archaeology of ancient Minoan culture. Dr. Stanley-Baker's well-written and incisive essay demonstrates a methodology that is of significance for other students of consciousness studies.

Kathey Seton (Brisbane, Australia) provides a clear and thorough introduction to theories in Fourth World geopolitical analysis. Her essay details the origins of our modern thinking about Fourth World peoples and their relationship to states.

Dr. Richard A. Griggs (Durban, South Africa) examines the geopolitics of claims by Afrikaners to the right of self-determination. Identifying themselves as a distinct people in South Africa, Afrikaner political aspirations are significant for their potential impact on South Africa's many indigenous nations.

Dr. Jovanna Brown (Olympia, USA) documents the efforts of Indian governments in the Pacific Northwest United States to negotiate a settlement to protect and enhance ancient salmon runs in the face of growing demands by settler populations for hydroelectric power.

Geovrk Ter-Gabrielian (Bowling Green, USA) sees violent ethnic conflict as the major threat to the post-Cold War peace, and suggests that this violence is internationalizing in different ways. In his essay, Ter-Gabrielian describes four groups of major actors in ethnic conflict, and he discusses their most general strategies. The discussion helps to explain difficulties in achieving peace (either by force or by agreement) via the existing strategies. It also helps to identify the most common causes of ethnic conflicts becoming violent. A comprehensive peace strategy, based on the idea of revising the status of

indigenous groups in the international setting is suggested on the example of a hypothetical Organization of Transcaucasian Nations.

Finally, I offer a brief review of a wonderful essay book by Catalan scholar Josep Fontana. The Catalan view of Europe clarifies the age of European domination and clearly shows indigenous nations' diverse views of social, economic and political realities may be the trend of the future informing our reality of the 21st century.

I hope you enjoy this issue.

Rudolph C. Ryser, Ph.D.  
Editor in Chief

# Living Anishnabe

by Allen Gabriel

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She:kon (Greetings),

I was once asked, by a Canadian person, to explain the importance of culture to Aboriginal peoples. I tried, for a while, to bend my thinking around the framing of the question (*pan-Aboriginal approach*). The more I tried the more my head hurt. Finally, I decided that the best way to do this was to explain what my culture means to me.

The following piece is the result. I hope this gives people a little insight into my personal philosophy. It is based on the teachings, principles and values I've received throughout my life which, like my culture, continues to evolve because I learn something new everyday. I'd like to point out that, depending on who I am speaking with, I prefer to use the terms "Canadian," "American", "Anishnabe". Many of our people still use terms like "whites", "non-Indians", "non-Aboriginal people" or "non-Kanienkehaka" to describe people who are not of our nation. Many people (not of our nation) have told me they don't like being referred to as "non-whatever". Besides, I believe it to be disrespectful of peoples' identities (individual and collective). We have long been the victims of such disrespect (to say the least), but I find it difficult to justify using such terms -- I should be respectful of others if I'd like them to be respectful of me.

It is said that, as we walk the path that is our life, there are times when the way is not clear. Things happen to make us lose our way. Perhaps a loved one is sick or has died -- it could be something else that troubles us. When this happens we suddenly find ourselves stumbling through the brush.

As we struggle to push our way through the underbrush, looking for the clear path, we pick up burrs and thorns which cling to our clothing, pricking our skin. We get dusty and scared. Our fear causes us to cry and our hearts pound.

It is good to see that you have arrived here safely and that we may spend some time together. I know that you have come from far away and that many obstacles were in your way. And yet, despite these obstacles, you are able to be here. I take you by the hand as a brother or a sister. I offer you words of greetings and respect. I offer you food and drink. Because that which you carry may cause you grief, we have gathered here together.

I speak these words so that your mind may be put at ease and your load lightened. We come together in this way because you are grieving. We come to offer our thoughts and our support. We come to lift the weight of your burden from your shoulders and to share it among us. We know that as an individual you are very strong. But we also know there are times when one needs the strength of others. We understand that when one is in pain, the mind is distracted and one finds it difficult to use the power of a good mind.

First, we take the finest Eagle feather we can find, and with this Eagle feather, we sweep away the dust which clings to you. We remove any burrs or thorns or twigs which may be caught on your clothing. We remove these things because they surely cause you pain and discomfort. And so, we hope this makes you feel more comfortable and more at ease.

Your eyes may be filled with tears because of the grief you carry. These tears blur your vision and sting your eyes. There may be a sound like roaring in your ears because of the fear, pain and anger you may be feeling. And so, we take the finest and softest deer skin we can find. We gently wipe away your tears so that you may see the beauty that is all around you, and your friends and relations who have gathered here to support and help you.

Next, we wipe away any obstruction in your ears which may prevent you from hearing the good words that people speak to help ease your suffering. We offer you a place to sit so that you may rest your weary body.

Finally, your grief, your pain and your anger may cause an obstruction in your throat. It



is important to obstruct that obstruction so that, when you speak, your words may come loudly and clearly so that all may understand what is troubling you. And so, we offer you a drink of pure, cool water. Water is indeed one of the most powerful medicines we have, for it has the ability to give and to sustain life. The water will help to remove that which clogs your throat. It soothes your insides and quenches your thirst.

And so, with all this we hope you are now more comfortable and we have helped to ease your burden. We hope these words have helped to restore a sound mind, body and spirit. We hope that now you may focus, with a clear and good mind, on the words of thanksgiving, the Ohentenkariewatehkwen (the words before all others). We celebrate the fact that life exists, for we understand that it is by pure chance that it does.

And so it is Sonkwaiatison, our Creator, that as we prepare to begin this new day, we take a few moments to centre ourselves, to reflect on who we are, on our place within the Circle of life, and on our responsibilities to all of Creation.

We begin by turning our thoughts to you, Ietiniistenhen Ohontsa, our sacred Mother the earth. We know that you are sick and you are dying at this time because of the way we, the two-legged show you disrespect and abuse of your gifts. And yet despite this, your love for your children is such that you continue to provide all we need to survive on a daily basis. You continue to fulfill your responsibilities and carry out your duties in accordance with the instructions given you in the beginning of time. For this we are grateful. And so it is, we turn our minds to you, we acknowledge you and we give thanks. So be it in our minds.

We understand that we share our time here with many different forms of life. From the smallest micro-organism, and the insects which live in the body of our Mother Earth. It is your responsibility to keep the body of our Mother healthy and strong. It is your duty to fight the effects of pollution. We know your task is great at this time because of the demands we the two-legged place upon you. And yet, despite this, you continue to struggle with the weight of the burden we place upon you. You fight to carry out your responsibilities and fulfill your obligations in accordance with the original instructions. Because of this, the cycle continues. And so it is, we turn our minds to you, we acknowledge you and we give thanks. So be it in our minds.

We turn our minds to the different forms of life that walk on the face of Mother Earth. There are those of you who crawl and those of you who slither. We acknowledge you Okwaho, (wolf), Okwari, (bear) and Anowarah (turtle). You represent our clans, our families. There are those of you who provide us with shelter, tools, clothing and food. We call you Skanionsa, the moose and Oskenonton, the deer. You give of yourselves so that we may survive. We understand that there is a relationship of respect that must exist among us.

We turn our minds to the fish and other forms of life that live in the bodies of water. We know that you struggle because of the disrespect we show you. We pollute your world and treat you as "resources" and products".

We look now to all the different birds that are around us. When the Creator made you, he gave your feathers the colours of the rainbow. He gave each of you a beautiful and distinctive song and he asked that you greet each new day with that beautiful song. Every day, when your voices come together in a beautiful chorus, we are reminded of the importance of the diversity and harmony in the Creation.

From among the birds the Creator chose you, Akweks, our brother the Eagle. You are the strongest and are able to fly the highest. Your keen eyesight allows you to see the Creation. Upon your shoulders, the Creator placed the added burden of being his messenger. Our Elders teach us that, should you appear in a dream and speak to us, we should pay particular attention to your words. For it is said that you are bringing a message directly from the Creator.

We turn our minds to the rooted nations of Creation. We acknowledge the grasses, the medicine plants. We greet you, the Three Sisters -Onenste (corn), Osaheta (beans) and Onononsera (squash). You are the staple of my people. We know that, when we plant you together, you protect one another from disease and insects. We acknowledge the trees. And you, Wahta (the maple), you provide us with wood for heat, tools and shelter. You also provide us your life's blood so that we may have Wahta osis (maple syrup) for medicine. It is indeed a happy time when you give us this gift, for we know the Creation

is awakening and the cycle of life continues.

We turn our minds to you, the various bodies of water. The rivers, the lakes, the oceans and the springs. You fulfill a vital function in the continuation of the cycle of life. You provide us with the most powerful medicine there is, for water has the ability to give and to sustain life.

As we look around us this morning, we see, Karakwa, our brother the sun, that you have chosen to grace us with your presence once more. You bring the warmth of a new day. You bring us light so that we may see the beauty that surrounds us. Working with all the other elements of Creation, you help perpetuate the cycle of life. We know that your time with us will be short this day and that you will soon disappear where the sky and earth come together in the west.

We know that, as darkness surrounds us, Ahsontenka Karakwa (Grandmother Moon), you will watch over us. You work with all the female life in the universe. You decide when children will be born. You work with the waters and help to keep the cycle going. We are reminded everyday, as you share the sky with Karakwa, of the balance that must be maintained between the roles of the female and of the male. We are reminded of the equal importance of both, and we understand that without the one there is no other.

As we look to the night sky, we see you Tsiiotsistokwaronion (the Stars). Some of our Elders teach us that you represent the spirits of those who have gone on before us. You represent the past, our history, and yet you are still here in the present. We understand that your teachings are as old as time itself, and yet they remain unchanged by the passage of time. You also show us the way into the future and we have but to look to you for guidance.

Once again this morning, we have felt the presence of unseen forces that are around us at all times. We feel the air. You represent the breath of the Creator and you bind all life together in an unbreakable circle. We understand that we must respect your gift for, should we ever destroy you, we will destroy all life and the cycle will end. We feel the presence of the winds. Coming from the four directions, you bring the changing seasons. You help to keep the air we breathe clean and pure.

And now we come to you, Sonkwaiatison. You have created all this and you have given us certain instructions. We see that all the different Nations of your Creation struggle to carry out the instructions you gave them in the beginning of time. They continue to strive in fulfilling their responsibilities and carrying out their duties as you have asked them to. It seems that only we, the two-legged, have difficulty in remembering your instructions. We seem to be blind to the lessons you have placed all around us. We are deaf to your teachings.

We invite you to spend some time with us. Move among us, feel our hearts and our minds. We have done our best to remember our place within the circle of life. But, we are frail and afraid. We build many things to help us survive, to help us control your Creation. The Ohentonkariwatehkwen helps to remind us of our responsibilities and duties. Hopefully, one day, we will begin to see the wonders of your Creation. Perhaps we will learn to live in harmony with it, rather than try to control it. Perhaps we will see that all things, and all people, have their rightful place in the Circle. We hope that you are pleased with us and that we have shown you the respect you merit. We have done our best to honour you and the rest of Creation. Finally, we acknowledge one another. We give greetings and thanks that we have this opportunity to spend some time together. The issues we are struggling with are great and we carry a heavy load. There are others who are not with us in this Circle and I hope they will gain some comfort and strength from the medicines we offer and the words that have been spoken.

We offer a special thought for our families, our friends and our loved ones, where ever they may be. We ask that you watch over them and keep them well until we can rejoin them. If it should be your desire to call one of them back to your side, that will be a sad time and we will grieve. We understand, however, that this is the greatest honour we can achieve and we will try to not let our grief hold them back from the journey they must make.

Finally, Sonkwaiatison, I ask that you give us all the courage, the strength and the wisdom to use the power of a good mind in all we do. Help me to speak clearly and honestly so that all may understand the how I feel and why. Help me to listen carefully

to what others say and to not react in anger if negative things are said about me. Help me to understand that even harsh words contain teachings and that I must sometimes look and listen hard to find them. Help me to be a better person today, then I was yesterday.

I am one person. I have a language which, while it has certain similarities with other languages of the Rotinonsionni, is distinct from any other language in the world. My name is Kanatiao. In the English language it means "Nice Village". My name situates me within my clan/family, community and nation. My name places me within time and space as it is derived from an event or other significant factor surrounding my birth. My name identifies me to Sonkwaiatison, the animals, medicine plants and other elements of the Creation. During the Atonwa (Naming Ceremony) I was held up for all Creation to see, so that all may know me and remember that day.

My mother's name is Kaseniioosta (She Makes a Name Beautiful), for reasons obvious to anyone who has met her. My father's name is Kanatase (New Village). He was given this name to commemorate the fact that he was the first one born into the new house his father built for his mother and older siblings.

My daughter is Ioseriio (Nice Winter). She was born at a time when the weather was particularly pleasant for the season. My sons are Rowente (Big Voice) and Rotewe (Good Humour). The boys' names reflect the characteristics inherent in their nature. They are whole people. They learn and they teach. I speak to them as equals. I have brothers and sisters. I have aunts and uncles, cousins, nephews and nieces. They all have names as well.

I come from a community which we call Kanesatake (Where the Frozen Snow is). Long ago this name was given to that place because the sunlit sand hills, seen at a distance as one paddled down the river towards it, looked like frozen snow.

There are two other communities near Kanesatake -- Kahnawake (Where the Fast Waters Are) and Akwesasne (Where the Partridge Drums) -- and I have relatives there too. Together we are the three Eastern-most communities of the Kanienkehaka. In all, there are eight communities within our territory. They are located near larger communities within our land that have strange names. Kahnawake is near Montreal, Ganyengeh is near Plattsburgh, Akwesasne is beside Cornwall, Tyendinaga and Belleville are neighbours, Ohsweken (which has people of all six Rotinonsionni nations living there) is close to Brantford and the people of Wahta occupy lands near Muskoka.

Kanatsiohareke is near Palatine, New York. It is the newest community and was established by Sakokwenionkwas (Tom Porter) in order to restore peace of mind to several families who were severely traumatized by the events of 1990. You see, when we had total control over our territory, we were better able to maintain peace among ourselves. If a conflict arose in the community which could not be resolved, one side in the dispute made the ultimate move to restore peace and a good mind -- they packed up and left to establish another community elsewhere. This alternative dispute resolution mechanism can no longer easily be implemented, however.

I am born with a gift. Part of the challenge I face in adolescence is to discover that gift. My greatest challenge now is to develop it so that I may use it to the benefit of those I come in contact with throughout my life. I have a way of life. It is a spiritual way of life. My spiritual beliefs influence and guide all that I do. I believe in peace, friendship and respect. I strive for justice and equality. I understand the need to respect and recognize the diversity the Creator has made. I am part of that diversity, I am not arrogant enough to think I am above it, or in control of it. I believe that all things have the equal right to exist. This is what the Creator intended.

I have the right to choose my way of life. I have the right to choose to live alone. I have the right to choose to live with others. If I choose to live in the company of others, I have a responsibility to live in a manner where I do no harm or become a burden on them. I have the responsibility to maintain peace by using a good mind.

I am part of a continuum. The principles which are the heart beat of our way of life are still valid today. I try to keep them alive and to live by them. Being human, the most fragile of Creation, I sometimes stray from these principles. I forget to apply them to my actions.



Because this happens, I take the time, before I begin each day, to reflect on my past, to acknowledge Creation and give thanks that the cycle of life continues for another day. I reflect on my responsibilities towards the future of Creation. I hope that I will learn from my errors for then they are no longer errors, they become lessons. Errors only remain so if I learn nothing from them.

I have a history that is almost as old as this land. My people are Kanienkehaka (the People of Flint). We are called this because of the particular nature of the land we come from. Some of you call us Mohawks. Long ago, my people were barbaric. Hatred, cannibalism and war were the essences of our lives. Then, over a period of time and with the help of a messenger from another place, we came to understand that the true power to accomplish great deeds is in the use of a good mind. We came together to form the spiritual and political alliance of the Rotinonsionni (People of the Longhouse or Iroquois Confederacy). My people became some of the world's most accomplished practitioners of diplomacy and democracy.

I have a government and a constitution. I am a man of law. The law I choose to follow is known as the Kaianerekowa (the Great Good or Great Law of Peace). It is a law of peace -- peace of mind, body and spirit. I lead by example. I follow by choice. My government represents my mind, it doesn't make my decisions for me. It is my responsibility to seek to maintain peace through the use of a good mind.

Our society is based on an organized societal structure of checks and balances. Balance is important in maintaining peace and harmony. We have found a way to strike a balance between the rights and responsibilities of the individual and the collective. Our spirituality makes it easier for us to remember our place in the Circle of Life. Our spirituality helps to use a good mind in coming to a mind on issues.

The Kaianerekowa provides the primary guiding principles for our people. It is among the most cherished teachings of the Rotinonsionni (People of the Long House or Iroquois People), that alneed and I will use all of what I take. I will not waste. When I pick medicines plants, I leave two for every one I pick. This way, I make sure the next person has medicine to pick, and I also ensure the sacred medicines will not disappear.

When I pick medicine, cut wood or take an animal or fish -- indeed, whenever I take from Creation -- I give thanks. I'm not sure if what I take has feelings as I do, or if it has the capacity to understand or communicate as I can. But, it is certainly alive. It grows and perpetuates itself. It plays a vital role in the Circle of Life and, eventually, it dies. When it gives of itself, I perform a ceremony to honour the gift of its power. In order to properly honour this relationship, I kindle a fire and I offer Oienkwenonwe (Sacred Tobacco) so that the spirit of that which I have taken may hear my words and thoughts.

The relationship between us is an intimate and personal one:

"Look what I have done to you. I have taken your life. It gave me no pleasure to do this. I had no choice for, you see, my children are crying because they are hungry. They need the healing powers you possess. In order to honour your sacrifice, I will see to it that you are not wasted. What we cannot use will be given back to Mother Earth. That which may be more than I can use will be shared with others. I will not take more than is absolutely necessary. Your sacrifice is proof that you continue to fulfill your responsibilities and carry out your duties according to the instructions the Creator gave you in the beginning of time. Because of this, the cycle of life continues and I am able to provide for my people so that we may survive. And so it is, I acknowledge you and I give thanks."

In me is vested the responsibilities of many institutions. I am father and provider. I am protector, policeman, judge, priest, soldier, mediator, teacher, student, doctor. I fulfill whatever role is expected of me by my people.

I speak the truth for I know the Creator knows my mind and heart. I hope my actions today will make me a better person, will make my part of Mother Earth a better place. I hope that I will be able to help someone by sharing with them in some way. But, most importantly, I hope my children will someday look to me and tell me they are grateful that I was able to allow them the opportunity to have a good life.

When I die, my body is returned to the womb of Mother Earth. In time, my body turns

back to earth and I become nourishment for Creation. Because of this, it is important for me to keep my body clean and healthy. In so doing, I give of myself and complete the circle.



# **Long Term Strategies for Institutional Change in Universities and Colleges: Facilitating Native People Negotiating a Middle Ground**

**by A. Rodney Bobiwash  
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In the epistemological sense there is no question that the tribal method of gathering information is more sophisticated and certainly more comprehensive than western science. In most tribal traditions, no data is discarded as unimportant or irrelevant. Indians consider their own individual experiences, the accumulated wisdom of the community that has been gathered by previous generations, their dreams, visions and prophecies, and any information received from birds, animals and plants as data which must be arranged, evaluated and understood as a unified body of knowledge...tribal knowledge systematically mixes facts and experiences which western science would separate by artificial categories.

The question being asked by Vine Deloria in the article referred to above is quite simply "Why do we think that western science is the criterion of truth and accuracy? Why is tribal knowledge described as striving on an ad hoc basis to rival the information obtained by western science?" Consideration of this question must precede planning for any scholarship or incentive program, curriculum development, or access program we can design to entice Native people into the science or mathematics. The approach that is often taken in recruitment of Native people into, for example engineering programs, can often be referred to as the Field of Dreams approach - build it and they will come. Hang a cedar shingle on the ivy with Native engineering program on it and you will get Native students. Perhaps even give it a catchy Indian name or design some brochures with feathers and medicine wheels and you will double the numbers. It is true that this approach will get some students but the truth is that you would probably get these students anyhow. Institutions are often caught on the horns of a self-perpetuating dilemma - raise the admission hurdles too high and you attract only the brightest and the best while denying access to many who might succeed. Set the admission hurdles too low and you set students up for failure who lack the requisite academic, organizational, and life skills to cope with the demands of the program. The solution lies not in designing better access programs (although cognate support services are greatly needed) but in empowering students to take responsibility for their own academic progress; empowering the discipline to embrace new approaches and ideas; and, empowering institutions to embrace the change resulting from the interaction between the former two. One of the better known young Native engineers in Canada is Karen Decontie from the community of Kitigan Zibi (Maniwaki) near Ottawa. When asked what she attributes her interest in engineering and science, and her success in the program, she says "Children need positive role models to enhance their development and self-esteem. My role models were my mother and father. My mother is Director of the Algonquin Immersion Program and a teacher at Kitigan Zibi Kikinamadinan in Maniwaki. She was also the first principal of this First Nations controlled school. My mother is responsible for ensuring that our language and culture are an integral part of the education received by our students. My father was a fisherman and worked in construction for thirty years in the United States and returned home to start his own excavating business" It should be noted that in addition to being an engineer Ms.

Decontie is also a traditional Native dancer and dance instructor. What is important about her statement is not her reference to role models. We all recognize and acknowledge the importance of role models in determining the range of attractive life choices available to young people. The significant part of the statement above is the reference to culture particularly as it relates to her mother. While her father is an extremely important part of her life it is the example of her mother, as a woman who has chosen to actively work towards the maintenance and promotion of her culture in a contemporary context, that seems to allow Ms. Decontie the freedom to be Indian in a very non-Indian world and profession. While choosing to work in a non-traditional (for an Indian woman) profession she has maintained a strong sense of herself as an Indian woman. This is exhibited in her role as a traditional dancer and dance instructor, in her social and cultural life, in her frequent trips home, in her stated values and in her strong commitment as an Indian role model. Ironically enough her dream as an engineer (which she has realized) was to build bridges. Perhaps the most important bridge she has built is the one between her culture and experience as an Indian woman and the non-Indian world she has chosen to build her profession in.

## Coming to the University

When Indian students come to university they may be coming from any number of situations and be located anywhere along the scale of acculturation. Some speak their Native languages fluently some not at all. Some may be active participants in the traditional religions - the Midewiwin Lodge, the Sun Dance Society, the Longhouse religion for example, others may be staunch Roman Catholic, Anglican or even Pentecostal or Southern Baptist. Some might come from very remote isolated communities where trapping and hunting are still the main economic activities, others from the core of Canada's biggest cities. Most come from somewhere between these extremes. It needs to be stated here that extreme caution should be exercised in attempting to make any determination about the extent of inculturation that has occurred in any individual. A person might exhibit many of the outward signs of inculturation yet hold deep foundational values which are Native. An Ojibway man I know in Toronto left his reserve in Northern Ontario early in life to find work and has lived in the cities of Chicago and Toronto for over three decades. He fits no stereotypes of "the INDIAN". He wears his hair short. He holds a responsible managerial position with an industrial firm. He enjoys the Blue Jays. He has held several responsible positions on the Boards of Directors of non-profit agencies. He is well educated. He speaks English impeccably and some French. On the surface he seems inculturated. He also is a skilled hunter who not only gets his moose and deer each year but shares it out in the community in a traditional manner. Although a practicing Roman Catholic he also follows the traditional Pipe religion and is a Pipe Carrier. He speaks seven Native languages fluently. This example illustrates that the shift from critical and informed cultural analysis to stereotype and racist assumptions is a very easy process. Despite the variation of their backgrounds one thing that Native students have in common when they come to campus is that they come to inhabit the "middle ground." I am borrowing this historical term which refers to the ever-shifting frontier inhabited by Native people and non-Native people in the early stages of colonization where a society developed which was neither Indian nor white and whose parameters were defined on a continually shifting yet more or less equitable base by both groups. When Native people come to university they are not passive victims of an unfamiliar, opaque and omnipotent other-culture (*uber kultur*) but they are determinants of culture - their own personal cultures, the culture of the Native community within the institution, and hopefully the wider culture of the institution. They carry with them their own understandings, values, beliefs and behaviours consistent with these. They also usually have a much better understanding of the dynamics of the dominant culture than it has of theirs. If we fail to apprehend this as an active truth then we fail to deal with the student in a productive manner which facilitates their success at university.

While there has been much discussion of cultural hegemony and the resultant *ethnostress* experienced by Native students the discussion has taken place in an intellectual framework which views disempowerment and disenfranchisement of Native people as inevitable. A more reasonable and useful model sees opportunity for cultural interaction within institutions posited on the inevitability of cultural persistence and the inability of all but the most fascistic cultural constructs to resist change.

## Women and Middle Ground

One group that has begun the process of establishing middle ground in the university is women. The degree to which this has signaled real institutional change varies widely across departments, disciplines and faculties. Having said that women have entered into the process of negotiating the middle ground I am not suggesting that the process is anywhere near complete. The example I will use to illustrate this point is the area of engineering. In the early 1960's protest singer Peggy Seeger was lyricizing , An Engineer could never be a lady Dainty as a dishrag Faithful as a chow An engineer could never have a baby You'll grow up to be a gal... Not a woman... This song about a young girls dream of becoming an engineer and all of the reasons her mother (and society) could think of for her not becoming one epitomized the struggles women had for equitable access to programs like engineering. The final lyric of the song deals with becoming an engineer and the fight for equal pay. Debates over the behaviour of students and initiation rites in engineering schools at the beginning of each school year are commonplace across the country. Student newspapers invariably uncover some new atrocity committed by the student body. Most engineering faculties have worked hard to curb the worst excesses and many universities have imposed strong disciplinary codes and sanctions against sexist, harassing or intimidating behaviour. Much of this was done in the wake of the Montreal Massacre as a result of women realizing that as a matter of survival they needed to demand the terms whereby they would participate in university programs. Much work had been done prior to this and as women slowly start to occupy faculty positions the discipline will change. The change in the discipline itself is reflected in the growing body of literature that is now being produced by women which addresses the very question of how women's ontology differs from that of men (who have almost exclusively defined the parameters of the discipline in the past). Books like Discovering Reality, Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka represent a redefining of the scientific enterprise within an alternative cultural framework, and thus the carving out (or negotiation) of middle ground by women. Twenty years ago at the University of Toronto only five percent of engineering students were women. Today the number is up to twenty-one percent. The presence of women as an active voice in organizations like the Professional Engineers Association of Ontario is reflected in the Women In Engineering Advisory Committee to the PEO and other organizations like the Women In Engineering Association and Women In Science. When asked what was the single most important factor in the increase of the numbers of women studying engineering Diedre Stanton, at the Office of the Registrar of the Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering at the University of Toronto, identifies the creation of a "critical mass" of women. When a significant enough number of women are enrolled in the same cohort they are able to provide support for each other. Perhaps more importantly however they can assert themselves, identify positions and leaders, and speak their voice -- in other words they then have the capacity to change the culture they live in. In doing so they make it better for all not just for themselves -- they humanize a culture in which inhumanity is often lionized.

## Balance and the "Seven Grandfathers"



One of the most important cultural understandings that all Native North American peoples hold to is the necessity and the rightness of "living a good life." In Ojibway (Anishnaabe) this is expressed in the phrase *mino bimaadziwin* - to live a good life. Living a good life can mean many things but it can essentially be reduced to the sense of balance and beauty that is the result of the taking up of one's responsibilities. This is not an easy concept to translate for non-Indian people who tend to view obligation as onerous. In the causal world of the Indian all beings are caught up in an intricate web of obligation and mutual reciprocity. To fail to fulfill one's responsibilities is to cause imbalance which can have minor or major effects ranging from a sense of things not being right (dissatisfaction with self) to bad luck and may even result in injury or death. Among some Indian groups like the Navajo (Dineh) when an offense is committed either deliberately (rejection of responsibility) or through omission (neglect of responsibility) elaborate healing ceremonies are required to restore this balance. In universities and colleges there has been a tendency within student culture to embrace irresponsible behaviour. This is epitomized in such staples of popular culture as the movie Animal House. This is slowly changing as harsher economic realities force students to worry about graduating with higher grades for access to a restricted job market; the fear of AIDS and STD's place some constraints on sexual behaviour; and universities, increasingly caught up on the horns of liability, are encouraging more responsible behaviour in alcohol consumption. Nevertheless the rowdy undergraduate still remains a potent symbol for students and nowhere more so than in faculties of Engineering and Medicine. The exploration of identity and the requisite socialization of undergraduate student life are important and positive parts of the student experience but they remain posited upon the notion that student life is a rite of passage. As such it is the final opportunity for adolescent exploration prior to taking up a job, a family, a mortgage and other symbols of adulthood in Euro-Canadian society. A rite of passage which emphasizes that it is the "last gasp of freedom" prior to assuming responsibility. This is a cultural construct directly in opposition to Indian values which emphasize that the only good life is one in which a person lives out their responsibilities in a conscious and deliberate manner. In the Ojibway (Anishnaabe) cosmology there are seven values (teachings) which are paramount. Though other Indian people may express these in different ways there is consensus that these values are basic to most Indian peoples. These Teachings are referred to among the Ojibway as the Seven Grandfathers and these are: Nbwaakin - Wisdom; Zaagidwin - Love; Mnaaddendmowin - Respect; Aakdehewin - Bravery; Gwekwaadziwin - Honesty; Dbaadenizwin - Humility; Debwiwin - Truth.

The Seven Grandfathers are teachings which are understood in the context of a relational world; a world in which the self is understood as it stands in relation to the Creator, the Pawaagan (Spirit masters), non-human beings, animals and plants and other people; a world in which all things are potentially animate and therefore worthy of respect and care. As one Native scientist has put it "Mother Earth has rules and regulations. If we don't understand it, it is our problem and we must learn to understand. We must take responsibility as to what happens to Mother Earth as everything is connected." This alter-Native understanding is light years away from the rationalist view of the universe which posits that all knowledge is knowable and that individual verifiable observation (the scientific method) is the path to understanding. One Native artist and educator has said that if he were designing a drawing course for Native people he would not begin with the traditional exercises taught in Canadian art schools. These courses focus on drawing models, the human form. Rather as a Native person he would teach his students to draw the land first. Take them to the bush, to the lakes, to the hills and teach them to draw the land and the sky -- to go outside themselves, to *decentre* the sense of self. An approach at odds with art teachers from the Renaissance onwards, yet one which is perfectly sensible to Native people.

When the Mohawks of Akwesasne approached the problem of designing



culturally relevant and appropriate math/science curriculum in their community they started with the question.

What is the Mohawk way of schooling? Bring in the resources of the earth: frogs, landscape, rivers and other parts of the natural world. Earth is the basis of the curriculum. Since Science equals Nature Native students can learn a lot about their culture. Students must understand the relationship between the Creation story of the land - themselves - the Creator - relationship to others and how these things relate to science.

Tobias, in her research on the effects of pedagogical method on effective learning in American universities, has shown that in many cases it is not a lack of requisite ability that deters many students from successful completion of science and math-based programs but rather a series of other pedagogical factors around learning styles which result in lack of success. As she puts it

Some students who could do well in science chose not to...What they experience, painfully and without adequate explanation from professionals, is that their preferred learning styles do not serve them well when they cross certain disciplinary boundaries.

The problems that native students face in the classroom go far beyond the requirement to step outside of one's comfort zone of learning. That problem is increased exponentially by the ethnostress experienced by Native students who find that what they are being taught (not just how they are being taught) is somehow inimical to their identity as Indian people. To address a problem of this magnitude requires strategies that go far beyond four-colored brochures with Native art or programs with Native names. These strategies require real institutional change where Native students coming into the programs in conjunction with program administrators are encouraged to negotiate a "middle ground" which affirms Native values, strengthens identity, allows for the full expression of an Indian world view within the course of study, and provides the skills and knowledge necessary for successful completion of the program.

## **Openness and Respect**

What then are the prerequisites necessary to provide students with the facility to negotiate a middle ground within an institution? I do not say to ensure success as I believe that to be a joint responsibility of the student and the institution and the conditions necessary for success are to be worked out between the those parties. I think we need to step back from that point and say what are the prerequisite steps and approaches the institution must embrace to ensure dialogue. In the traditional Council lodge of the Anishnaabe it was the given responsibility of the leaders of the Bear Clan people to ensure that all who spoke were heard fairly and equitably. In the Ojibway construction of social reality equality of voice was a spiritual responsibility and competition to be heard mitigated by a profound sense of egalitarianism. In universities the voice of students generally is heard in a number of ways, and with varying weights:

- Student Councils (Representative bodies);
- Student representation on university committees and Boards of Governance;
- Student media;
- Student organizations and associations;
- Complaints offices ie. Ombudsman office;
- and, student organized protest events

In the adherence to the dialectic which universities have embraced as a primary ontological construct the voice of students is usually expressed in an adversarial fashion and in competition with a number of other interest groups

within the university community. The response of non-western peoples then is often to withdraw and establish alternate representative bodies or to become marginalized and not participate in any fashion.

Native students have tended not to be too formally organized although most college and universities do have some form of Native Student's Association. In many cases the links between these associations and other student bodies are tenuous. Among the indices that need to be measured to indicate whether or not Indian students have established themselves in a successful manner in the institution is the degree to which they participate in the polity of the institution. Other indices I would suggest which are important are:

1. Whether culturally-safe space has been established within the institution;
2. Whether the number of new and current students will sustain a critical mass of peer support and encouragement;
3. Whether Native specific student representative bodies (NSAs) have been established;
4. The extent of integration with the larger Native community in the *centre* in which the institution is located;
5. The equitable representation of Native students across faculties and disciplines;
6. The number of tenured Native faculty within an institution;
7. The amount of Native specific academic programming within an institution;
8. The amount of core funds expended by the institution on Native student support services;
9. The extent to which Native student services and Native-specific academic programming are integrated;
10. Native access to the institution's decision making bodies;
11. Faculty involvement with Native community-based research projects.

All of these indices are measurable over a period of years and while there may be time-sensitive issues that influence particular institutions I believe that taken together, measuring a period of say ten or twenty years, they reveal a true picture of institutional commitment -- or lack of commitment.

Where Native students have had a physical space (ie., the TUNA Lounge at Trent University or First Nations House at the University of Toronto) they have had the capacity to develop much stronger Native associations, but have maintained an isolationist position *vis-a-vis* the rest of the student population. This is significant as it suggests that there is no middle ground being developed, although there is "indigenous space" or "Indian country", which is almost analogous to reservation land, within the confines of the institution. I do not believe this is a negative -- indeed the development of culturally-safe space for Native students is I believe one of the prerequisites to the negotiation for middle-ground for Native students. While there are many examples of where this has been done, and in Ontario the Ministry of Education and Training Aboriginal Education and Training Strategy funded several colleges and universities to establish such *centres*, there are three that deserve mention either for the amount of time they have been established or for the amount of institutional commitment they signify; these are the TUNA (Trent University Native Association) Lounge at Trent University, First Nations House at the University of Toronto, and First Nations House of Learning at the University of British Columbia (the UBC Longhouse). The other that also bears mention is the Native Student's Lounge at the University of Windsor. This is primarily notable as it represents a partnership between the local Native community, through the Windsor Can-AM Friendship Centre and the University of Windsor.

These facilities have come about through various means. In some cases the demands of a significant and growing Native student population; in others

the vision of determined faculty; in other cases they are the result of reports done regarding the need of Aboriginal people in the institution, or the need to attract more Native students. What they have come to represent for Native people, within and outside of the institution, is a place where Native people can define their own experience within the institution. These places working at their ideal best fulfill the following functions:

1. A focusing point for Native students to gather;
2. A sense of institutional commitment;
3. The opportunity for the Native community at large to interact with the campus Native community;
4. A focal point for the delivery of Native-specific programming within the institution;
5. A point of consultation for the institution with the Native community.

In order to ensure the above the institution must commit to doing more than merely providing a physical space and calling it a Native Students Lounge. It must commit staff, resources which shore up a sense of the importance of indigenous knowledge, resources to *indigenize* the space, and must review its other policies and procedures to ensure that Native cultural practices are welcomed. To illustrate this last point one of the most widespread and important Native cultural ceremonies is the practice of smudging. This is done prior to most gatherings of any importance and is always accompanied by prayer. To describe it briefly and simply the ceremony consists of the burning of sacred herbs (usually sweet grass, sage, cedar or tobacco) and the ritual washing of oneself in the smoke as a process of purification. Almost all institutions in Canada have implemented non-smoking policies. Although the ritual use of tobacco is exempt in Ontario under the Tobacco Control Act, and in other provinces under similar legislation, there have been instances where smudging has not been allowed by overzealous security guards, or fire trucks have been called, or people smudging have been accused of smoking illegal substances by ignorant people, where other staff members in adjoining offices have complained to the university safety officer about the smoke from the smudge or even in one case that I know of where an Elder with a particularly thick and smoky smudge pot inadvertently set off the water sprinkler system. While the latter example is somewhat humorous the former ones caused much hurt, humiliation and embarrassment for both the Native people involved and the institutions involved. At First Nations House at the University of Toronto a minor dispute over smudging resulted in the entire space being declared a ceremonial ground for the purposes of exemption under the Tobacco Control Act. If anything the lesson to be learned is that these initiatives must go ahead with a high degree of consultation and partnership between the institution and the local Native community.

If the construction or implementation of Native cultural space, whether this be a Native Student's Lounge/Centre or a full-fledged Native college within the institution, is the first prerequisite to facilitating the negotiating of a middle ground for Native people within an institution what are the other prerequisites? I would suggest that there are five:

1. Equality/Equity in curriculum;
2. Respect for cultural difference;
3. Learning styles;
4. Critical mass;
5. Basic skills base.

One of the myths that Native people, particularly in professional programs, still have to deal with is that they have gained admission to the program merely because they are Native. Accusation from other students that they have not worked as hard, have not jumped as many hurdles, and an expressed sense of grievance that somebody else (usually expressed as "one of my friends") was denied entrance because a Native person was granted



entry are everyday occurrences across Canada. In some cases this leads to failure or incompleteness due to stress, in other cases psychological problems brought on by racial harassment and intimidation, and most usually to the creation of a defensive and isolated group of Native students trying to "keep their heads down" and get through the program. While it cannot be overstated that it is the responsibility of the Deans and Principals who run these faculties to respond immediately and with appropriate sanctions to racial incidents this response will only serve to limit more extreme expressions and will not deal with the underlying misunderstandings that contribute to the formation of racial and stereotyped attitudes which result in bigoted and prejudicial behaviours. This can only ultimately be accomplished by a radical shift in the epistemological approaches current within our universities. There should not be a curriculum in any subject taught in a Canadian university or college (with perhaps the exception of some pure sciences, mathematics and pre-Columbian European philosophy and history) that fails to incorporate First Nations perspectives, history and philosophy and ontology. While I realize that this statement may seem radical it is rooted in the realization that if we accept the rightness of the doctrine of discovery, exploration and conquest of the Americas then we may well accept the curriculum as it is now taught. If we comprehend the doctrine of discovery, exploration and conquest as primarily historical fiction, rationalization and justification for the genocide of the people's of the Americas, as an arcane artifact best discarded to the dustbin of history, then we have little choice but to rewrite the curriculum we teach as the first step in the building of a new social order in which Aboriginal people take an equitable place in the learning of our young.

## **Respecting Cultural Difference**

Educational institutions must do far more though than just change their curriculum to embrace new epistemological approaches, they must also make a commitment to embrace cultural difference. This must occur at the level of student interaction, faculty-student interaction, and student-administration interaction. Although universities are places where students are supposed to be allowed to explore identity there is often an immense amount of intolerance and pressure to conform. Ultimately however this pressure might be easily dealt with were there a climate in the institution which allowed real difference rather than diversity within narrow established parameters situated within hegemonic paradigms. Universities and colleges are far more than places in which we impart the knowledge necessary to produce members of society who are functional economic units. They are also places in which we replicate and reinforce the values and beliefs by which our (Euronorthamerican) society functions. Having said that we realize that base, or foundational, values and beliefs are inculcated at a much earlier stage in the education of the individual, but the values and belief systems taught at the post-secondary level are refined and explicated interpretations which are very much tied to the place mature adults are expected to occupy within the socio-economic structure -- if we learn the catechism of culture in Grade school then we learn the theology of it in university. This is the crux of the problem for many Native students then: they do not see a place for themselves in the dominant society, or at least a place they can occupy without violation of their fundamental or base values and thus their very identity as Indians (ie., without renouncing their faith). The values which are taught in universities are not only often opposite to their own (and we remember that this teaching mostly goes on informally) but are even inimical to their own. I do not mean here to take a simplistic good/bad cultural paradigm and suggest that all *Euronorthamerican* values are necessarily bad and that all indigenous values are necessarily good. Quite often the underlying values of the former are portrayed as rapaciousness, greed, selfishness, exploitation and uncaring consumption. The values of the latter in contrast are seen as sharing, generosity, compassion, caring and ecological understanding. There may be, and certainly there were at various points in history, certain



values shared by both. However, to look at it through the lenses of post-modern analysis, when we begin the task of deconstruction of the historical experience of our peoples (of each alone and of the interaction between them) those values held in common have undergone immense change over the historical epoch in which our peoples have interacted. Simply put, they have been put into the machine of history and have come out with significantly altered meanings at the end of the process. These meanings, or understandings, are no longer understandable to the other. An example of this is the word *bravery-aakdehewin*. This word may only be understandable to Ojibway people in Ojibway as the term has none of the heroism associated with it that it does in its English meaning. Another example is the word *love-zaagidwin*: in English it has come to mean primarily romantic love (a feeling). In Ojibway it entails a whole body of relationships and responsibility which signify a belief. Is this a problem of translation? I do not think so. I do not believe it is possible to translate culture - the act of translation in itself so alters meaning that key concepts will be lost. This is the reason that when the Aboriginal Studies Major Program Committee at the University of Toronto was meeting to plan the program the Aboriginal participants insisted that a prerequisite to gaining a degree in Aboriginal Studies at the University of Toronto would be the successful completion of a Native language course. Where then does this leave us if culture is not communicated across linguistic barriers. One of the places it leaves us (and perhaps the most important) is the role of the cultural broker. It is not the role of the cultural broker to translate culture as much as it is to make it understandable to either party in terms that are understandable to each. I believe that there is only one way at this time we have devised which does this successfully and this is through the use of Visiting Elders and Elder-In-Residence programs. Of the two types of elder's programs I would recommend the latter because it allows an individual to not only become familiar with the student body over a course of years but also to become familiar with the culture of the university. Most elders programs work on an ad hoc basis, or even an itinerant basis, but institutions need to consider ways in which elders can become institutionalized in the same manner that the elders of the dominant society are already institutionalized in universities and colleges (ie., Chaplains offices, integration with counseling services, and recruitment of elders as faculty). While Trent University used to have two elders (Jake Thomas and Fred Wheatley) employed as tenured faculty they no longer have and unfortunately seem to have regressed and put their elders on now as quasi-counselors.

## Learning Style

One of the questions that students should be encouraged to ask is "How do I know what I know?" Earlier in this article I cited the work of Tobias in examining learning styles and the negative impact of a dominant pedagogical style on the teaching of math and science to otherwise capable students. Universities generally inhabit a narrow range of teaching styles loosely classified as either "American style" or "British style" meaning more or less reliance on lectures and tutorial/seminars. There is a grave error made in hiring people to teach whose primary emphasis has been on individual research for several years. This is not to say that there are not brilliant teachers among the staff of universities in Canada but the fact that they tend to stand out on any campus must tell us something about the overall quality of the classroom experience of the average undergraduate. This problem is made worse (and occasionally better) in larger research institutions where a significant amount of the undergraduate teaching load is taken up by teaching assistants. For Native students the problem is further compounded by a lack of cultural familiarity with teaching styles. We all learn how to learn in the same fashion - in early childhood we watch and we mimic the actions of those we identify as having something to teach us. In a home where the parents read, older children do their homework, important things are written down,

discussed, deliberated over a child will have a definite advantage. That child learns that knowledge comes from books, that discussion is a way of problem solving, that study is necessary. In many Indian communities functional illiteracy remains high, books and paper can be almost non-existent, older children take an active part in raising younger children and often have no place or time to study, and important questions may be deliberated in forums other than the home. This creates an obvious disadvantage for the child coming into the western school system that will remain with them all of their lives. How do these children learn? In many Ojibway communities children learn by watching and doing. They are encouraged to play, to explore, and left with little adult supervision, thereby facilitating independence. When they are with their fathers, or more likely their uncles in more traditional communities, they are expected to learn by watching what their uncles do. In this way they learn to use an ax or run a chain saw to cut wood; where, when and how to set a beaver trap; how to track, hunt, kill and skin a moose, and other skills necessary to live on the land. They are rarely admonished, but often given a teaching. As one speaker at the University of Toronto Visiting Lectureship in Native Health Series described her experience When I was a little girl I was visiting my Grandmother and I saw a great big spider walking across the floor of her house. I walked over to it and I stomped on it with all of my might squashing it flat. My Grandmother who was watching me called me over, but she didn't scold me. All she said to me was "Granddaughter, who is going to feed her little one's now?" What this means for those who teach Native students in the university is that there needs to be some flexibility in approaching pedagogy. The obvious conclusions are already bolstered by some well established practices within some disciplines; the use of practicum, the encouragement of independent thinking and problem solving exercises, etc. Some years back I submitted a proposal to a university I had formerly taught at to develop and teach a course on urban Indian people. This course would be taught in situ at various social service agencies in Toronto. The reasoning being that the Toronto Native community is organized around the Native social service agencies. The idea was rejected with no explanation other than that it would cause logistical problems - this from a university (and department) that sends students to Thailand to study but decided that the one-and-one-half hour trip to Toronto every fortnight was too complicated. The implementation of new approaches to pedagogy requires institutional change which will surely meet with significant opposition from faculty members but which would benefit universities as a whole - perhaps a pedagogical institute for professors is not out of line. With many older faculty retiring soon across Canada perhaps the time is ripe to consider this as new faculty are recruited into institutions. As many merit points for teaching should be available as for research. The recruiting of a significant number of students within the same cohort, course of study etc., may be one of the most important components not only of student success in university and college but also of the ability for those students to influence and change the institutional culture and determine the conditions of their participation. In programs like the Transitional Year Program at the University of Toronto (an upgrading access program for pre-entrance to the University) we have discovered that one or two students trying to make it through the program alone were almost guaranteed failure. Those that made it through successfully reported an immense amount of loneliness and isolation and were often reluctant to continue on in university, choosing college or other situations over continuing at the University of Toronto. When the cohort was increased to four or five students the completion rate rose exponentially and the majority of students chose to go on to the University, and the cohort remained a strong group until they graduated. For students like this the provision of Native specific space and support services is credited as a key factor in their success, particularly as it allowed the continuation of the sense of community begun with the cohort in their first year. The creation of the "critical mass" of students, as has been shown, provides valuable peer support for students but more importantly provides opportunities for leadership development and expression of the voice of the students in a collective fashion. In so doing the

students become empowered and the process of empowerment leads to a realization that they can change not only the small corner of the institution they inhabit but also the institution as a whole. Finally I believe that universities and colleges will never be successful in their attempts to educate Native people without a complete overhaul of the primary and secondary school system. There has been some demand for the creation of Native-controlled post-secondary institutions in Canada. This has been put forth as one of the essential prerequisites to Native self-government. While this is commendable position it is not one which I am entirely sure of. I do believe that a Native-controlled post-secondary institution will be extremely beneficial for Native people but I believe that if Native people controlled their own elementary and secondary schools it would be far more beneficial in the long run. When we first approached the idea of running a Native science camp at the University of Toronto we decided that it would be far more economical and have far greater consequences to reach the teachers who taught Native children. The recruiting model we were working on was not based on the short-term but rather had a ten and twenty year trajectory and was fully informed by the realization that if students were not provided with basic skills in the mathematics and sciences (as well as in grammar, English, etc.) that they were being given false expectations and being set up for failure. We need to work with schools to educate teachers, develop Native culturally based and local specific curriculums, develop policies which create empowered students, and give them the tools necessary not for success as an Indian, or as a white person, but for self-realization within the paradigms of community need. I believe that we need to begin setting out the prerequisites for Native students to be empowered to negotiate a middle ground for themselves within our post-secondary institutions. I do not believe that there will be a reluctance on the part of Native students or Native people to participate in the process if they are shown real institutional commitment; if their culture and values are respected and honoured; if honest and honourable consultative mechanisms are developed; and, if change is effected at the institutional level not just at the end of the process but as a result of beginning the process. Universities and colleges have changed much and in some cases made heroic gains in recent years. This is evidenced by the growing numbers of Native students in our universities and colleges. It is useful at this time to stop and look at where we have come from, where we are, and to dream a little about where we want to be. Many years ago there was a great chief on the North Shore of Lake Huron named Shingwauk. Shingwauk had a dream-vision of a great learning tipi where the Indian children would gather and learn - be educated in the skills and knowledge necessary to walk alongside the non-Indian people who had come to inhabit their lands and participate with them on an equal basis. The vision of Shingwauk of a great tipi of learning is one which we, as Indian people, and we as workers within the centres of learning given responsibility for the education of the young, would do well to share.

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# Consciousness-Related Issues in Minoan Archaeology Social Functions Gleaned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective

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This preliminary study probes the *Weltanschauung* underlying part of the Bronze Age civilization based on the so-called Palaces that flourished for around six hundred years on the Aegean island of Crete between the 20th and the 15th centuries BCE that is commonly called Minoan, after the legendary King Minos. [1] As an historian of Asian art I trespass, in this essay, the disciplinary domains of feminists, psychologists, anthropologists, archaeologists, and perhaps even historians of Western art, as I step far beyond traditional investigative "boundaries" and venture into *terra*, while not altogether *incognita*, certainly *non firma*. Nevertheless I shall review some of the archaeological evidence found in "Minoan" Crete, not from an Aegean archaeologist's perspective, but from that of a student of East Asian art history and, in a cross cultural and inter-disciplinary context, attempt to identify examples of concrete manifestations of what may be gender-related aspects of human consciousness. This is strictly speaking an exploratory essay in the methodology, perhaps even in the epistemology, of comparative art history and the recovery of the early human *Weltanschauung*. And we hopefully may learn in the process what contributions the study of Asian art have to offer to Western archaeology and anthropology.

I shall underscore the fundamental difference between the so-called "Minoan" and other, more "typical" Bronze Age cultures to illustrate what seem to me radical differences in human relationships (to nature, to space, to each other). And I believe that the differences may lie respectively, for lack of a more encompassing definition, in a *yin*- feminine and a *yang*- masculine consciousness. I am using *yin* and *yang* to represent characteristics common to many Asian civilizations, and not literally to Chinese cosmological *yin-yang* principles. And I shall argue that the "Minoan" civilization was characterised by an aspect of human consciousness that is characterised by egalitarianism, inclusiveness and peace (as we shall see) - an aspect I shall call - until a better term is found, a *yin* or largely feminine consciousness. I would like to suggest, with the greatest respect to my seasoned colleagues in the field, that we entertain the idea that there may have been among the "Minoans" an awareness of Earth as a living organism that must be treated with reverence and love, [2] and that it was this awareness that fundamentally conditioned the spiritual and physical life of the inhabitants of the temple-palace complexes, setting them apart from their contemporaries who clearly viewed the Earth as part of Man's Domain, to be manipulated and exploited. I would like to propose, again with deep respect, that such an awareness triggers a reverence and an inclination toward ecological and human nurturing, characteristics incommensurate with exclusion (walled towns), exploitation and oppression (of large labour forces for wall-construction), and subjugation (of persons, societies, or states) which, in order to highlight the contrast and for lack of more appropriate terminology, I shall term *yang* or masculine behaviour, behaviour which characterises most Bronze Age societies. [3] I would argue that this six-century span preceding 1450 BCE should perhaps be considered the *pre*- Minoan period. [4]

At a more general level, I am interested in the active ingredients in a society's *Weltanschauung* and behaviour, and firmly believe that gender characteristics need not necessarily be uncritically related to whether the



actors are biologically male or female. As an historian of Chinese and Japanese art, I propose to discuss Minoan archaeological remains in terms of structure and style in an attempt to derive possible implications regarding the social and spiritual orientation of this silent society. In short, I hope to show that while they were a Bronze Age people, the "Minoans" maintained - or adopted - certain behavioural patterns from the Neolithic inhabitants on whose site they built their palace of Knossos to whom they were arguably related in more ways than the purely physical. [5] To go one step further, I would like to suggest that the "Minoans" even while enjoying the technological advances of the Bronze Age, continued to live lives of open pacifism and relative egalitarianism characteristic of earlier, non-warring societies whose lives were regulated by foraging and gathering [6] or otherwise governed by spiritual attunement and ritual. [7] Implied here is the assumption that Bronze Age technology is usually associated with war-based societies and institutions, with concentrations of power and sharp social stratification as we see in Egypt, Sumer, Babylon, China - and, later, in Japan. While such an association may be unorthodox, I wish in this study to highlight what I consider the exceptional nature of Bronze Age Minoan civilization in this regard.

A serious problem lies in the designation of Minoan for entire Second Millennium BCE. For the separatist, exploitative and violence-based institutions that underlie the culture characterized by the tale of the Minotaur are entirely at odds with the holistic, broadly peaceful and worship-based lifestyle underlying archaeological remains of the Proto- and Neopalatial Periods (2000-1450 BCE) as we shall see below. On the other hand, such a fearsome tale seems to fit in much more readily with the more militaristic Mycenaeans (and their civilization marked with increasingly linear and stratified decoration in the ceramic ware) that appeared on Crete after the island-wide cataclysm that had finally brought their palatial civilization to an end around 1450 BCE. But during these previous six centuries when the island may have had an influx of Luvian immigrants from Asia Minor, [8] the palace-builders managed to create a high civilization that in certain crucial aspects was not maintained. We glean from their material remains a life of largely peaceful (and joyful) worship and (clearly very profitable) overseas contacts with central activities organized from the temple-palaces and serving the regions around them.

Such a society could not have produced a fear-motivated climate like that associated in legend with the ruthless and brutish Minotaur. That is to say, King Minos and his foreign conquests occurred *after* the arrival of the Mycenaean Greeks, or Achaeans, from the Peloponnese. They date to the *Mycenaean* period in Crete (after 1450 BCE) and not, as is widely believed even today in Crete, reflect activities occurring during the previous, or "Minoan", period. [9]

Archaeologists tend to refer to the entire pre-Conquest centuries as Minoan, and do not seem particularly disturbed by the shift in resident populations in the temple-palace complexes from "Minoan" towards Mycenaean after 1450 BCE, noting the changes in material culture largely in a context of unbroken, continuous habitation of the Palace at Knossos, for example.

But the earlier civilization represents to my mind a rare and perfect example of a society whose spatial, religious, economic and social organization was nurtured on the whole by an inclusive, integrative, *yin* or feminine consciousness; while the subsequent periods at Knossos under the Mycenaean Greeks, produced a culture that was bellicose, boundary-conscious, *yang* and masculine, or typical "Bronze Age" in character.

The Minoan civilization was so named by Sir Arthur Evans when he first excavated the site of Knossos near Heraklion in the opening years of the 1900s: uncovering its dazzling remains, he declared that he had found the Palace of King Minos. [10] This sage king was famed for the half-bull-half-man Minotaur who exacted annual tribute of twelve live youths and maidens



from Athens as recounted in Homeric legend (set down in the early eighth century BCE). Since scholarship tends to stick fast to precedents, for virtually a century the Palatial periods have therefore been subsumed under the name Minoan. For ease of reading, therefore, I shall in this paper follow convention and call this period Minoan - but with the caveat that I believe it to have *preceded* the time of King Minos of the Minotaur, and that the designation Minoan for the Palatial periods is anachronistic and misleading. [11]

Seen from a Chinese perspective, the six centuries (20th-15th centuries BCE) during which this civilization flourished coincided with China's late Longshan Neolithic [12], continuing into the Bronze Age of the Xia dynasty. [13] And when the Minoan world finally succumbed around 1450 BCE [14] China was coming into the high phase of her Shang Dynasty. In a Japanese context, Minoan civilization flourished during the latter centuries of her Mesolithic, or late Jōmon period, [15] characterized by the typical cord-marked pottery which, during these centuries, was showing clear signs of continental influence in a smoothing down of the surfaces, in the new typology that included pottery versions of rhyta and rounded pots with sharp long spouts similar in contours to those in prehistoric Bulgaria. [16]

With regard to what seems a gender-based approach to states of human consciousness, I do not offer a political or feminist stand, nor a psychologist's interpretation. In fact, in attributing one shade (one polarity) or the other to aspects of the visual art, to space and to tactile sensations, I seem to be venturing into fairly untried realms, having come across virtually no discussion by gender specialists, psychologists or aestheticians in quite the way I propose to offer my definitions here. While I am tempted to borrow comparisons like inclusive and exclusive, enfolding and dividing, or pliant and rigid, each pair seems too limited in its own way. The gender-related terminology I have decided finally to adopt here, is more in line with the broader traditional Chinese notions of *yin*, (implying pliancy, yielding, darkness, moisture, notions which the Chinese associate with feminine aspects of consciousness, and *not* necessarily with human females), and *yang* (implying the hard, unyielding, dominating, [17] straight, bright, fiery, which the Chinese associate with masculine aspects of consciousness - though not exclusively with men). To this already pregnant definition I would add a further aspect where by the feminine-*yin*consciousness tends more to the accommodating and holistic, implying knowledge of oneness and interconnectedness (unbounded wholeness), whereas the masculine-*yang* consciousness tends more to the exclusive, territorial, dissecting, hierarchical, implying compartmenta  
may offend some colleagues as simplistic or reductionist, the radical difference between a holistic and a divisive approach in society seems to me precisely that which distinguishes most peaceable and warlike peoples. The relatively egalitarian, holistic and crop-growing Neolithic settlements [18] with their communal burials were mostly matrilineal, [19] These aspects differ radically from the typical warring and walled-in Bronze Age societies. It is tempting to ascribe them respectively to predominance of the right and left hemispheres of the brain. Clearly human beings, biologically male or female, exhibit *both* tendencies in their consciousness, and it would be foolish to assign feminine consciousness as defined here to women, and masculine to men. Rather, we may see these tendencies as *polarities* of the same consciousness, and either may be in the ascendant under particular conditions. Let us assume therefore that genes, environment and upbringing condition people during their growth to favour and develop one aspect over the other.

Thus when I use the term feminine consciousness I do not mean that it refers to actions taken or choices made by *women*, nor do I mean the reverse when the term male consciousness is used. I mean only that the feminine or masculine aspect of our consciousness as a social group comes to the fore in the artwork (institution or behaviour) and becomes predominant. I would at the same time submit that society as a whole is conditioned by its ruling



bodies and will develop its culture as an accurate reflection of its predominant consciousness. I have therefore no political axe to grind in this paper, nor psychological battles to fight. Rather, it is a metaphysical problem I am tabling here. I hope by combining both the cogitative and the intuitive faculties, that is, the masculine and the feminine consciousness at my own disposal, to arrive at some kind of understanding and appreciation of how ascendancy of a particular consciousness in a society may so condition it as to affect the lives of all its members and its neighbours, for long periods at a time. I propose to transgress traditional academic boundaries that would confine explorative thinking to thoughts already verbalised by others by way of legitimization, and include in my discussion not only ideas and findings already published elsewhere, but some deductive "hunches" [20] based on my own previous researches in Chinese and Japanese art.

## **I. Background**

When, a century ago, Arthur Evans first excavated the site of Knossos in north central Crete, he uncovered a dazzling culture that stunned and delighted the Western world. Workmen found palaces or temples decorated with lively frescoes celebrating flora and fauna in a bright and breezy manner. They found no walled fortifications. They found little evidence of strife or human sacrifice. The ravishingly beautiful women in dark flowing curls and sensuous maquillage displayed to advantage their round and fully exposed breasts, wasp and waists, set off in their elaborate dresses as they sat in lively converse: the world gasped in admiration. The grace in their lifestyle, the apparent egalitarianism betwixt mortals and divinity, and the pacific architecture of the temple-palace complexes successively uncovered throughout the island have over the decades combined to produce a profile of the Minoan world that one art historian termed "the last of the nice civilizations." [21]

Recently women's study groups have widely promoted the Earth-Mother or Goddess concept in a host of studies and books, [22] films and video tape series. [23] Independently and as a result of group studies, the image of Minoan women mediating between celestial cycles and earthly fruition has kindled the minds of countless women as well as New Age researchers, cutting across racial, social, religious, and age barriers, it would appear, with unprecedented force. [24]

Perhaps in a swing of the emotional pendulum as a reaction to the infatuation with the youthful beauty presented by the Minoan world, the new generation of specialists in Minoan archaeology have come increasingly to question the rosy world view originally engendered by the Minoan finds: much of which, they contend, has been projected with elaborate gender baggage onto the Minoan world by the 1960s Flower-Power mentality, and more recently by feminists and the "New Age fringe." Adjustments in our understanding are being demanded by new evidence of child-sacrifice, [25] the reassertion of military capabilities, [26] and the reassessment of evidence for walled fortifications and strongholds [27] all of which have led some scholars to speculate on Minoan aggression in the Aegean. [28] Recent writings argue for a more detached view that would see the Minoans as not so unique or exceptional, but more similar in many ways to other Bronze Age cultures flourishing in the Aegean at that time. [29] The lack of historical writing from the Minoans themselves leaves us no verbal descriptions about their world, the argument goes, and care must be exercised not to impose on them a world view across four millennia which we have fashioned from our own twentieth-century rose-tinted lenses. While I admire such caution, I propose in this paper to uphold the earlier vision of the Minoans as rather exceptional in both artistic expression and, by inference, worldview.

## **Thesis and Methodological Approach**



I shall select certain facets from China's material culture to illustrate masculine-*yang* characteristics, and I shall choose from Japan's artistic heritage those aspects that reflect to my mind a feminine-*yin* consciousness. Since it is possible to corroborate our impressions with writings from these cultures both of which are well documented by their own written accounts, let us take some soundings, as it were, from China which has been recorded since the Shang era [30] on the one hand, and from the arts of Japan which began to be richly documented by writing since at least the eighth century CE, to describe in visual terms certain characteristic expressions of what may be regarded as gender-related consciousness.

First we may posit that the arts are true reflections or accurate material manifestations of the mindset of the people that created them. Once we identify certain clues for reading a society's arts as expression of its collective mindset, we can with some degree of assurance approach the mindset of peoples who have not left any writing.

That is, the cross-cultural art historian working with the arts of early literary societies who have described themselves in texts may, by sifting through their material culture, identify clues that reveal particular aspects of the mindset of a "silent" society like the Minoan. By analysing the structural and stylistic features of those arts selected from China that are largely informed by masculine consciousness, and those selected from the arts of Japan that in social tastes and mores are informed largely by a feminine consciousness (see discussion below), and where confirmation can be found in surviving writings, we may identify those characteristics that most directly reflect such mindsets. Then, with a greater degree of assurance, we may reverse the process and test the twin models against a reading of the unrecorded Minoan legacy.

At this point it is worth drawing attention to a notable difference between China and Europe around the eastern Mediterranean in their perception of fertility and the human anatomy. In Neolithic China, there seem to have been few instances of anthropomorphic representation aside from the rare instance of the head of a female deity (with inset eyes that appear to be blue) of baked clay uncovered beneath a caved-in shrine at Niuheliang in Western Liaoning Province, belonging to the Hongshan culture which has been dated somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 BCE. [31] There seems to be very little representations of deities from the Neolithic; and even less evidence relating the female body to agriculture or to fertility. [32] Of the Hongshan deity, found in a disturbed state, only the head was recovered, In the vicinity were found life-sized clay hands and feet which may have been votive offerings similar to those found in Minoan cave sanctuaries where pilgrims left behind representations of those parts of themselves they wished to have healed. [33] At Niuheliang there was a conspicuous absence in the figures' rendering of a stress on the reproductive cycle: genitals, abdomen and breasts. [34]

But in Asia Minor and the Levant, and by inference on the Aegean of the late-Neolithic and well into the Bronze Age, there was strong identification of the female body with apparent respect to its aspects of health, vitality and fertility. The earth both generated all bounty and received her dead. Early on in the Neolithic this association was expressed in stone and clay images of the Earth Mother or Earth Goddess, like the "Venus of Willendorf" (c. 25,000-20,000 BCE, Museum of Natural History, Wien) with her exaggerated breasts, prominent abdomen and clearly articulated genitals, or the Fertility Goddess from Cernavoda (Romania, c. 5,000 BCE, National Museum, Bucharest) of baked clay, with no articulation of the face, hands or feet (parts inessential to child-bearing) but whose reproductive parts are stressed with prominent elegance. In the Bronze Age which began in Mesopotamia in the late fifth millennium BCE (McCall, 1990, 32), Sumarians continued to worship the Fertility Goddess Inanna (Ishtar to the Babylonians). Early hymns to her reflect a literal association of the sexual act with vernal cultivation. Inanna sings of her own sexuality and her sexual organs:



My vulva, the horn,  
The Boat of Heaven,  
Is full of eagerness like the young moon.  
My untilled land lies fallow.  
As for me, Inanna,  
Who will plow my vulva?  
Who will plow my high field?  
Who will plow my wet ground?  
As for me, the young woman,  
Who will plow my vulva?  
Who will station the ox there?  
Who will plow my vulva?

(And here the King, Dumuzi, replies:)

Great Lady, the king will plow your vulva,  
I Dumuzi the king, will plow your vulva.  
(Wolkstein and Kramer, 1983, 37)

Elsewhere Inanna sings of her love-making with Dumuzi in pastoral terms:

I bathed for the wild bull,  
I bathed for the shepherd Dumuzi,  
I perfumed my sides with ointment,  
I coated my mouth with sweet-smelling amber,  
I painted my eyes with kohl.  
He shaped my loins with his fair hands,  
The shepherd Dumuzi filled my lap with cream and milk,  
He stroked my pubic hair,  
He watered my womb.  
He laid his hands on my holy vulva,  
He smoothed my black boat with cream,  
He quickened my narrow boat with milk,  
He caressed me on the bed.  
Now I will caress my high priest on the bed,  
I will caress the faithful shepherd Dumuzi,  
I will caress his loins, the shepherdship of the land,  
I will decree a sweet fate for him.  
(Wolkstein and Kramer 1983, 44) [35]

Here the goddess of fertility, pleased with the sexual prowess of the shepherd king and with his amorous techniques, grants him 'a sweet fate', - that is, fecundity of his flock. Agrarian economy, politics and sexuality are dynamically and inextricably fused in one single act. Conjunction - or indivisibility - of human physical desire, divine power, female sensibilities, affairs of state relating to agriculture and economy, appears entirely natural in the Inanna verses. Such literary documentation may help give voice to the silent testimony of Minoan society, where cult objects, often feminine in human sphere of reference are known everywhere. They are found not only in spaces especially designated for ritual practices, but in ordinary dwellings throughout the temple-palace complexes at Knossos and Phaestos. [36] We shall return to this indivisibility of functions later.

## **II. Gender-Consciousness Manifested in Cultural Artifacts of China and Japan**

For convenience and easy contrast, I here characterise the Chinese experience from the dawn of the Bronze Age (at the first half of the Second Millennium BCE [37]) as largely paternalistic, male-dominated, divisive, exclusive, fragmentary and boundary-conscious. And I characterise the Japanese experience of its long Mesolithic (from around the Eleventh Millennium to the Third Century BCE [38]), Shintôism [39] and its aristocratic aesthetic



developed in the Heian era (794-1185 CE) as one informed by a largely *yin* or feminine consciousness. [40]. This is not to deny the world of evidence in Chinese culture illustrating what I here term feminine consciousness (from the Yangshao of Majiayao to the wealth of material of the Warring States, especially Chu, as anyone remotely familiar with Chinese culture can at once see.) Nor do I deny the impressive evidence in Japan's cultural legacy of entirely masculine or *yang* characteristics. We can in fact very easily contrast what I term masculine and feminine aspects using material evidence of China, or of Japan, alone. It is not that I wish to paint China in a masculine mode and Japan in a feminine mode, but that I wish to make a broader cross-cultural exploration, and have therefore chosen in this study to use one particular aspect of each culture, in order to contrast some very strongly masculine aspect of Chinese Bronze Age culture (contemporaneous to Minoan Crete) with the very strongly feminine aspects of Japanese culture (which bear in some ways startling resemblances to Minoan art as we shall see - even though it post-dates Minoan Civilization by three millennia). I hope the reader will bear with this framework therefore and permit me to present the contrasts by this cross cultural means.

Chinese creation myths, for example, comparatively late in their collation and recording [41] include a giant male named Pangu, who lies down to rot and thus forms the mountains, rivers, and trees. Japanese creation myths recount how the divine pair, Izanagi and his sister Izanami, flew over the oceans and disgorged from their pearl spear heavenly droplets into the sea, thus forming the islands of Japan, and they produced among other deities the Sun Goddess Amaterasu-no-ô-Kami, ancestress of all Japanese. While these creation myths are doubtless much younger than their respective cultural histories, they nevertheless form a significant contrast in how these two peoples saw themselves (at the time of the genesis of these myths).

When in contact with artifacts we may experience, perhaps in the unconscious, a sense of gender when we encounter particular subject matter, particular manners of space-function, and particular patterns of interrelationships. We recognize in what we see that quality we most often associate with the *yang* -masculine, or with the *yin*-feminine. A sense of gender may also be evoked by inter-relationships of forms, of textures, by their relative mutual size, position, gesture or distance. We discern gender, again perhaps unconsciously, in chromatic choices, in their combinations, deployment and their inter-relationships.

As has been articulated in classical definitions of the archetypal male and female, features that evoke a sense of the feminine tend, on the whole, to give forth a sense of warmth, of enfolding and security, qualities associated early on with Mother. Here I wish to point out that an underlying yet subtle aspect of the feminine consciousness is an implicit knowledge of the interconnectedness of all things. [42] In other words, the absence of boundary lines, barriers, separation and segregation between all beings/things. Associated with this openness and integration is the sense of flexibility or pliability and adaptability. Photographs of the universe confirm this interconnectedness in Nature (feminine in our consciousness and with a capital N [43]): myriad concentrations of energy in various states of relative dynamic growth or decay, all interactive (butterfly wing to tornado) but without boundaries or barriers. Thus children of most known societies feel that Mother is the nurturer, gentle and approachable, for to them Mother represents fecundity, nurturing, and succor.

Features associated with the masculine side of our consciousness tend to be cool, logical, detached, regular, "severe": qualities we tend to associate with Father. Here a sense of boundaries, of territory, of distinctions and hence "a time and a place" for each thing or event, animate or inanimate, prevails. Closely allied is the sense of rigidity and inflexibility (in modern times often translated as strength, regularity and dependability.) This sense of



separateness, of isolatable and independently sustainable autonomy is consecrated on earth in the sole man-made object visible from the Moon: The Great Wall of China already begun in Bronze Age Shang, developed during the Warring States period, and connected by Qinshihuang in the Iron Age.

Later on we learn to look up to Father for knowledge in the Ways of the World, i.e. to external affairs. He is experienced often as the disciplinarian, the undisputed authority regarding all things outside the life cycle of feeding, clothing, and health. Indeed, *pater familias* is synonymous with authority. We feel safe in his strength, in his iron will. We admire (and fear) his vision and understanding of things far away, things unknown to us.

We tend therefore to feel like siblings with our mothers as we become adults, but with fathers the distance and the mutual sense of boundaries may never be bridged. Following from the above, let us isolate features in architecture, architectural space, in the arts and crafts that reveal such aspects, proceeding from public to private criteria.

### **a. Public Criteria**

**Architectural Proportions** that are human in scale and not oppressively large, engender a sense of the feminine. Human proportions in architecture can impart a personal, intimate and warm feeling, and make the individual feel enfolded, included, associated with and part of the space and its significance. [44] Non-human proportions, with high ceilings and doors over twice that of an average man's height and so proportioned as to appear larger-than-life, tend to dwarf, and to create a sense of smallness in the individual. By extension, such imbalance makes one feel unequal, hence separated or alienated from the space, and from what it stands for. Typical illustrations are the ways we create our spiritual or divine spaces: Buddhist temples scaled in Chinese imperial style, have vast Main Halls where the devotees are dwarfed by the doors and red columns as they prostrate before the golden, reflective images often three times life-size set on pedestals much higher than eye level. The feeling thus induced is not too different from the duality ingrained from the start in Christendom where supplicant and Almighty God (here Amituofuo Buddha) occupy separate loci in the consciousness, where the devotees' task is to seek reconciliation, pity, mercy, praying God will look their way and grant their wish. [45] This feeling of awe and dread evoke a sense of the *yang* or masculine.

On the other hand, many of the human-scaled Japanese Zen meditation halls devoid of icons, with their low ceilings and human-sized walls and doors, re-enforce our sense of Inner Perfection. The central lesson of the Buddha, as those of all realised beings, that Perfection is Within, is supported by architecture which underscores the indivisible unity of the divine and the mortal, thus bringing the pilgrim to inner contemplation. Only then can the quest begin for the Buddha Nature inside oneself, - only when one is not reaching outward for the Great Buddha glowing separately on a distant pedestal. Even though the disciplinarian routines of Zen practice are severe and unequivocal and masculine in character, the seekers' feeling of ease and of rootedness in the Zendô space is generated by a distinctly feminine consciousness of belonging, being one with and within the space(/universe).

**Space-Allocation and Spatial Functions** also reveal gender consciousness. A building organized along principles of formal bilateral symmetry, in which each room is assigned its unique, unchangeable function, becomes a predictable constant. Too many a priori conditions exert a sense of tyrannical authority over the inhabitants who in turn feel encaged, confined. Such are the pre-ordained constraints of traditional Chinese domestic dwelling, temple and palace architecture, - whose inhabitants would not dream of changing rooms. There was no hope of trying to exchange the dining area for the study, of moving the in-laws to the periphery, or even of giving the emperor a sunnier location. Spatial organizational rigidity and architectural dominion over

social conduct has been generic in China since the first palaces were built upon their rammed-earth hangtu foundations in the early Bronze Age. City walls separated barbarians from civilized folks, and palace-complex walls separated rulers from the ruled. Palace- and room-size were determined a priori, in accordance with column diametres, and the roof's pitch and span.

Such rigid and authoritarian utilization of space represents the *yang* -male consciousness in us that would create Order with a capital O. Mobility and intercourse within such regulated spaces became subject from the beginning therefore, to powerful regulation. Locked within a priori spatial definitions, human action was controllable and controlled.

Japanese architecture, on the other hand, is distinctly feminine in aspect and impact. With its relatively indeterminate use of space, flexibility in expanding or contracting room-sizes by means of removable sliding doors, it stresses multiple uses of space. Movable things are stored away into oshi-ire (closets). At different times, different activities take place in the same room - without impaling onto it a particular purpose with any permanence. Thus a room may serve as reception space for tea and chats with guests, for a family card or mahjong game, the evening meal, the children's homework, or, finally, it becomes the sleeping space for as many as would like to, at that time, drag their bedding onto its tatami floor. For each new occasion, furnishings, utensils, or books of the preceding function are removed and a new arrangement is given space to accommodate the new function. The sense of flexibility and multi-tasking is typically associated with Mother, who aside from gardening, bathing the children and cooking for the family, is charged with laundry, sewing, teaching, entertaining, accounting, tending the sick, or indeed of mourning. These have been the tasks, performed by the same woman, and often in the same space.

**Surface curvature** plays a role as well. Straight lines and curves engender a sense of male and female qualities respectively, associated with rigidity or flexibility, with strictness or pliancy. Thus contours with rounded corners, curved roofs, or cars with rounded bodies, feel feminine, while straight-sided, blocky, angular structures (including motor vehicles) with predominantly flat contours feel masculine.

By extension, groupings of paving stones or massing of building blocks that are natural or irregular in shape feel feminine, while walls or roads faced with angular blocks, predictable and even, evoke the masculine. Here we cite the courts and walkways of the Forbidden Palace in Beijing, designed to be smooth and straight, as masculine. Large effort had been expended to produce building blocks of equal size as in the Pyramids, so that regularity, regulatability, predictability, and efficiency are assured in the workmanship, and a sense of control can be achieved.

In contrast, we may perceive the irregular paving stones lining the meandering mossy paths that lead to the Japanese teahouse as *yin* or feminine. Stones of different shapes, sizes, textures and colours are brought together to make a flowing and harmonious pattern. The grouping is entirely irregular, but pleasing and imbued with a sense of life because of its ever-changing aspect. Beneath this association may lie experiences with Mother who loves her children by acknowledging their differences, who nurtures each child in the particular way it requires. This is in contrast to Father who tends to set unequivocal rules or codes to be observed by all regardless of age, gender, temperament or health - in the name of fairness and justice.

In England, a further extension of this comparison can be made between the straight roads built by Roman legions that penetrate space unbending and feel distinctly masculine, and both earlier and later pathways that twist and curve along the contours of mountains or streams, and impart a sense of closeness with Nature, a *yin* or feminine feel.



## b. Personal Criteria

**Texture** is another factor. Here the hard, shiny surface tends to impart a sense of coolness and distance. We slip on shiny surfaces. In another sense, shiny surfaces reject us. By contrast, rough surfaces feel warm, and exude a sense of enfolding as in a nest. Thus formal occasions call for halls, furnishings, even clothing, with shiny surfaces like marble, lacquered wood, taffetas, velvets, silks or brocades. The relatively reflective (rejecting) surfaces appear to hide the interior (or private feelings), revealing nothing of themselves but reflecting only the exterior, evoking a sense of impersonal space and of distance. This is perceived by our male-consciousness as dignity appropriate to formal occasions. Indeed, male-dominated autocratic societies have created such as St. Peter's Basilica based on earlier imperial models, just as Chinese palaces, grand temples and stately homes are paved and covered with glistening surfaces with the same intentions.

Thus marble walls, pillars and columns, or lacquered wooden doors and posts gleaming red, glazed roof tiles shining in green or imperial yellow, being reflective surfaces, seem masculine and formal. We feel distant from them. And walls covered with natural fibre, bark, textile or rough, unpainted wood, even stucco, pillars of natural wood, and thatched roofs, like knobby woolly sweaters, feel feminine and warm, cozy like a bird's nest.

Chinese imperial architecture's stress on glossiness and smoothness, on surfaces that look hard and permanent, achieves physical representation of authority and legitimacy appropriate to the perennial patriarch. That is, it reflects the awesome, subjugative imperial system. The unequivocal quality reflected by entirely even and smooth surfaces, a quality that suggests firmness and permanence, reliability - qualities favoured by the silk-loving Chinese and, for example, by Chinese calligraphers in their choice of "unblemished" paper, and by potters in the smoothness and firmness of their porcelains. Japanese architecture, by contrast, strove at all times to provide textural interest (except when overtly trying to imitate Chinese or Western masculine models). Even the most formal structure imaginable such as the Shishinden, the emperor's residence during the Heian period, had by imperial request no lacquered pillars with that startling crimson colour and high gloss, but featured architectural members all in plain, unadorned wood. The Heian Court preferred the relatively soft, matte, fibre-woven tatami floor matting, and a thatched roof. [46] Indeed, for the historical period in world civilizations, it was during the heydays of Fujiwara stewardship in Japan that the feminine consciousness was given the scope to come into full flowering. And poets and painters, male more than female, gave vent to one of the most refined expressions of human sensitivity ever witnessed on earth. [47]

Japanese love of rough, tactile, "woolly" surfaces is evident since the 7th millennium BCE with the emergence of cord-marked Jōmon pottery. And long after knowledge of the wheel had made it possible to turn out even-walled and smooth-surfaced pots, Japanese craftsmen continued to prefer hand-fashioned wares with "accidental" surface interest such as blisters and irregularities. By the 17th c. CE, tea masters came to name their favoured tea bowls each of which, with its particular set of imperfections, was unique and easily recognizable as "an individual". The names are imbued with poetic feeling full of nostalgia.

Here an interesting emotional feature underlies the Japanese preference for textures, - even for imperfection. Gompertz reports that a Japanese connoisseur had explained that Chinese porcelains were rarely left on his display table for longer than a day, for they "wait for no one" whilst a Korean or Japanese pot, because of its unique set of imperfections which, much like words felt but left unsaid, could stir in the viewer a sense that the pot would "wait for one". [48] Implied in this extraordinary statement is the need, on the part of the (art) lover, to interact with the beloved (artworks), to take part in the creation and re-creation of the intended form and potential perfection



which, in these particular specimens, remain uniquely, and poignantly, forever frozen in the realm of immanence.

**Colours** can impart a sense of gender. [49] For example, primary colours like red, blue, yellow, green (white and black, the total reflection [50] and the total absorption of light), feel *yang* and masculine because they appear strong, unequivocal, independent, uncompromising and non-compromised.

Mixed hues like magenta, pink, mauve, aquamarine, oranges and ochres, etc., created by combining two or more primary colours, feel at once more feminine, because unconsciously the eye discerns mixture, and by association the yielding, accommodation, self-adjustment that takes place - processes associated with the *yin* and feminine.

**Colour interrelationships** likewise evoke a sense of gender. Combinations forming sharp and stark contrasts (as in most national flags, and like the shiny marble walls and floors of major structures), create a sense of formality, of easy identification, of pellucid clarity. Black and white, black and red, red and green etc., make stark contrasts that excite the retina.

On the other hand, close-harmonies, different shades of ochre next to mauves, pinks, oranges, or a series of blue-based mixtures applied in close proximity, impart a sense of intimacy, almost of secrecy. Retinal excitement is notably less intense. By analogy, the decibel count is lower, and one senses these softened hues like a group of muted voices whispering softly together. This has a *yin* or feminine feeling.

Thus we acknowledge in China a notable love for stark contrasts, for the grand *yang* or masculine statement on universal truths, for paintings of hoary mountains in cosmic majesty, and in calligraphy for jet black ink that penetrates with unequivocal incisiveness the pristine white surface.

And in contrast we acknowledge in Japan a notable preference for the muted expression in all things from poetry to conversation to all the tangibles in daily life. [51] the equivocal and often unfinished sentence where emotions are deeply felt but left unexpressed, the intimate awareness of the temporary nature of life itself and the fragility of ideals, the impermanence of things, etc. The sigh implied behind their cultural expression, that "Ah-ness of things, mono-no aware" which informed Heian courtly art, produced calligraphy written (on the whole by men) in delicate emotive scrawls that flowed down in columns of unequal length and verticality, upon collage paper that had been hand-torn and stained and tinted in hues of close harmonies. Outstanding examples illustrating the quintessence of Japanese aesthetic sensibilities include, among others, the Sanjû-roku-nin-kashû, a selection of poems of the Thirty-Six Immortal Poets, inscribed by celebrated calligraphers of the Heian Court to celebrate the emperor's sixtieth birthday in the year 1112, the illustrated narrative scrolls of the Tale of Genji, and the Taira clan-commissioned illustration of the Lotus Sûtra (Hokkekyô, also known as the Heike-Nôgyô or Taira Offertory), breathtaking works surviving from Japan's Golden Age. [52] And they epitomize the feminine consciousness in historical times.

\* \* \*

## The Minoan Evidence

With the above descriptions and definitions of *yin* and *yang* characteristic in visual terms in mind, let us review the Minoan archaeological evidence.

### a. Architecture

The Minoan temple-palace complex of Knossos was built c. 1900 BCE, large over the Neolithic settlement tell which had been in continuous habitation



through at least ten successive building levels since 6,000 BCE comprising, and I think significantly, the largest Neolithic settlement in all Europe. [53] The Minoan structural complex, like those in existence at the same time at Phaestos, Aghia Triada, Archanes, Mallia and Zakro, was built on an agglomerate plan: one subject to easy, organic expansion. [54]

The basic principles of spatial organization, and of function-designation, are in clear contrast with those of Chinese architectural principles since the Bronze Age.

**Walled fortification?** At Knossos no evidence of walled fortifications has been revealed, though candidates exist in the First Palace period for such at Mallia and a concern for security is argued for the so-called 'forts' at the east of the island. [55] The typical palace layout - relatively open and unbounded - would not have been conceived without unquestioned assurance of either peace or an effective system of defense; and, as we see by its massive storage areas, a continued agricultural surplus. [56] The Knossian layout also speaks of the interrelatedness of all things: of ruler and ruled; and - as is clear from the many interior courts and lightwells - of sun and shade, of inside and outside, and again of the various spheres of Nature and the Spirit, as seen in the many remaining frescoes of plants, animals, humans, and divinities. I would argue that such interrelatedness, the unbounded oneness with given conditions, speaks of a *yin* or feminine consciousness.

**Outward growth.** Unlike the builders of the hangtu palace foundations in China who defined a priori the boundaries and size, forever precluding outward expansion of the same building, the Minoans reserved as their central court such space as was needed for their various ceremonies (perhaps including the sport of bull-leaping). Around this reserved area, moving outwards and upwards, they added rooms as needs dictated - a manner of construction that has its roots in the so-called agglomerative approach of the houses of the Early Bronze Age.

The consciousness that begins a project by defining its outer limits, thus confining future processes to present limitations, tends to produce a growing set of boundaries and limitations. It tends to lead the rulers to subdivide, to impose further internal boundaries in order to accommodate the demands that will arise with the increase in population, knowledge, and experience. A priori boundaries generate subsequent rules and procedures to accommodate growing priorities and such an approach is doomed to increasing pressure, stratification, and sometimes oppression which can be expressed in social, economical, political, or even spiritual terms.

The Minoan approach to space (and probably to society) was, I argue, based on an assumption of peace and on relative egalitarianism (see below). Architectural growth thus proceeded in an organic way, adding and expanding in all directions physically possible. There appeared to be few a priori limitations. [57]

**Interrelatedness of spatial functions.** A feature of Minoan architecture that may be remarkable to modern eyes is the close proximity of spaces assigned to the disparate activities that today occupy separate institutions. Especially notable is the easy accessibility to the areas of "cult rituals" and a pervasive religious atmosphere. Where in some societies "temple" and "palace" are easily distinguished by their structure, placement and internal characteristics, in Minoan Crete these seemed to have been more fused, so that the complexes have been called either palace or temple, depending on the particular archaeologist's predisposition. However, I would submit that the verbal division is peculiar to the contemporary scholar's mind - but not particularly to the Minoans' own concept of space. Apparently 'separate' activities (and their spaces) appear rather to have been entirely integrated - or at least undivided one from the other. Thus close to the central sanctuaries and adyton (sacred areas sunken beneath the floor level, the so-called lustral



basins) stood the rows of narrow storage rooms with their massive ceramic pithoi and under-floor cists filled with grains, wines, and oils, and likewise workshops where craftsmen carved ivories and stones, and produced items of faience, ceramic, metal and more perishable materials. Marinatos (1984), perceptively stresses the inter-relationship between religion and economy in relation to the domestic sanctuaries which are connected with one or more of industrial activities such as grinding grain, storage of produce and preparation and consumption of common meals. [58]

This is in contrast with architectural zoning of most other Bronze Age societies which reserved a single area for worship, apart from all other "profane" areas, and sometimes from administrative seats of "earthly power". Minoan thinking not only set areas aside exclusively for ritual activities, but further vessels of a ritual type were found in rooms primarily for dwelling or work purposes. This suggests that while a specialized group of people may have performed special rituals in the special sacred rooms, spiritual life was not their monopoly, that other people were not far from aspects of worship. [59] There is no doubt that a ruling person or group lived in these temple-palaces, but we know also that they were not separated from the artisans, smiths or wine-makers. We must therefore infer a ruling elite who singly or as a group were charged with spiritual or psychic attunement with the divine, who at the same time supervised all these activities without a sense of hierarchy [60] or segregation. And we must acknowledge the probability that on a daily basis priest(esse)s and leather-worker(s) rubbed shoulders.

What can we infer from such unity of activity and behaviour long subsumed elsewhere under separate and autonomous domains? I have referred to the Minoan sites as temple-palace complexes, requiring two words. If we were to be thorough, we should say "religious, economic, agriculture-administration, craft, and dwelling centre". These diverse activities have over the centuries become distinct provinces which in modern societies have supported mammoth governmental ministries each with its own separate building complexes and autonomous administration. The divisions have become sharp both politically and spatially and, significant in this context, in the minds of scholars, who today "specialize" usually in only one of the compartmentalized "disciplines".

## **b. Frescoes**

The especially "nice" qualities that have long impressed the world about the Minoan frescoes come not only from the subject matter, but also from their forms and colouration as well as the interrelatedness of the visual elements which, together, evoke a sense of joy, of peace and harmony. Although recent scholarship has tended to play down the differences between the Minoan world view and that of other Aegean civilizations, I wish here to explore the mindset underlying not only the subject matter, but its treatment in visual terms, highlighting what I consider a subtle but radical difference in basic outlook - and hence social behaviour.

**The subject matter**, long celebrated among lovers of Minoan art, is unusual for Bronze Age societies in that it does not obviously immortalize brutality and martial conquests, but celebrates everyday things readily visible at the time. Often entire walls were decorated, not with exotic subjects or fear-inspiring images, but with familiar images of frolicking dolphins, swimming fishes, garden-variety field lilies in bloom, octapi in motion, doves or swallows in flight or nesting, and most striking, the many group-portraits of beautiful women with long black curls, clad in wasp-waisted culottes and tight bodices, engaging in animated conversation, where one among them may be a priestess or goddess. [61] Male figures, usually as lithe youth - some naked, some with sumptuous kilts or loin-cloths - are depicted at times in more active postures - offering fresh-caught fish, boxing with gloves (at Akrotiri in Thera), or processing in rows holding huge rhyta of sacral libation (in Knossos). [62] Rooms with three contiguous walls celebrating the same themes without



division or interruption have been uncovered in tact on the island of Thera [63] and in Crete. [64] A common theme seen also in Knossos is of blue monkeys [65] gathering saffron pollen. These are not however, pictures without meaning: all objects and actions carry a symbolic significance. [66]

Of great significance is the intimate nature of the subjects which contrasts, for example, with those of the Chinese Bronze Age featuring fear- and awe-inspiring monster masks, the taotie, and registers of mysterious kui- dragons, all rendered as abstractions unseen in nature. Minoan images are rendered naturalistically, although in flat colouration with little shading, but with recognition clearly intended.

Equally significant is the relative egalitarianism implied in the paintings. Nowhere does one figure excessively dominate others in size, in detail of rendering or in posture. Among a group of female figures, for instance, the central priestess (or goddess) is identifiable only because others face or are processing towards her. This relative egalitarianism is perhaps confirmed archaeologically by the lack of tombs or tomb-furnishings that are extravagantly, or by several degrees, more imposing than the general run: such as are typical of autocrats - a practice that accompanied all other Bronze Age societies, from Egypt to China, even to Bronze Age Japan. [67] However, this should not be thought to imply a sort of primitive communism: central figures (male or female) of authority can be discovered in various media, [68] but they may involve a broader group of people than just a ruling family or two. Significant also is the size of the faience statues of goddesses who stand, never much over one foot in height, bare-breasted and trance-like with dilated eyes, sometimes holding snakes. These were possibly related to the principal Minoan Earth Goddesses - but were never perceived or constructed in super-human size, as the statue of Athena was made, a thousand years later in Athens, thirty-foot tall to tower over men, striking beholders with fear and awe.

Comparable instances of continuation of the same theme across different wall planes without interruption around the corners can be found only in Japanese fusuma-e and shōji sliding door painting developed in Heian times. Scenes from the same landscape, or floral motifs, evocations of the four seasons, progress along the four walls of a room, enfolding its space. This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese preference for disposition of particular images (deemed suitable, sometimes exclusively) to each of the Four Directions. Here is another instance contrasting the holistic and the separatist *Weltanschauung*.

**Curves and Straight Lines** in Minoan painting tend to be used for natural and man-made motifs respectively. Landscape elements in particular tend to sine-curved rhythmic undulations upon the walls, and rocky hills sprouting lilies, rise and fall much as the seashore contours ebb and wane in the marine frescoes, but with more emphasis.

The remarkable Knossean fragments of twin doves hatching their eggs, or a bird among reeds, show a love of bright but close colour-harmonies and curving forms that is seen too in Heian Japan among the collage-formed calligraphy papers of the Thirty-Six Poets where tissues of different texture, hues and designs are cut straight edge or hand-torn with rounded curves and pasted together to form abstract yet soft, rolling rhythms with a rich emotional resonance.

**Ceramics** from Minoan sites, especially those named Kamares ware (after the cave site near Phaestos whence the first group was discovered), are marked with lively patterns, abstract curves and spirals, as well as figural paintings of plant and marine life. [69] Here I wish to draw attention to the unique and complete fusion of form and decor which other Eastern societies seem to have left behind with the onset of the Bronze Age. [70] Chinese bronze vessels, departing from the unified decor of the Neolithic Yangshao, are marked with



registers or zones separating neck, belly and foot of the vessel, each of which may be decorated with different motifs, in different sizes. In this way a different statement, unrelated to the vessel itself, is made using the vessel, through which a division is projected between the high, the middle and the low.

Minoan ceramics in general, classic Kamares in particular, show the painter harmonizing his work with that of the potter, flaring his design where the vessel flares, bringing it inwards where the form tapers. Thus we find an octopus embracing a round pot, fully utilizing its tremulous tentacles to enfold and to highlight the spherical dynamics of the flask. Or plants that grow and taper upwards along the swelling and shrinking contours of a tall vase.

Such fusion, oneness, or interconnectedness of decor and form, is not commonly encountered - an exception being China's Northern Song (960-1126 CE) ceramics where incised or impressed floral motifs entirely occupy the centre of a bowl. It is most prominent again in the East in Japanese ceramics which over the Mesolithic Jōmon (11,000-300 BCE), in the Heian (794-1185) lacquer ware, and in Rimpa School (16th to 19th centuries CE) crafts of diverse media, which cover a bowl or a box entirely with a single continuous motif, unifying it, crawling over its entire surface without breaking to acknowledge the different planes. I would like to include such oneness under the *yin* aspect of human consciousness, in contrast to the separatist *yang*. [71]

### Colouration

Minoan colours [72] are bright, pan-chromatic, and move in lively combinations. Notable here is the use of matte crimson on the walls and pillars. Not especially bright and shiny, but matte and muted. Moreover in the frescoes the colours are always in notable close proximity: next to each other we find fluid swaths of ochres, yellows, aquamarine, grey, brick-red, brown and mustard, though this must in part be put down to the use of natural, often mineral, sources for the pigments. The similarity to Heian courtly painting is remarkable and one is forced to consider the impact of aristocratic women on the formation of court aesthetics in *yin*-oriented societies as a factor of major cultural importance.

## IV. Conclusion

To understand the significance of Minoan culture today, it is important that we re-examine the mindset from which we ourselves proceed to do the understanding, and reconsider our own particular assumptions about society and utilization of time, space and our interrelationships with each other.

We live in an age of propaganda through mass media, and most societies of the industrialized world have come to share the achievement-oriented world view. The GNP is expected to grow each year - based on expansion that in turn depends on take-overs or conquests (but always at the expense of other parties). In a world of "we" and "they" where compartmentalization and stratification have been ingrained in our minds the separateness of nations, races, classes, disciplines, earth-destructive ideas such as dumping "our" nuclear wastes onto "their" land can not only be readily conceived, but usually go unchallenged. Not that there is anything new in this latest manifestation of man's inhumanity.

Our approach to the past may therefore be based on assumptions of multiple agencies, separate in function and location, and an assumption of political authority of the type we have been used to since the Bronze Age. And in scholarship we naturally tend to see the "Minoan" civilization in the same way.

But if we impose relative institutional parity between Minoan Crete on the one hand and Pharaonic Egypt and the other Imperial powers of the Middle and Far



East on the other, we need to explain the apparent difference between the nature of the surviving material culture of the last set and that of the Minoan - little of which involves the glorification of brute force, killing and conquests as evinced in the artistic legacies of those societies.

But if we remember that Knossos, the largest and most sumptuous of the Minoan temple-palace sites, was built over the largest Neolithic settlement in Europe - and one which for a very large part of its existence had no rivals or even peers on the island, we may consider the possibility that the Bronze Age culture that developed in part from it in the Prepalatial period may well have had social restraints in place to minimize violence and territorial aggression. Much of the proposed Neolithic egalitarianism and the deep-rooted concerns for earth-nurturing activities, for peace and harmony may have survived to influence Bronze Age attitudes and developments. The abundant - and evidently most attractive - existing female-engendered contributions in the spheres of spiritual and psychic practices may have lasted longer and more effectively. Like the Sumerian song of Inanna which stems directly from Neolithic fertility goddess consciousness, Minoan civilization could have developed by fusing Bronze Age world-experiences with Neolithic knowledge of universal forces.

Thus it would not be surprising to find the architecture imbued throughout with reference to what we today call "cult" and "ritual" activities and appurtenances. It would be more natural for people to be living and working in the temple-palace complexes with heart and mind in a state of relative spiritual alertness.<sup>[73]</sup> Was Minoan life so imbued with ritual activity that such alertness became second-nature? Contemporary Western communities like Findhorn in Northern Scotland have over only a few decades turned the erstwhile barren land declared by agricultural experts to be unsuitable for cultivation of any kind into a flourishing miracle of vegetables and flowers, scents extracted of which have been extracted for aromatic and homeopathic therapy, and distributed all over the world. The single ingredient binding the entire community is the state of prayer that as it were resounds from the depths of each soul. Thus it is not remarkable that activities which we today perceive to be subsumed under separate domains like "government", "religion", "economy", "trade", "food-production industry" etc., were intimately "related" in Minoan society. Rather, I would submit, that in Minoan Crete, these activities had not been separately institutionlised or given autonomy.

We may in conclusion consider the probability that it was a particular internal condition that underlay all aspects of Minoan life. That Minoans, at least the elite whose cultural remains comprise the bulk of our archaeological data, may have lived in spiritual and probably also psychic connectedness at all times with the invisible forces at work in the universe. And it was this interconnectedness which four millennia ago sparked their civilization with such dazzling life and beauty, and which today rekindles in us memories of a long lost sense of oneness and liberation.

#### **- ENDNOTES -**

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1. King Minos of the Minotaur fame aside, Minos may have meant ruler or king. Many King Minoses might be assumed to have ruled from the Palace at Knossos, and perhaps also at other sites on Crete.
2. Such an idea surfaces periodically to the conscious level and, most recently, has been expounded by James Lovelock (1979) in *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*, Oxford, and in a follow-up (1988) *The Ages of Gaia: A Biography of our Living Earth*, Oxford.
3. As for example in the foundation of the Mesopotamian walled town of Habuba Kabira in the middle Euphrates around 3500 BCE (Reade, 1991, 22), or the earliest walled town excavated in northern China to date in the Longshan layers at Chengzi-yai of around the early third millennium BCE, where the top section of the



wall was about 9 metres and the original height about 6 metres. "Surely this massive town wall hints at two new characteristic features at least of the Lung-shan culture: the first construction of a public nature to have required enormous labor force, and the first erection of a defensive wall by a prehistoric settlement." (Chang, 1986, 248) Together with the walled town, archaeologists uncovered tomb clusters in which the furnishings became sharply differentiated. "This is the earliest example of a burial pattern associated with the stratified lineage society of ancient China that is seen often hereafter." (*Ibid.*, 249). Minoan sites are characterized by the lack of walled fortifications, and the lack of highly differentiated tomb furnishings, suggesting an absence of recurrent warfare and absence of significant concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few.

4. Or Luvian (that Homer called Kydonian), or Asia Minor, or Oriental period? (See note 6 below).
5. The question of whether the Bronze Age Minoans were essentially evolved from the Neolithic holders of the island or the result of considerable immigration in the fourth Millennium BCE is still well debated: Evans (1994) 19; Hood (1990a) 151 ff and (1990b) 367 ff; Broodbank (1992) 68.
6. René Lorraine (1993) summarizes the several studies on the aesthetic activity of African foragers, and on statistical studies of the relationships of social structures and song and dance styles in contemporary societies by anthropologist Alan Lomax on the one hand, and the "matriarchal aesthetic" offered by philosopher Heide Göttner-Abendroth based on her broad knowledge of ancient myths and art on the other, noting the remarkable similarity of their conclusions which include, among others and significant in the present enquiry, that egalitarianism is characteristic of societies where women enjoy high social status.
7. Unlike most other ancient cultures where animals, especially those that are not easily domesticated, and humans are pictured together in a state of psychological tension and threat, the relationship of human beings and "dangerous animals" in Minoan Crete are represented in a state of harmony, cooperation and what to present-day viewers may appear even to be "fun." For example, the famous bull-leaping scene represented in Minoan frescoes and carvings, the *taurokathapsia*(taurokaqayua) or bull-purification game show men and women leaping toward the bull, grasping its horns and somersaulting over it. There are never any weapons depicted in such scenes. "The purpose of the games has never been certain: no weapons were used and no scenes of the animals' death have ever been found. A part of the spring festival, the bull games were dedicated to the goddess Ariadne. Her sacred knot and her pillar shrine are found on frescoes and gems of the ritual. In some instances, her shrines overlook the arenas in which the acrobatic feats were carried out." ( Johnson, 1988, 298) Or, in the faience statuettes of the Snake Goddess, we find such descriptions as "The Snake Goddess bends to the snakes, not by imitating their snaky movements, but by holding their movements and letting them vibrate through her...Her dance is a joyful celebration of openness to difference, of the wondrous softness and openness of the human body, of its ability to bend to the swirling lines of nature.....The Minoan delight, as we have discussed, is not in the mastery of another but in the taking up and holding of another's movements." (Bigwood, 1993, 178,179).
8. Homer's suggestion that these ancient peoples of Crete were Achaeans, Eteocretans, Kydonians, Dorians and Pelasgians has been debated. Modern scholars have offered various opinions, but none conclusive. Evans himself believed that the advent of the Minoan (pre-Mycenaean) civilization was related to the arrival on the island of refugees from Lybia. Davis, according to Alexiou (1969, 127) believes that the Phaistos Disk (believed to be the earliest form of hieroglyphic writing found on the island) represents writing related to Hittite. Gaining greater acceptance is the theory that the "Minoans" were Luvians, a people from south-western Asia Minor: "Another interpretation would see the Kydonians as Luvians, a people from south-western Asia Minor...(regarding) Minoan connections with Asia Minor: Herodotus reported that the Termilians of Lycia believed themselves to be descendants of colonies who had come to Asia Minor with Sarpedon from Crete.

About 1600 BC the king of Knossos expelled Sarpedon from Cretan Milatos, whence the fugitive moved to the Asian coast and founded Miletos. If the Termilians descended from those who accompanied him did not change their language completely later on, then the implication is that an early form of the Lycian tongue was current on Crete. Termilian, or Lycian, is a Luvian dialect." (Cotterrell 1979, 66-67)

9. This is, obviously, a personal reading of the legends. I am aware of the question of the thalassocracy attributed to Minos by Thucydides: see in a 'Minoan' expansion into the Cyclades, and further afield to the Near East and Asia Minor in the later part of the First Palaces continuing into the Second: Hägg and Marinatos (1984) several articles. I do not argue against this having happened, but rather propose that the myths refer to the later and short period when the Mycenaeans were exploiting the island directly (c. 1450-1375).
10. An interesting account is Arthur Evans and the *Palace of Minos* prepared by Anne Brown of the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, which holds the largest collection of Minoan antiquities outside of Crete. Sir Arthur Evans was Keeper of the Museum from 1884 to 1908, and continued to be closely associated with the Museum until his death in 1941.
11. For a Western art historian's challenge to Homer's dating, and a different discussion of this problem, see Barbara Ward, *In Search of Theseus*, London 1967.
12. The clear indication of the knowledge and ritual uses of metals (perhaps beaten rather than cast) which is indicated by the typology of Longshan "egg-shell" blackware is irrelevant to this enquiry and shall not be entered into here. Suffice it to say that by 1977 two metal awls were excavated at the Longshan site of Sanlihe, of copper alloyed with zinc, with some lead and tin (*Kaogu* 1977.4, 267 and *Wenwu* 1981.6, 47), and that I believe the lustrous blackware phase of Longshan culture to have been product of a typical metal-working society.
13. On the question of whether the Erlitou phase of the early Bronze Age was of the Xia or Shang dynasty, the geographical, that is relatively westerly location of sites coinciding with traditional accounts of Xia cities has persuaded many archaeologist, including Chang Kwang-chih, of the former (Chang, 1986, 316).
14. Around 1700 BCE (or earlier), a severe earthquake, or a series of them, destroyed all the First Palaces. They were promptly rebuilt, giving rise to the Neopalatial Period. Later, around the time and preceeding the Thera eruption, further extensive damage necessitated more substantial rebuilding as can be argued from the physical record. But we are still a generation or two away from the 1450 deadline - firmly in the "Minoan" phase. The absolute chronology of all this continues to be debated: see, for example a recent conference on Thera. More recent probes based on frost rings and sediments of volcanic sulphur in Greenland ice-cores, etc. M. Marthari, 'The chronology of the last phases of occupation at Akrotiri in the light of the evidence from the West House pottery groups', in D. A. Hardy and A. C. Renfrew (eds.) *Thera and the Aegean World III.3: Chronology, Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Santorini Greece...1989* (London, 1990), 57-70; J.S. Soles and C Davaras, 'Theran ash on in Minoan Crete: new excavations on Mochlos', *ibid.* 89-95; P. Betancourt, P. Goldberg, R. Hope Simpson and C. J. Vitaliano, 'Excavations at Pseira; the evidence for the Thera eruption', *ibid.* 96-9; T. Marketou, 'Santorini, Thera from Rhodes and Kos: some chronological remarks based on stratigraphy', *ibid.* 100-113, and the informative summary of the radio-carbon dating results by S. W. Manning, 'The Thera eruption: the third congress and the problem of the date', *Archaeometry* 32 (1990), 91-100. The first series of tri-partite divisions devised by Arthur Evans has been revised and the idea of an absolute chronology itself has been debated. G. Walberg, "Middle Minoan Chronology: Relative and Absolute," in *High, Middle or Low*, Part I (Götebrog, 1987); W. Hankey, "The Chronology of Aegean Late Bronze Age," in *idem*, Part 2 (Götebrog 1987); Ph. Betancourt, *Archaeometry* 29 (1987), 212-13; P. Warren, *ibid.*, 205-11. A chronology agreed to by consensus but without absolute firmness may be as follows: Neolithic period ? - 2900 BCE Prepalatial or Early Minoan



Period (EMI-III)) 2900-2000 BCE Protopalatial or Middle Minoan Period (MM IA-MMII) 2000-1700 BCE Neopalatial or Middle to late Minoan Period (MMIIIB-LM IB) 1650-1450 BCE Postpalatial or Late Minoan Period (LM IB/IIIA-LM IIIC) 1450-1200 BCE Generally on the chronology of the Aegean Bronze Age, see Warren and Hankey (1989), esp. 72 ff. Warren also provides a very useful summary of opinions on Thera and the LM Ib destructions:

15. See Pearson (1978, 1986 and 1992) and Barnes (1988)
16. See illustrations in *Nihon no Bijutsu* series published by Shibundô, series 6, #145, Kobayashi Tatsuo, *Jômon dôki*. But the issue of cultural diffusion into prehistoric Japan likewise belongs to a separate study.
17. In her definition of a masculine aesthetic (primarily in literature), Marilyn French writes eloquently on domination which to men, "is divine, so to pursue it is noble, heroic, glorious. The material to be dominated is, essentially, nature... Feminism considers transcendence illusory or factitious and pursuit of power a fatally doomed enterprise, since it cannot ever be satisfied, and usually or always involves the destruction of vital qualities and even life itself. Domination is not divine but lethal to dominator and dominated. It harms the dominator by cutting him off from trust and mutuality, the foundations of friendship and love, the two primary values; it harms the dominated by forcing them into dependency, which precludes truth in relationships. Domination creates false forms of friendship (society) and love (conventional marriage) which mask power relations. And feminist art focuses on people as whole; the human is made up of body and emotion as well as mind and spirit; she is also part of a community, connected to others; and - on the broadest level - to nature in both positive and negative aspects." (1993) 69, 70.
18. Renfrew and Bahn (1991) 154 ff.
19. I do not imply here that the "Minoans" were necessarily matrilineal, as this area of enquiry lies well beyond my competence and must await the expertise of trained anthropologists. My interest is in the mindset that underlies the nature of Minoan relating (to their environment and to each other), which wrought a society that in its visual legacy differs so radically from those of its contemporaries. Indeed, there is evidence of at least occasional male rulership, though not perhaps exclusive male kingship. We know also that the principal deity was always female, and women were depicted in elegance and at leisure, sometimes in postures of authority and often as primary movers in ritual - as seen in the gold rings: Marinatos (1993) 141 ff, 184 ff - on priestesses. Men in positions of authority are, of course, also visible - a fact all too often passed over: Marinaatos (1993) 127 ff. Otherwise they are often shown in postures of adoration, in process of ritual offering, or, as in the vase from Aghia Triada, singing on the return from harvesting.
20. Intuition is a valuable human faculty that has been too poorly served by male-dominated academicism which places undue weight on quantifiable externals, often to the detrimental exclusion of living internal qualities like inspiration or intuition.
21. Verbal communication, Professor John Onians, Director, School of World Art Studies, Sainsbury Centre for Visual Arts, University of East Anglia, during a conference in honour of Sir Ernst Gombrich on "The Nature of Chinese Painting" September, 1994.
22. Those with an especial focus on archaeology or historiography include, among others, Foley, H.P. ed., (1981). *Reflections of Women in Antiquity* London; Averil Cameron and Amélie Kuhrt, eds., (1983) *Images of Women in Antiquity* London, Routledge; Gero, J.M. & Conkey, M.W., eds., (1991) *Engendering Archaeology: Women and Prehistory* Oxford; and Archer, L.J., Fischler, S. & Wyke, M. eds.. (1994) *Women in Ancient Societies: An illusion of the Night* Basingtoke, among others.
23. Including the memorable Goddess Remembered. (1993?) produced by Margaret Pettigrew as part of the *Women and Spirituality* series, National Film Board of Canada.
24. Unaware of the phenomenon and a stranger to gender issues, as well as being a student of Chinese and Japanese art, I was drawn quite unexpectedly into the current when, in 1984, I first visited the Sir Arthur Evans Room in the Ashmolean

Museum, Oxford, and saw the extraordinary "Kamareos II" wares. I was stunned by their beauty and irresistibly drawn to the culture that had produced them. By 1992, again quite independently, it occurred to me to organize an exhibition of Minoan Civilization for the National Museum of Natural Science in Taichung. The exhibition even in its planning stages has attracted undreamed of enthusiasm from around the world, and active participation in the project by preeminent figures including Harry Lange of London, Oscar-winning designer of *Star Wars*, *The Dark Crystal*, etc., and Vancouver architect Arthur Erickson, Gold Medalist of the American Architecture Association. The National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., has written a Letter of Intent expressing interest in hosting the exhibition even before brochures had been circulated to travel the exhibition around the world. The Board of Advisers include experienced archaeologists working in Greece, as well as ranking administrators of the National Museum of Natural History in Washington, and the American Museum of Natural History of New York City. To account for this spontaneous enthusiasm and support one can only surmise that the topic evidently touches a wellspring in our present consciousness and seems to fulfill a widely shared desire.

25. "'Child-sacrifice' seems a reasonable explanation for the remains of at least four children of between under-8 years up to 12 years in age, which were discovered in the ruins of a house at Knossos (destroyed in LMIB) and accompanied by numerous finds of a 'ritual' nature. The children had not merely been killed, but were further dismembered and the flesh and internal organs removed - perhaps for cooking purposes. See S. M. Wall, J. H. Musgrave, and P.M. Warren (1986) 333-88. It must be observed here that this is the single instance of child-sacrifice that has come to light thus far, and would appear to have been a desperate act performed to propitiate the natural forces at the time of the terrible catastrophe that destroyed the entire civilization. Also for adult sacrifice, see the circumstances surrounding the bodies found in the rural shrine of Anemospelia on Juktas - Sakellarakis and Sapouna-Sakellarakis (1991) 137 ff. Also Marinatos (1993) 114.
26. A very large collection of weapons (unfinished swords) was recovered from a cave site at Arkalochori, along with many signs of ritual activity. The cave was blocked by a fall of rock in the Neopalatial period. Spirou Marinatos (1935) 212 ff; Hiller (1984) 27 ff; and Marinatos (1993) 125.
27. The evidence of fortifications and defensive concerns in Prepalatial Crete is collected by S. Alexiou (1980) 9-22. A defensive wall of Protopalatial date at Mallia is reviewed by H. van Effenterre (1980) 253, 256, 365ff. A road and fort system has been recently researched by Greek scholars and archaeologists in East Crete - it belongs to the Proto- and probably Neopalatial periods (reference not published). Neopalatial or later evidence is also found at such sites as Petras near Siteia of large walls of potentially defensive nature, but the citadel mentality so obvious with the Mycenaeans cannot be paralleled. The concerns for safety at the end of the Bronze Age and beyond are obvious: for discussion on some recently explored, see K. Norwicki (1994) 233-68.
28. "The Palace at Knossos is by far the largest palace of this period. Was it a kind of *primum inter paria* or was it the political administrative centre of the entire island, and did it also play the leading role in the domination of a large part of the Aegean area by Minoan Crete in this epoch (the New Palace era, ca. 1700-1450 BCE)?" see W. D. Niemeier, "Knossos in the New Palace Period (MMIII - LM IB)" in Evely, et al (1994), 87. Concerning evidence for this domination, see D. Hood, "A Minoan empire in the Aegean in the 16th and 15th centuries B.C.?" in R. Hägg and N. Marinatos (1984), 33-37; W.D.Niemeier (1986), "Creta, Egeo e Mediterraneo agli inizi del Bronzo Tardo", in M. Marazzi, S. Tusa and L. Vagnetti, eds., *Traffici micenei nel Mediterraneo*, Taranto, 2245-59; M.H. Wiener, "The isles of Crete? The Minoan thalassocracy revisited". in D.A. Hardy, C.G.Doumas, J.A. Sakellarakis, and P.M. Warren, eds. (1990), *Thera and the Aegean World III, vol I: Archaeology. Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Santorini, Greece... 1989*, 128-60.
29. That is, autocratic societies with a conspicuous lack in social equality like Pharaonic Egypt, Imperial Sumer, Dynastic Babylon, the Hittite Kingdom, etc., the Levant, etc.,



by then long-established as typical Bronze-Age societies where warfare and oppression were major facets of daily life in internal affairs and external relations. This is indicated by massive rampart-, wall- and palace- or pyramid-construction projects requiring enormous labour forces suggestive of oppression. Moreover, surviving images of carnage and bloodshed by the sword or bow and arrow, on foot or from horse-drawn chariots, images covering mountain sides, palace walls, stone reliefs, and steles both in situ and in major Western museums testify to the importance of killing in the lives of these ancient peoples. Portraits of kings are never without their personal weaponry, indicating that warfare or physical danger was a constant aspect of life, as we see in palace reliefs of Ashurnasirpal at Nimrud, stone relief of King Sargon II talking with an official, details of embossed bronze from the Balawat Gates dating from the reign of Shalmanesser III, or from Sumer the charging chariots inlaid in the Standard of Ur, the mass suicides by attendants, together with ox-drawn carts, to accompany their lord into the nether world (Reade, 1991, 43); and images of fighting and warfare that continued for three millennia to decorate Egyptian rulers' tombs (Aldred, 1980, 33ff), would indicate that Bronze Age technological advancement did not serve to upgrade the lives of people at large, but was exploited by the privileged few for domination and exploitation of the masses.

30. Cf. the archives of oracle-bone divinations as well as inscriptions found on many bronze vessels that together give us a fairly detailed view not only of society and warfare, but concerns of daily life including religious practices among the ruling classes of the Shang. The primal archival materials have been amply published by Academia Sinica, Taiwan and the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto.
31. For excavation report see Sun Shoudao, Guo Dashun (1986), 1-17. The head is H. 22.5 cm. At another site close by, a small naked female figurine was found, some 12 cm in overall height (with the right leg missing). She covers her belly with one hand, and is wearing an ankle boot on her left foot. For recovery of relatively intact stone-carved female statues see Tang Chi (1994) 46-51. It is by no means established that any of these were fertility Goddesses, related to the land or to bounty. Well illustrated reports of the figurine and deity are published by Kuangfu Shuju, Taipei (1994), (plates 74, 75, and 76)
32. The more common "supernatural route" to bountiful harvests in China in antiquity seems to have been the propitiation of the rain-bestowing Dragon. This mythical animal acquired form in a type of funerary "mosaic" created with pebble-insets, at a very early time, from at least the fourth millennium BCE. There seems little sympathy with notions of the chthonic fertility deities or with notions like "from earth to earth", "in death resurrection" favoured in agricultural societies in and to the east of the Mediterranean. See discussion in Chang (1990), 95-101.
33. For example, from Petsophas above Palaikastro: Rutkowski (1991) 57, pls. 45-46.
34. In this aspect the Chinese Goddess is a textbook opposite of the Western Goddess of Cernavoda (see below).
35. Contemporary feminist scholarship has become interested once more in the female body-Earth analogy, with many books and papers devoted to the subject. Page DuBois, among others has written persuasively to argue that current psychoanalytic theory is consistently ahistorical in its readings of other cultures. See Page DuBois (1988), *Sowing the Body: Psychoanalysis and Ancient Representations of Women*. Chicago.
36. Alexiou (1969), 102 ff. See also Cotterell (1979), 162 ff.
37. Archaeological finds of the most rudimentary bronze artifacts date from the Zhengzhou period of the early 16th century BCE.
38. The earliest ceramics, newly uncovered in the 1970s, lying immediately beneath the stratum dating from the seventh millennium BCE to which Japanese archaeologists had given the name Jōmon I, caused great excitement, and an overhaul of the entire periodization, with the original Jōmon I becoming now Jōmon II, and so on upward the strata. The new Jōmon I ceramics, according to Japanese carbon-dating, range from the 7th down to the 11th millennium BCE, creating a remarkable gap in time-span with neighbouring Neolithic or Mesolithic societies.

(See *Nihon genshi no bijutsu* §E•a?I©I§§", =N(Prehistoric Japanese Arts), 6 volumes) We must also account for the fact that Japanese archaeology is nearly 75 years older than those of China or Korea, which, too may account for the relative depth of Japan's stratigraphical excavations to date. That is, for the fact that Japan has been excavating more deeply into her past, reaching deeper levels. On the other hand, Western archaeological scientists have in private expressed serious reservations about Japanese laboratory techniques. But the debate remains as yet beneath the surface.

39. The spontaneous, instantaneous recognition of the Divine in unexpected places, in trees, in rocks, in open spaces, recognition that is unexpected and unplanned; the sanctification of white pebbled beaches, worship of the supreme deity, Amaterasu-no-ô-Kami or Shining Celestial Great Divinity or Sun Goddess in temples served by vestal virgins, the communication taking form in physical dancing and singing . (See *Kojiki* 712, *Record of Ancient Matters* which carries some of the creation myths) On the potency and mythic significance of dance, see Langer (1953,190ff). The direct, wordless body-movement in communication with natural elements is in stark contrast to celebrated inscriptions in oracular questionnaires addressed to ancestors, and would seem to me on the whole representative of the more spontaneous and natural, perhaps also more feminine, aspect of human consciousness.
40. This intriguing aspect, as well as the quintessential quality of emotionality in Japanese art has been a leitmotif in Joan Stanley-Baker (1984).
41. The Pangu myth appears remarkably late, around the third century CE, according to Dirk Bodde (Samuel Noah Kramer, 1961, 382). The dearth of creation myths from along the Yellow River deserves further study. Most Chinese creation myths seem to date from the Han dynasty. The Nüwa-Fuxi image does not appear in tomb or other decoration before emergence of the State of Chu, and may have entered from Southwest China. Pangu, too, seems to come from this rather cosmopolitan and expansive period. For enlightening studies of the archaeology of mythology - all more or less from a Western Eurocentric perspective, see Joseph Campbell (1959, 1968), Jaan Puhvel (1987) Henrietta McCall (1990), among others.
42. Interconnectedness is an irrefutable biological fact: the experience of total interconnectedness is learned at birth when the baby is first put to the breast. There is no sense of territoriality or boundary regarding proprietorship of the milk. Our first "lesson" is of the holistic, dynamic process where Mother's breast and Baby's mouth are interactive and indispensable terminals of a living cycle. I offer the above from personal experience. Let me also invoke other, published, academic authorities for readers requiring citation of experiences other than one's own for fear of possible subjectivity (which has remained an all-too feared facet of being alive). Alan Lomax (1968, 164-69; 1972, 234-39) found that cultures where women enjoyed high social status (usually the gathering ones versus agricultural ones involving intense cultivation - and sense of territory) have the most "integrated and cohesive" singing and dance style, "The singing in these societies is described as 'interlocked' or 'varied synchrony,' a contrapuntal unity in which everyone sings together yet independently, and there is no dominant part. ... The dance style is described as flowing, curved, successive, highly synchronous, and erotic, with multipart trunk action and accentuated hip, pelvis, and breast movements. What is remarkable about this is that all of these characteristics are positively correlated with the significant social participation of women." (Summarized in Lorraine, 1993, 46). Göttner-Abendroth's nine principles of matriarchal art "preclude any divisions of aesthetics into 'a formalist, elitist, socially effective art on one hand and a popular, widespread but socially vilified and outcast art on the other'." They are based essentially on interconnectedness, on "the ability to shape life and so change it, it is itself energy, life, a drive toward the aestheticization of society" (1986, 82-84, 88-92).
43. The Greek word for Nature h Fysis (physies) is rendered in the feminine form. Note that the adjective for natural is Fusikos (physikós), but in English "physical" has acquired a different meaning. The Latin *la natura* and German *die Natur* (or indeed



*Eigenschaft*) are also in the feminine. Similarly, earth, gh (ge),- the ancient Gaia (often rendered as Gháya), like the Latinate terra or the Teutonic *Erde*, were perceived in the feminine. Thus the Western European mind can be described as conceiving of nature and earth, those environments that nurture and sustain, as feminine.

44. Even in a large space, as long as the major components like alcoves, windows and doors are kept in human proportion, the effect remains that of a smaller enclosure. This has been successfully accomplished in many contemporary civic buildings which seek not to awe but to welcome the visitor, and is best exemplified in the works of Arthur Erickson as in his supreme court in Vancouver, of the Canadian Chancery in Washington.
45. In the West, the feeling of dichotomy, of the beauty of God and the misery of mankind, or of our spiritual impoverishment, is keenly brought out in Gothic architecture in cathedrals that stretch skyward, often soaring up over three storeys. Moving ant-like in their cool and resonant silence engenders in us a sense of our own helplessness. More subtly, it induces in us as well a palpable sense of our distance - hence separation - from God. This architecture effectively throws the supplicant at the feet of the priests, the only human-sized beings accessible. The central message Jesus taught while sitting in close intimacy among his disciples beneath a tree, "the Kingdom of God is within" can hardly be part of psycho-physical experience when the Cathedral assumes patriarchal dominance in its commanding space, and pilgrims are made to feel they have "entered the house of God" by stepping inside, and once service is over, they are "leaving the house of God."
46. The Shishinden, or Purple Private Palace within the Dairi of the imperial palace complex in the ancient capital of Kyoto, is a wooden structure that still stands today, after restorations and some modernization.
47. The world's first full-length romantic novel, *Tale of Genji*, was written in the tenth century by a Japanese noble woman, Lady Murasaki Shikibu. In it to this day we recognize detailed revelations of the feminine worldview (as experienced and as expressed by both men and women). A useful general introduction to Japanese poetry in English remains Earl Miner (1969). A typical Heian love verse for the period:  
On her straw-mat bedding  
The Lady of the Bridge of Uji  
Spreads the moonlight out,  
And in the waiting autumn night  
She lies there in the darkening wind.  
(113, Poem by Teika (1162-1241) from the Shinkokinshû)
48. Gompertz, G. (1958).
49. A classic in the study of colour perception remains the work of Brent Berlin (1969). *Basic color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution* Kay, Paul. But Berline does not address the sensation of feminine or masculine consciousness in association with certain colours or colour-groupings in the way presented here.
50. "A smooth white surface can reflect things." "We speak of a 'black mirror'." Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on Colour*. edited by G.E.M. Anscombe (1977), Berkeley and Los Angeles.
51. Here I refer to conditions in ordinary times of peace. During conditions of great stress, extraordinary violence and brutality may erupt, as the world has witnessed in the twentieth century. Such extremes of behaviour in the same people serves to confirm the polarity rather than dichotomy between *yin* and *yang*, feminine and masculine characteristics which are but perceptual and behavioural tendencies that cohabit the same individual consciousness, and serves to underscore the fact that it is not a matter of separate or distinct psyches being unique to one or the other gender, and for all time. The Japanese themselves have been keenly aware of masculine and feminine tendencies of their own cultural expressions, and have devised since the Heian era terms like *otoko-e* and *onna-e* meaning masculine painting and feminine painting, referring to subject matter and technique (Louisa

McDonald Read 1976). But Japanese art as a whole compared to Chinese art reflects a relative leaning toward the feminine, and in this paper I refer only to the most "feminine" of Japanese art expressions, that is, to aesthetics engendered by courtly Heian aristocrats, and periodically resurrected in later art, and even discernible immediately beneath the surface of much of contemporary art.

52. All three works are copiously published with brilliant reproductions in many Japanese publications under their respective titles, in Japanese, and fragments are reproduced in English language works, among which see J. Stanley-Baker, (1984), which illustrates a scene from the *Tale of Genji* (pl. 64), the *Heike- Nôgyô* (pl. 65) and, in black and white, *onnade* calligraphy (pl. 68, 69). See also Kurata & Tamura (1987) with lavish illustrations of different versions of the illustrated Lotus sūtra. For the Thirty-Six poets collation see Kinoshita Masao in the Shibundô series *Nihon no Bijutsu* #168 (Shôwa 55), *Senjûrokuninkashû* which illustrates some of the leaves in colour. The *Tale of Genji* is massive illustrated in Tokugawa Museum publications, also.
53. Cotterell, 86
54. Shaw (1971) 74. Footnote 4 - for summary of opinions of himself, Graham and Preziosi concerning Minoan unit of measurement and planning techniques.
55. Recently fragments have been found in some of the southeastern coastal sites. See note 27.
56. Assurance of continued agricultural surplus is a result of a particular conjunction in Crete of geographical and climatic conditions which favoured the production of olives, grains, and honey on that island. This "state of Grace" is all too rare in other parts of the world, necessitating plunder and warfare, a fascinating topic that deserves a separate discussion.
57. "A Mycenaean palace in its heyday would in many superficial respects have resembled its Cretan counterpart, but there were certain fundamental differences. In the first place, Mycenaean palaces were heavily fortified with circuit walls of enormous stones, whereas Cretan palaces were unfortified. In the second place, Mycenaean palaces were designed on a fairly rigid plan, based on one or more units known to archaeologists as the megaron, whereas Cretan palaces possessed a much more elastic layout." (Higgins, 1981, 82).
58. At Zakros connection between religious and economic activities is shown in the West Wing of palace which contained the central shrine, with a 'Lustral Basin', a treasury, an archive, etc., also a series of magazines and workshops both on the ground floor and the upper storey. And a banquet hall with a great number of jugs, cups and amphorae, and a Kitchen. H. Reusch's theory is that the priestess played the role of the goddess, sitting on the throne and flanked by griffins (Reusch, 1958)." Both Marinatos (1985) "Function and Interpretation of the Thera Frescoes" (BCH Supplement XI, 219-230), and Robin Hägg's "Pictorial Programmes in Minoan Palaces and Villas" (idem, 209-217) persuasively argue that the frescoes were not merely decorative but that they fulfilled a definite function relating *directly*, that is physically, to activities that took place within them, with indications of where celebrants were to stand, to place the offerings, etc. I.e. that in part the painting took the place of actual furnishings. The activities relate to fertility, germination, economy (industrial activity of saffron-gathering) etc. Although the close observation and analysis are most admirable, I find the implication that *each* single painted room was restricted to a specific ritual incommensurate with the interflowing, integration of Minoan space on the one hand, the in painting the integrative, fusing methods preferred in the deployment of forms in space. In Chinese and Japanese wall decoration, religious or secular, it has since the earliest antiquity been the inspiration, the metaphor or association which engendered the particular feelings of the spaces - but I know of no instance where a room is painted with the exact activities that took place in it. Rather, I would suggest, as in the Chinese love of painting rugged northern rocky mountains or soft southern hills bathed in lake-side mists, or the Heian practice of *meishô-e* painting which were evocations - not direct "photo-copies" - of famous sights celebrated in landscape poetry, the idea was simply to enhance the poetic nostalgia inspired by



the poem or the regional flavour. Figure paintings of historical figures, real or fictitious, as well, served to produce a sombre or poetic mood - but did not confine the rooms to particular juridical or poetic activities. But this fascinating subject may be developed further in another study.

59. We can still witness ubiquitous divinity-consciousness in modern ashramic life - as well as in many monastic communities, Buddhist or Catholic - today. In the ashrams, for example, this is most prominent: there are, as in Minoan settlements where large groups of lay people live and work for months and often years at a time. Places for the creation of crafts and land for agriculture are all tended by a few clerics together with many lay people, working and worshipping in a communal way. Group meditation and prayer at certain times of day aside, individuals or groups go off to till the land, work the fields, press the grapes, turn the lathe, etc., being at the same time ever-mindful of their prayers or meditation. The communities subsist by trading, selling their produce or crafts. They also engage in charitable works such as setting up hospitals, or dispatching mobile clinics to isolated rural areas. While community members come from disparate social and economic backgrounds, in the ashram they are equal, and united in their common spiritual journey. Buddhist and Christian monastic communities, while perhaps not so large, conform on the whole to the same spirit.
60. In the century since the first excavations, no single tomb has come to light of a powerful king or ruler such as that of China's First Emperor, Qinshihuang, or even of powerful imperial relatives such as the rock-cut mausolea of the "jade suits" belonging to the Prince Liu Sheng and his consort Dou Wan uncovered at Mancheng in Hebei Province. Minoan burials were simple and without ostentation in crypts, mountain sanctuaries or in rounded *tholos* tombs with ritual areas attached. This indicates that there was, as in China, worship of the dead, but the Minoans would later gather the bones for cleaning and final rest, collectively, in communal earthen *larnakes* lidded tub-like sarcophagi.
61. See Doumas (1992) for the most recent and large-scale reproductions from Thera; Marinatos (1993) and Morgan (1988). For Knossos, the several articles (eg 1968) and unpublished thesis of Cameron can be mined. Aegean-wide considerations on the subject will include Immerwahr (1990).
62. See Doumas (1992), and the many books on the Palace of Knossos.
63. See Doumas (1992).
64. For example: Amnissos (room 7) - Immerwahr (1990) 179 ff; Aghia Triadha (room 14) - *ibid.* 180; and Knossos, House of Frescoes (rooms D-F) - *ibid.* 170.
65. Believed to have been obtained from trade or gift-exchange with Egypt.
66. Marinatos (1993) 5 ff for equipment and *passim*; and 193 ff for something on the ubiquitous crocus. One of the chief properties of saffron pollen is the easing of menstrual pain.
67. See the megalithic tumuli of the Kofun period, typified with golden crowns, bronze swords and mirrors, marking the arrival of peoples who ruled with concentrated power and wealth.
68. EG. As on the Chieftain cup from Aghia Triadha, Hood (1978) 144, fig. 137; or the Master impression sealing from Chania, Hallager (1985) - both males.
69. On Kamares ware, see Walberg (1976); and generally on Minoan pottery Betancourt (1985).
70. Discussing the tendency of dividing into separate registers the painted decor on vessels, Higgins remarks, "The Mycenaean love of zoning was probably never really sympathetic to the more exuberant and less disciplined Cretan spirit." (Higgins, 1981, 117)
71. My argument is that it takes flexibility, adaptability, resilience (water-like), to bend over 90-degree angles.
72. It is not possible to discuss colours as they were at the time, and we must take into account the deterioration and general fading of most colours, whilst the Thera frescoes may be considered more reliable. On the whole they confirm impressions highlighted by Evans in the early century, although his restorations had tended to give the colours more dramatic contrast, when Thera frescoes indicate a far closer

colour-harmony, commensurate with my definition of the *yin* or feminine aspect of consciousness.

73. See note 59.

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# **Fourth World Nations in the Era of Globalisation An Introduction to Contemporary theorizing Posed by Indigenous Nations**

by Kathy Seton

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In this article I explore the challenges that the rise of Fourth World theory and indigenous politics pose to contemporary political economic analyses. There are two themes prominent within contemporary political economic analysis; globalisation and the ever-growing emergence of difference (localisation). Many of these analyses are underpinned by the notion that a world system exists as a single entity (see, for example, Wallerstein 1974), under globalisation. However, this does not account for the increasing action of peoples at the local level, who are identifying with one another on the basis of, for example, nationhood (i.e. indigenous nations), ethnicity, or sexual preference; they are sustaining, creating and asserting their difference. This is particularly relevant when it is noted that in any exploration of difference, differentials in access to power must be considered. Images of the 'Other' may be related more closely to the perpetuation of the interests of those in power, than to reality. Images of "Self", conversely, may be a response to that power.

## **Indigenous Social Movements as Sites of Power**

The rise of indigenous social movements in world politics, as well as the single international indigenous movement, signifies that international solidarity is a 'real world' event. Indigenous nations everywhere are demanding the right to self-determination. They are asserting their sovereignty as distinct and autonomous nations of peoples. Popular stereotypes of indigenous nations as having 'primitive', 'backward' cultures have helped cover-up and often rationalize the reality of their ongoing marginalisation. This process of marginalisation has frequently been motivated and legitimized by colonial powers under the banners of 'modernization', 'development' and 'progress' (see Tauli-Corpuz 1993; Wilmer 1993).

The powerful notions of 'progress', 'development' and 'modernization' have led to a conception of a hierarchy of States delineated as the 'Three Worlds' (see Worsley 1984) based on contrasts of ideology (i.e. First World capitalism versus Second World socialism/communism) and contrasts of wealth (i.e. the industrialized First and Second World versus the underdeveloped Third World) (see Nietschmann 1987). However, indigenous nations are not recruited to their political situation on the basis of either ideology or their economic well-being. Instead they are "peoples and political movements in the same moment of space and time" (Brough 1989:5). They are temporally united through their histories and traditions passed on with their own languages. They are spatially united through their powerful links to their land and water territories. Their struggles for self-determination are struggles to retain and/or regain cultural solidarity which unite them as a distinct people.

The challenge for contemporary theorists is how to work out a mode of investigation that accounts for both the processes of integration on a global scale (globalisation) and the processes of self-identifying on the local indigenous level (localization). By moving away from an all-encompassing global narrative of history and politics, and stressing the local and particular forms of difference and struggle, new outlooks on power-relations are achievable; essentially power can be considered in terms of micro-political levels (subsiding indigent pockets throughout societies) not just in terms of macro-political levels such as classes or States (see Brough 1989). Culture then becomes connected to 'real life' experiences and theorists can encompass



forms and occasions of representations as sites of power in themselves.

## **The Rise of Fourth World Theory**

Through the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Fourth World theory "emerged to explain persistent global patterns of ethnocide and ecocide" (Nietschmann 1994:225) perpetrated against the 6,000 to 9,000 (note 1) (see Griggs 1994a, 1994b; Ryser 1996) ancient but "internationally unrecognized nations" (Griggs 1992:NET) of the Fourth World. These nations represent "a third of the of the world's population" (Griggs 1992:NET) whose descendants maintain a distinct political culture that predates and continues to resist the encroachment of the 192 (note 2) (see Ryser 1996) recognized States now in existence. Fourth World theory was fashioned by a diverse assortment of people, including "activists, human rights lawyers, and academics but principally leaders of resisting [indigenous] nations" (Nietschmann 1994:225). Through information networking they share thoughts, knowledge and resistance tactics in meetings and by photocopy, mail, telephone, fax, computer modem, and computer bulletin boards (see Field 1984; Nietschmann 1994). As Nietschmann (1994:225; see also Field 1984) delineates, the doorway to Fourth World analysis cannot be found in library catalogues, because:

1. Fourth World theory seeks to change the world, not just describe and publish an article on it;
2. Fourth World advocates rely on the electronic circulation of firsthand information; and
3. it is counterproductive to discuss plans, strategies, and an overall theory that are aimed at resisting and reversing the territorial and political occupation of nations by states.

Indigenous nations' political solidarity is founded on their cultural solidarity. Thus, more recently the term 'Fourth World' has been applied to indigenous peoples in acknowledgment of the limitations of the Three Worlds schema (see Dyck 1985; Graburn 1981; McCall 1980). The Bartels (1988:249; see also Griggs 1992) have criticised both Graburn (1981) and Dyck (1985) for characterising the 'Fourth World' in "terms of a set of static criteria which aboriginal groups may or may not presently fulfill." All these theorists draw on the work of Manuel and Posluns (1974), however, the fundamental difference is that Manuel and Posluns (1974:5-7) refer to the 'Fourth World' as a product of struggle and development: they juxtapose the growth of a 'Third World' from former colonies, against the [then] future emergence of a 'Fourth World' from diverse aboriginal peoples struggling to achieve more acceptable relations with the States that encapsulate them. Manuel and Posluns (1974) formulation of the term 'Fourth World' has become the most widely used definition; that is, 'aboriginal peoples' who have special non-technical, non-modern exploitative relations to the land in which they still live and are 'disenfranchised' by the States within which they live (see for instance Griggs 1992; Hyndman 1991; Ryser 1996). Hyndman (1991:169; see also Duhaylungsod and Hyndman 1993; Weyler 1984) notes that "[i]ndigenous peoples themselves are popularising the term Fourth World, and it is still being circulated for validation."

Starting from a "Fourth World perspective" (Ryser 1996:8) allows a more all-encompassing analysis than pure economic theorizing, which tends toward a core-periphery structural analysis of the world capitalist system. While economic analyses are important, it must be noted that the political interests of indigenous nations cannot be reduced to purely economic considerations that disregard their struggle for cultural autonomy. Fourth World analysis "produces a dramatically distinct, "ground-up" portrait of the significance and centrality of people in most world issues, problems, and solutions" (Nietschmann 1994:225).

## **Persistent Cultures and Hidden Nations**

Analyses that ignore culture over pure economics also deny those aspects of life that persist. Spicer (1971:799) has developed the notion of persistent cultural systems, defined as a cumulative cultural phenomenon, an open ended system that defines a course of action for the people believing in it. These persistent systems, according to Spicer, are more stable than political organizations, and furthermore, States depend on the accumulated energy of persistent peoples for their impetus. Spicer (1971:796) suggests considering more fully the links between political systems and identity systems. He concludes that an oppositional process between identity systems and State apparatus exists, which can lead to either the breakdown or reinforcement of an identity system.

In more recent theorizing, Spicer (1992) advances the notion of "hidden nations" to explain how States' have continued to subjugate persisting indigenous nations. Hidden nations "are not hiding" (Spicer 1992:30) themselves, rather States suffer from "cultural blindness" or "insulation against reality" (Spicer 1992:36, 47). Cultural blindness is integrally based in power relations:

Dominant peoples control the institutional relationships of nations in their state. The dominant people do not have to adjust to others; they can require the subordinated peoples to adjust to them...The dominant people do not ordinarily experience any pressures to see the subordinated peoples as the subordinated peoples see themselves (Spicer 1992:37).

Thus, the cultural blindness of States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries facilitated their governing of indigenous nations "whom they believed were like themselves already, peoples who could be made into images of themselves, or peoples who were hopelessly inferior and could not be changed" (Spicer 1992:34).

However, while there can be no denying the fundamental importance of recognizing the growth and impact of colonialism, capitalism, bureaucracy and the division of labour as central features of contemporary history, the understanding that these factors would eventually destroy persistent cultural systems is clearly false. Thus, indigenous nations' struggles for cultural autonomy (self-determination and sovereignty) have been unjustifiably ignored or distorted; a serious flaw when theorizing about indigenous nations and their political movements, considering the culture concept is so central to their 'being'.

### **Time and Space: Ideologically Construed Instruments of Power**

The new European states have worked diligently to wipe out indigenous history and intellectual thought and replace these with European history and intellectual thought. The great lie is simply this: IF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WILL ONLY REJECT THEIR OWN HISTORY, INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, LANGUAGE, AND CULTURE AND REPLACE THESE THINGS WITH EUROPEAN VALUES AND IDEALS, THEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE WILL SURVIVE (Ryser 1986:NET; emphasis in original).

The history of indigenous nations is integrally connected with the history of colonialism. Colonialism represents the imposition of the power of one State or nation over the territories of another in order to gain economic and/or political advantage (see Brough 1989). Thus, colonialism is about the spatial expansion of one people and the corresponding constriction of another; colonialism is about the discovery and exploitation of 'frontiers'. By calling indigenous territories, 'frontiers', colonialists can debase any prior political attachments to that territory and deny the existence of the original owners of those territories. Frontiers are seen as abstract spaces devoid of human connections; they are wildernesses which require 'taming'. Indigenous nations



and their territories become conceived in economic terms, as "untapped natural resources" (Tauli-Corpuz 1993:7) waiting for the taking. Indigenous nations' natural resources become "national and transnational resources" (Hyndman 1988:281).

Colonialism also established the foundations for all future relations between colonizers and colonized. The fact that indigenous nations continue to be marginalized (in a comparative sense) is testament to this ongoing problem. Further, colonialism is a process through time and space, and, as such, indigenous nations have not only been dispossessed of their lands but also of their histories (see Brough 1989). The history of indigenous nations is often portrayed as 'peripheral', 'backward', and 'doomed to extinction', "by the dogma of colonialist notions of the 'progress' of 'civilisation'" (Tauli-Corpuz 1993:10; see also Wilmer 1993). Indigenous nations are not only resisting the spatial relationship ("ever expanding space" (Brough 1989:24)) that advances their lands as underdeveloped frontiers, they are resisting an augmented sense of time:

...the expansive, aggressive, and oppressive societies which we collectively and inaccurately call the West needed Space to occupy. More profoundly and problematically, they required Time to accommodate the schemes of a one-way history: progress, development, modernity (and their negative mirror images: stagnation, underdevelopment, tradition) (Fabian 1983:144).

Thus time and space become "ideologically construed instruments of power" (Fabian 1983:144; see also Brough 1989). These trends continue today to marginalize indigenous nations in both colonial and neo-colonial situations, resulting in clashes between ideas and philosophies.

## **THE GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE OF FOURTH WORLD THEORY**

Fourth World theory scrutinizes how colonial empires and modern States invaded and now encapsulate most of the world's enduring nations and peoples: "It also explores how this destructive expansion jeopardizes the world's biological and cultural diversity and ultimately rebounds to break down and break up states" (Nietschmann 1994:225-6). Through a different geopolitical perspective, Fourth World analyses, writings, and maps (see for instance Griggs 1994a, 1994b) rectify the distorting and obscuring of indigenous nations' identities, geographies and histories (see Spicer 1992); "that make up the usually hidden "other side" in the invasions and occupations that produce most of the world's wars, refugees, genocide, human rights violations, and environmental destruction" (Nietschmann 1994:226, 230). To understand this different geopolitical perspective, some clarification of terms is necessary. The political terms nations, States, nation-States, a people, and ethnic group/minority are commonly used interchangeably in both popular and academic literature despite the fact that each has a distinct connotation (see Griggs 1992, 1994b; Hyndman 1994a; Nietschmann 1987, 1994).

### **Fourth World Perspectives on Terminology**

#### **A State**

Within Fourth World theory a State represents a centralised political system with a recognised civilian and military bureaucracy established to enforce one set of institutions, laws and sometimes language and religion within its boundaries (see Hyndman 1994a; Nietschmann 1987). The modern state grew from "European kingdoms, overseas colonialism, and the division of large colonial empires into smaller and smaller neo-colonial pieces" (Nietschmann 1994:227). The State, as a political entity, is a legal creation which comes into being on a specific date (see Nietschmann 1994), is comprised of a "set of internationally recognised boundaries that comprise greater than one (>1) nation" (Griggs 1994b:260; see also Nietschmann 1994; Spicer 1992), and is acknowledged by other States.

## A Nation

Nations, on the other hand, are not so easily defined since nations are a less tangible phenomenon. A nation is a people with a distinct culture evolved over time "as a product of human interaction with their environment (on the earth and in relation to the cosmos) and with the spiritual realm" (Ryser 1996:11). Nations are bound together by such common attributes as ancestry, history, society, institutions, ideology, language, territory and religion (Nietschmann 1987:1, 1994:261). Nations are, thus, self-defining (see Connor 1978, Nietschmann 1994) and are created by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a historically common territory and a national consciousness. The term nation also refers to the geographically bounded territory of a people. Further, as no nation has ever deliberately dispensed with their territory, resources or identity, "a nation is the world's most enduring, persistent, and resistant organisation of people and territory" (Nietschmann 1994:226).

Only when nations and States coincide with cultural and legal boundaries (less than 5% of the world's States), can the term nation-State be used (see Griggs 1994b; Nietschmann 1987, 1994; Wilmer 1993). Spicer (1992:30; emphasis in original) notes that the political environment in which indigenous nations are 'hidden' is "currently labelled the nation-state." As discussed above, every State is fundamentally a plural entity (comprised of two or more nations);

*...yet, the term nation-state tends to perpetuate the obscuring of this fundamental fact, because it suggests that a modern state is composed of a welded unity - a single nation within a state. Insofar as it suggests this kind of entity, the term perpetuates misunderstanding and obfuscation (Spicer 1992:31; emphasis in original).*

Fourth World theory focuses on analysing nations, however, at this stage of research Fourth World theorists have categorised nations in terms relating to the State (see Table 1). Both Nietschmann (1994) and Morris (1992) have noted that characterising nation types is an important developing area of Fourth World theory. As Morris (1992:NET) states:

*Fortunately, among the ranks of indigenous peoples a discussion has begun that calls into question the usefulness of forcing indigenous reality into the forms developed by Europeans. Consequently, new descriptions of the historical organisation of indigenous societies, as well as indigenous aspirations, are being formulated. The result may be the evolution of completely novel international relationships between and among peoples.*

Ryser (1996; see Table 2) has taken up the challenge and developed terms for the new and evolving political status relations indigenous nations are forging for themselves.

**Table 1: Types of nations in terms relating to the State (Griggs 1993, Nietschmann 1994:233)**

Autonomous nations	Nations that have endured long-standing state attempts at cultural and territorial assimilation and whose autonomy is recognised by the State, e.g., Catalonia, Kuna Yala
Enduring nations	Nations that have endured long-standing State attempts at cultural and territorial assimilation and have achieved a partial or limited autonomy, e.g., Saamiland, Yapti Tasba
Renascent nations	Historical nations that are becoming stronger by cultural renaissance and political movements seeking greater political recognition, e.g., Scotland, Wales



Remnant nations	Long-dormant nations (low levels of cultural activity) that have weak, incipient national movements, regenerating because of the example of neighbouring nations.
Nation cores of States	Most States have and are run by nation cores that become both the point of expansion and the hegemonic culture of the idealised nation-state, e.g., England/ UK, Russia/USSR, Castile/Spain, Java/Indonesia, Han/China.
Irredenta	Parts of nation cores of States lost to States by treaty or war. In some cases, groups within the "broken piece." Nations see themselves being ruled by the "wrong" State, e.g., Northern Ireland.
Recognised nations	Nations that endured State occupation and won independence, e.g., Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Eritrea.
Fragmented nations	Many nations are occupied by two or more states, which often hinders political mobilisation and territorial reconsolidation, e.g., Kurdistan is occupied by 5 States, Saamiland by 4, and Kawthoolei (in Burma) by 2.
Militarily occupied nations	Many nations have all or part of their territories militarily occupied by one or more States, e.g., the northern one-third of the Miskito nation is occupied by Honduras, and the southern two-thirds have partial autonomy.
Armed resistance nations	Of the world's 120-some wars (as of April 1993) 80 percent involved Fourth World nations resisting State military forces, e.g., Kawthoolei versus Burma, West Papua versus Indonesia, East Timor versus Indonesia, Chittagong Hill Tracts versus Bangladesh, Saharawi Republic versus Morocco.

## People

A people in Fourth World theory is also self-defining: "A people considers itself to be distinct from other peoples, adjacent or far, who may, in turn, recognise the difference" (Nietschmann 1994:227). A people is distinguished by a common history, a common geographical location and homeland, cultural or linguistic links, religious or ideological links, racial or ethnic ties, a common economic base, and an adequate number of individuals asserting common identity (see Nietschmann 1994). Sills (1993) and Smith (1986) (note 3) advance the perspective that it is when a people become politically mobilized, claiming the right to self-determination, that they appear to form nations. When faced by threats from common enemies a people politically organize and mobilize against these threats:

*For example, the Dine (Navajo) used to be a people who traditionally lived in a very dispersed, non-national pattern, organised in clans as basic operational units, until they were faced with a need to form a nation under military leaders (like Manuelito) who united them to defend their lives against encroachment and genocidal attacks by Euro-American invaders. Today, some 130 years later, the "Navajo Nation" is recognised juridically within the United States (although that recognition is full of contradictions) (Sills 1993:9).*

**Table 2: New and evolving political status relations forged by indigenous nations (Ryser 1996:Chapter 4)**

<b>Integrated nation</b>	No internal sovereignty and no external sovereignty, participation or sharing in political instruments of State or dominant nation, exercise delegated powers of government, constitutionally defined or impliedly understood to be an integral part of State domain or
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	dominant nation's domain, no inherent collective rights - individual and group rights defined in State constitution or reduced rights as a result of unstated principles, full economic dependency, e.g., Kalaallit Nunaat.
<b>Autonomous nation</b>	Governing authority delegated to nation from State-limited internal sovereignty, no external sovereignty, limited collective rights - State constitution defines individual and collective rights, partial economic self-sufficiency, e.g. Yapti Tasba.
<b>Associated nation</b>	Exercise inherent powers of government - full internal sovereignty, government to government relations - limited external sovereignty, partial economic self-sufficiency, e.g., Lummi.
<b>Independently federated nation</b>	Exercise inherent powers of government - varying degree of negotiated internal sovereignty, government to government relations - varying external degree of sovereignty, substantial economic self-sufficiency, e.g., Catalunya
<b>Independent Nation-State</b>	Exercise constituted powers of government, full internal sovereignty and full external sovereignty, economic dependency, e.g., Federation of Micronesia.

Almost no nation or people in the world calls itself by the terms used by most academics, journalists and States: "ethnic groups, minorities, peasants, tribes, herders, agriculturalists, lower class, or, simply, a group, a population or the poor" (Nietschmann 1987:4, 1994:230; emphasis in original). For instance, the term 'ethnic group' conflates two distinct geographical processes: "immigration to a place, and territorial annexation by an expansionist state or nation" (Griggs 1994b:259). From the perspective of Fourth World theory, all these terms have the common strategy of supporting States by obfuscating nations. Terminological confusion goes further: by centering on 'legitimate' political units at the level of States, the notion of 'sovereignty' (and nationalism) becomes distorted, ignoring the role of nations (see Brough 1989; Griggs 1994b). Sovereignty, in political theory, refers to the notion that all societies must have some absolute power of final decision, executed by a person or group identified as both able to determine, and capable of enforcing, the decision: "Sovereign rule then, refers to a notion of legitimate rule, not necessarily State rule" (Brough 1989:14). It is upon this understanding that most indigenous nations, all of who have their own names for themselves and their own territories, seek the right to self-determination internationally and resist incorporation (both peacefully and through conflict) into one or more States.

## **NATIONS ENDURE**

### ***The Westphalian System of States***

One of the oldest social practices is the conduct of international relations, however the history of relations between peoples is punctured with "new beginnings, collapsed old orders and proclaimed new arrangements" (Ryser 1996:139). The present political order was instituted at the Congress of Munster and Osnabrug in 1648 and is known as the Peace of Westphalia:

*This treaty brought an end to the Thirty-Years War between the keepers of the flame for the Holy Roman Empire in Austria and Spain, and the monarchies of France and "Swedeland." At the same*



*time the peace treaty created new structures between emerging "European Christian States," established monarchs as sovereigns in their own right, formalised borders between separate sovereigns, affirmed that all states would be ruled under the guiding hand of the Catholic Church and established mutual recognition of sovereignty as the basis for state legitimacy (Westphalia, 1648) (Ryser 1996:140; see also Ryser 1994b).*

Instead of an individual or family unit being the focus of sovereign authority, the Peace of Westphalia established a new political order typified by the distribution of sovereignty between States (see Wilmer 1993). Exercising governmental power within the framework of a State evolved into a "generally accepted system predicated on the principles of legal universality and of individual rights" (Ryser 1994b:NET). Initially only affecting Western Europe, as a result of global colonization by a few European States, the Westphalian political order spread across the world: "Independent states loosely connected to each other and supported by international and regional organizations defined the new international political order of the 19th and 20th centuries" (Ryser 1996:142-143).

The Westphalian system of States has functioned for close to four hundred years on a basic premise: "Universal standards for political sovereignty and political organization would ensure peaceful relations between peoples and promote global stability" (Ryser 1996:145). However, just as smaller political units (States) contested and eventually supplanted empires, even smaller units of human political organization have arisen to challenge the power and legitimacy of modern States:

*These smaller units (sometimes much larger than many individual modern states) are the world's more than five thousand nations; the original peoples whose cultures distinguish them one from the other. The peoples and territories that are these nations are the building blocks from which virtually every state is made (Ryser 1996:145).*

### ***The Repressive State***

"Bedrock nations" (Griggs ND:NET; 1992) existed prior to all States (see Nietschmann 1994, Ryser 1996). War became, and remains, the vehicle by which States appropriate ('State-building') the territories and peoples of bedrock nations. State governments tend to share and reproduce State-building strategies, and since "the common underpinnings of such strategies are force and tyranny, most are repressive and are reeled out with but minor variations" (Nietschmann 1994:234; emphasis added). The 'theory of the repressive State' proposes that because no indigenous nation cedes its independence freely, State-building proceeds through "various military and legal mopping-up stages," many of which may exist simultaneously "creating a single historical geographic process" (Nietschmann 1994:234). Viewing State-building as a historical-geographical sequence facilitates the defense of nations and understandings of State buildup and breakdown.

While nations predate States, all States attempt to erase the histories and geographies of the nations they occupy, through programs commonly referred to as 'nation-building': programs which are "based on political, cultural and territorial integration and development and education" (Nietschmann 1994:229) through the creation of common symbols (flags, national anthems, history and school-map geography). However, when States speak of nation-building they are, in most cases, undertaking "state-building by nation-destroying" (Nietschmann 1986:2, 1994:229; see also Connor 1978).

### **The Definition of Statehood by the Terms of the**



*The specific definitions frequently cited...include a political entity which: (1) exercises independent sovereignty (Article 73), (2) is recognised by other states (Article 76), (3) has the capacity to defend specific boundaries or lines of demarcation within which it exercises absolute power, and (4) maintains the Catholic religion (Article 77: "The most Christian King shall, nevertheless, be oblig'd to preserve in all and every one of these Countrys the Catholick Religion, as maintain'd under the Princes of Austria, and to abolish all Innovations crept in during the War.") (Westphalia, 1648) (Ryser 1996: 143).*

### **States Breakup or Breakdown**

As States are "artificial creations" (Nietschmann 1994:238) they breakdown and breakup as a part of their life cycle. State breakdown results when new internal boundaries permit greater autonomy for nations within a State (Griggs 1994b:260). State boundaries are generally subject to reorganization when "the political and economic costs of occupation exceed returns, and the empire becomes too expensive to maintain" (Nietschmann 1994:238). Spain's post-Franco development of 17 Autonomous Communities is an example of State breakdown (Griggs 1994b). State breakup refers to "the breakup of a state into 2 new ones" (Griggs 1994b:260). Recent examples of State breakup include Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

State-building by nation-destroying "sows the seeds" (Nietschmann 1994:238) for the State's eventual breakup or breakdown. Particularly significant is the notion that State breakup and breakdown occurs most commonly along the boundaries of historic nations (see Griggs 1994b; Ryser 1992, 1993). Griggs (1994b:260) states that "[t]hese old nation boundaries can be considered cultural faultlines since nations often persist in cultural form centuries after their legal boundaries have been absorbed by expansionist states or nations." When confronted with the reality of internal disintegration due to political turmoil, economic stagnation, and environmental devastation, States typically facilitate their own demise:

*They may expand further (e.g., the USSR's movement into Afghanistan, Argentina's into the Falklands, Morocco's into Saharawi Republic); apply more repression (e.g., Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka in the 1980s and Burma in the 1980s and 1990s); loosen up economic control but maintain the political and military occupation of nations (e.g., the USSR in the later 1980s); try to decentralise as little as possible within the existing state system (e.g., Canada and Quebec and home rule for indigenous peoples in the north); or develop a new method of international governance based on federations or confederations of nations that run their own affairs domestically and loosely unite to run the affairs of regions (trade, pollution, communications, defence and illegal drugs) (Nietschmann 1994:238-239).*

Griggs (1994a, 1994b) and Ryser (1994b) offer an example of a new method of international governance based on confederal organising along national and regional lines; the emerging Europe of Regions (ER) movement (State breakdown). Encompassing 130 nations inside the boundaries of 35 States, discussions are taking place within the framework of the European community (see Griggs 1994a, 1994b; Ryser 1994b). The central goal is to create a European Union (EU) (State breakup) that more closely aligns with geographic realities:

*For instance, the physical geography of Europe does not always fit*



*well with economic dominance by state capital. Malmö, the capital of Skaneland, is hundreds of kilometres closer to Copenhagen than it is to Stockholm but politics rather than local geography dictates that Skaneland make its trading hub the latter rather than the former (Griggs 1994b:263).*

The EU seeks to encourage trade and free regional economies by reinvigorating old trading regions that emulate geographic logic rather than politically bounded spaces: "One example is the European Union-sponsored Atlantic Arc that renews the ancient trading line among Cornwall, Brittany, Galicia, and Portugal" (Griggs 1994a:6, 1994b:263; see Figure 4). This new international endeavour places States under serious pressure, as do international conflicts which contribute to the breakdown or breakup of States (I will return to nation-State conflicts shortly).

## **RAPING THE WORLD: MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT ( [note 4](#) )**

*The needs and interests of political states and indigenous groups are in many ways diametrically opposed to one another. Political states view uncontrolled growth and progress as the highest idea, while indigenous groups regard balance and limited growth essential to their livelihood. From all appearances these ideas cannot be reconciled. We must reconcile the differences or a great deal of humankind will not survive (World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) 1979:NET).*

In the globalized world, industrialization, capitalism and modernization have increasingly alienated peoples (indigenous and non-indigenous) from land and nature in differing ways. ( [note 5](#) ) The past few decades have witnessed a massive acceleration in the rate at which indigenous peoples have been deprived of their lands and livelihoods by imposed development programs. Characterized by unchecked resource exploitation, these development programs have increasingly been brought to international attention; especially at a time when it has become apparent that they pose grave and irreversible threats to the earth's bio-cultural diversity.

### ***The New Wave of Colonialism***

Third World colonialism has replaced European colonialism as the main global force threatening indigenous nations' survival today. The wave of post-WWII decolonisation created the boundaries of Third World States "largely on the artificial outlines of the vanquished colonial empires" (Nietschmann 1986:2). As the notion of decolonisation was not extended to indigenous nations, Fourth World nations are now the subjects of recolonization and internal colonialism. In artificial Third World States, like the Philippines, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Indonesia and Bangladesh, economic development is used to invade Fourth World nations (see Duhaylungsod and Hyndman 1993; Hyndman 1994a; Nietschmann 1986). For example,

*The mining frontier expands in Indonesia and PNG by dispossessing indigenous nations from their land and resources and degrading the environment. Nations manage resources and states consume them. Melanesian indigenous nations maintain the quality of their lands, waters and resources but Third World states like Indonesia and PNG do not. A system that does work is being destroyed to maintain a system that does not work (Hyndman 1994a: 177-178).*

The strategy that many States like Indonesia and Bangladesh employ to annex indigenous nations' lands, territories and natural resources is termed 'transmigration' - the resettlement of people loyal to, or dependent on, a central government, backed by military force, "with almost all expenses lobbied for by transnationals and provided by international development agencies" (Nietschmann 1986:6). In Indonesia, the Jakarta government lists



seven goals for its transmigration program: "to promote national unity, national security, an equal distribution of the population, national development, the preservation of nature, help to the farming classes and improvement of the condition of local peoples" (Nietschmann 1986:7; emphasis in original). The reality is:

*...the spread of poverty; forced displacement of indigenous peoples from their homes, communities and lands; deforestation and social damage at the rate of some 200,000 hectares per year...destruction of local governments, economies, means of sustainable resource use; forced assimilation programs; wide-spread use of military force to "pacify" areas and to break local resistance by bombing and massacring civilians (Nietschmann 1986: 7).*

It is obvious that the fallacy of 'nation-building' disguises the real situation of 'nation-destroying' by State expansion: "Capture and control of resources, not extension of politics or economic philosophy, is behind the plunder and confrontation for control" (Duhaylungsod and Hyndman 1993:141; see also Hyndman 1994a; Nietschmann 1986) of indigenous nations' frontiers.

### ***Social and Political Issues: Challenging Notions of Sustainable Development***

Like the fallacy of 'nation-building' technical definitions of 'sustainability' also deny the social and political issues implicit in the notion of sustainability (and by extension conservation movements). As Colchester (1994: 70) notes:

*As the WCED [World Commission on Environment and Development] study acknowledges, achieving sustainability implies a radical transformation in present-day economies. It requires a fundamental change in the way natural resources are owned, controlled and mobilised. To be sustainable, development must meet the needs of local people, for if it does not, people will be obliged by necessity to take from the environment more than planned. Sustainability is fundamentally linked to concepts of social justice and equity, both within generations and between generations, as well as both within nations and between nations...Achieving sustainability thus implies major political changes.*

Even when government policies are nominally designed to discriminate in favour of indigenous communities, rights to traditional lands and to control of development are systematically denied; disenfranchising policies are underpinned by deeply held prejudices. One example (of many worldwide) is illustrated by Colchester (1994: 73):

*These [disenfranchising policies] have been most explicitly stated in Indonesia, where so-called **suku suku terasing** ('isolated and alien peoples') are defined by the government as 'people who are isolated and have a limited capacity to communicate with other more advanced groups, resulting in their having backward attitudes, and being left behind in the economic, political, socio-cultural, religious and ideological development process'.*

It is clear that implicit in the Indonesian government's formulation of development is the notion that societies or nations may be placed on a social Darwinist evolutionary scale; 'developed' States (i.e. Indonesia) are the most advanced and the so-called 'underdeveloped' indigenous nations are those who have not yet undergone the necessary transformations towards prosperity and economic growth (they are in a 'backward' state). Government directed development initiatives are often justified as being 'in the national interest' (national security and identity) and the State is therefore exercising its power of 'eminent domain' in denying local peoples' rights (see Colchester



Indonesia is just one example of a State which considers development to be a transition from one type of economic system to another; a transition which implies both economic growth (increased production and increased per capita income) and socio-cultural change for the better. Intrinsic to the historical development of the capitalist system of production is the tendency to expand frontiers of economic activity in order to amass surplus value:

*Historically, capitalism is thus an expansive or predatory system, constantly in search of new fields of operation. Thus the phenomena of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism may all be interpreted not only as phases in the development of a capitalist productive system, but also as expansions which are necessary in developed countries. (Seymour-Smith 1986:31)*

With capitalist expansionism has come exploitation of indigenous nations and their environments; both ecological exploitation of resources in the environment and economic exploitation with the extraction of surplus value from producers. The capitalist ideologies of expansion and growth also entail the expropriation of indigenous lands; generally carried out by the State as part of programs of land reform or as part of nationalisation schemes affecting foreign or national private capital enterprises. Colchester (1994:75-76) again provides one of many examples:

*The most severe problem that forest peoples face throughout South and South-East Asia is the lack of recognition of their customary rights to their land...The main result of this lack of land security has been the massive take-over of forest peoples' lands by expanding lowland populations and enterprises...The denial of communal land rights and their fragmentation into individually owned plots has undermined traditional systems of resource management, shifting cultivation in particular.*

### **Nation and State Conflicts**

*States and nations represent two seemingly irrepressible forces in collision: states, with their large armies, expansionist ideologies and economies, and international state-support networks, and nations, with their historical and geographic tenacity anchored by the most indestructible of all human inventions - place-based culture (Nietschmann 1994:236-237).*

Nation versus nation and State versus nation conflicts since World War II (WWII) have produced the most extended and abundant wars, inflicted some of the most extreme measures of genocide on civilians, created the greatest number of refugees, and, unfortunately, have the fewest peaceful solutions (see Nietschmann 1987, 1994). Ryser (1996) calculates that of the 250 wars waged since the end of WWII in 1945 until the end of 1994, 145 or 58% are wars between nations and between nations and States - Fourth World wars. Broken down further, 111 or 77% of all Fourth World wars are nation versus State wars and 22 or 15% are nation versus nation wars (see Ryser 1996). Of these Fourth World wars, 85 or 59% continue today (see Ryser 1996), and many will continue into the next century. According to Ryser (1996:25), "intimidation by the use of state power is the single most common explanation for violent contention between nations and states" (note 6). While these violent confrontations tend to be multi-faceted, most are rooted in territoriality and political status issues with the major secondary component being economics (see Ryser 1996). These wars by bedrock nations are essentially about their self-determination.



These conflicts include wars of environmental destruction where groups on behalf of the State (usually economic developers) generate death and devastation in Fourth World nations: "The act of development instills terror, causes psychological and somatic trauma and produces death either as a result of direct combat or as a consequence of destroyed habitat" (Ryser 1996:18; emphasis in original). Wilmer (1993:193) refers to the psychological trauma experienced by many indigenous peoples ('captive cultures') as a form of "posttraumatic stress disorder"; a disorder which is historical in nature and firmly based in tribal, community and personal histories. As Wilmer (1993:193) states:

*At a very personal level, meaning cannot be created and maintained until, and only as long as, an individual is able to locate herself or himself within a cultural universe of meaning and continuity. The destruction of culture inflicts real harm on individual human beings. One culture cannot simply be removed and another transplanted in an individual without committing a violation of the dignity and integrity of that individual.*

The irony is that in most cases these developers and their States suffer no casualties.

*More than three-fourths of the Fourth World wars studied were of the nation vs state type suggesting that it is in the nature of the failed capacity of the state to accommodate the nation that there is contention in the first place (Ryser 1996:38).*

Much of the violence perpetrated against indigenous nations is hidden by common consensus between States to transform the terminology of conflict: "aggressive conflict between states is called war; a nation's defense against aggression by a state is called terrorism; and the aggressive invasion and occupation of a nation by a State is called development" (Nietschmann 1986:2, 1987). Additionally, despite the fact that so many of the world's wars, refugees and genocide are the result of conflict over territory, resources and political status between States and nations, they do not come under international laws, rules, instruments, conventions or agreements: "States make international laws...From the point of view of the state, only "terrorists" resist state takeover" (Nietschmann 1987:1, 1994:237; see also Ryser 1996). Without new international laws, policies and multi-lateral institutions which recognize nations and their claims, many of these wars will continue, as will the deaths resulting from these nation-State conflicts. ([note 7](#))

## **ALTERNATIVES**

### **The interdependence of biological and cultural diversity**

Since the late 1980s 'sustainable development' (popularized by the United Nations' WCED) has become a major catch-phrase associated with development (and allied to conservation issues); referring "to the means by which "development" is made to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs" (Colchester 1994:70). However, many development institutions have adopted technical definitions of sustainability - "'ecosystems' continued production of goods or services or the maintenance of biodiversity - without any emphasis on human needs or sustaining livelihoods" (Colchester 1994:70). These types of definitions, in their search for ecologically sound production systems, effectively divorce technologies from their wider context; contexts which encompass social, economic, physical, technical and political environments (see Chapin 1991). Any search for ecologically sound production systems must take into account both human cultural resources (eg. applied traditional knowledge and resource management strategies) and biological resources;



both are necessary for the maintenance of the dynamic evolutionary processes involved in plant-human interactions (see Oldfield and Alcorn 1991).

To date, technical definitions of sustainability deny the interdependence of cultural and biological diversity. Nonetheless, concern about the loss of cultural and biological diversity has increased significantly over the past decade (see Hitchcock 1994). The earth's biological diversity, its ecological diversity, "is mirrored by the diversity of cultures humans created over great lengths of time" (Ryser 1996:6; see also Tauli-Corpuz 1993). Biological diversity refers to the variety of species, genes, and environments of the world (see Hyndman 1994b; Nietschmann 1994). Cultural diversity refers to the variety of human life ways, knowledge, and landscapes (see Hyndman 1994b; Nietschmann 1994). Biological and cultural diversity are mutually dependant, they are also geographically codeterminant (see Elford's maps 1995). Nietschmann (1991:373) clarifies:

*In Central America...as in other regions of the world, most remaining wildlife and wildlands exist where indigenous peoples exist. In non-indigenous areas, the same forces that degraded and destroyed biodiversity and environments did the same to indigenous peoples. Where indigenous people survived, so too did biologically rich environments. This means that the best guarantee for the survival of nature is the survival of indigenous peoples, and vice versa.*

By applying the theory of Fourth World environments two rules can be elicited: (1) 'The Rule of Indigenous Environments' - "where there are still indigenous peoples with homelands there are still biologically rich environments" (Nietschmann 1992:3, 1994:239); and conversely, and strikingly, (2) 'The Rule of State Environments' - non-indigenous environments are almost always destructive of generic and biological diversity (see Nietschmann 1994).

### ***Indigenous Nations Fight Back***

*To indigenous peoples sustainable development means meeting the basic needs for subsistence in partnership with nature. It means maintaining a spiritual and reciprocal relationship with nature and all living creatures and non-living things in it. They cannot abuse nature because it is tantamount to abusing themselves or abusing their mothers but also because their needs are very simple and the indigenous technologies, skills and processes they have developed are appropriate and in harmony with nature (Tauli-Corpuz 1993: 12).*

For centuries indigenous peoples have been actively manipulating, modifying, utilising and caring for their homelands, turning their environments into humanised, cultural landscapes and seascapes (see Chapin 1991; Hyndman 1994b) ecologically maintained through established forms of sustainable resource-management. An example of ecologically sustainable resource-management strategies (once again from thousands all over the world) is given by Clarke (1990:24), 'polycultural agricultural systems' in some Pacific communities:

*Recognisable orchards have been described for many Pacific communities, for example, on Santa Cruz by Yen (1974) or the highland fringe of New Guinea by Clarke (1972). Often, too, what looks at first glance like wild forest is really a humanised orchard in which almost all species are useful and many trees and shrubs may have been planted or encouraged. Rather than being a compartmentalised sector of the economy as forestry is today, traditional arboriculture was an integral part of agriculture, housing, medicine, and the production of a wide range of material goods,*



*while at the same time providing ecological services such as shade, erosion control, watershed protection, and habitats for wildlife.*

It is fair to surmise that most of the world's States are essentially governments without environments or resources as they are actually located within the lands and territories of indigenous nations; pre-existing nations who have successfully maintained, and stewarded for future generations, their lands, territories, waters and resources. Most States have come to exist because of their invasion and take-over of indigenous resources and environments; military force is often resorted to in the face of non-consent. However, the intimate association between indigenous peoples and their land, and their determination to maintain their way of life, is most obviously expressed in their worldwide opposition to imposed destructive change. For example, the Dayak peoples of Sarawak have been struggling against loggers and the resultant deforestation of their homelands: -

*...denied legal or political means of defending their lands, [the Dayak] have resorted to setting up human barricades across the logging roads to defend the forests around their longhouses. The government has responded with mass arrests and with a new law making all interference with logging roads a criminal offence. Yet despite the intimidation and threats, the blockades have been persistently re-erected, halting timber extraction on the concessions of prominent politicians such as the Minister for Environment and Tourism (Colchester 1994:82).*

Not all resistance has been subtle, but whether violent or not, and whether successful or not, "the most important and enduring outcome of these conflicts over natural resources has been the local, national and international mobilization and organization that has resulted" (Colchester 1994:85).

### ***The Key to the Future***

#### ***Conservation by Self-determination and Self-determination by Conservation***

Fortunately, in more recent years it has become increasingly clear to some conservationists that biodiversity cannot be sustained without cultural diversity and the preservation of traditional environmental knowledge; "symbiotic conservation" (Hyndman 1994b:300) is essential. However, what still remains contestable is how best to integrate traditional resource management knowledge, and associated customs and techniques, into effective and useful national development and conservation endeavours involving sustainable resource management and protection. As Nietschmann (1991:372; see also Colchester 1994) points out:

*Most indigenous peoples are not simply interested in economic alternatives to resource use, but in reestablishing or reinforcing their control and self-determination over their territory so that they can effectively use their own time-proven and culturally based conservation and resource management systems - sometimes augmented by incorporating the best knowledge and planning from Western societies.*

One recent development, the Miskito Coast Protected Area (MCPA) (which has recently been incorporated into the Windward Project of central American nations) represents a grassroots endeavour which provides an alternate model for protecting environments and wildlife; "it is... forging a different example because its starting point is that indigenous self-determination and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing" (Nietschmann 1991:373; see also Elford 1995; Houseal, MacFarland, Archibold and Chiari 1985 for information on a similar project under the Kuna Yala). Elford (1995:109), in her study of conservation by self-determination in



*conservation by self-determination has potential as a theoretically grounded program of action capable of changing conditions, engendering new understandings, and contributing to the emancipation of the oppressed nations of the Fourth World.*

Nation self-determination by conservation and conservation by nation self-determination, is increasingly (and ironically, since most indigenous societies were sustainable before capitalist invasion and expansionism) being recognized by conservationists and protected-area specialists who are now working more and more with indigenous nations. Similar notions of ethnodevelopment (note 8) and ecodevelopment (note 9) as alternatives to capitalist economic development projects are also being put forward by some indigenous nations and planners as ways to maintain cultural and biological diversity.

It should not be concluded naively that all established indigenous systems of resource use are undisputedly 'sustainable' and above criticism, but rather that they are far more diverse, complex and subtle than outsiders realise (see Colchester 1994). The social, cultural and institutional strengths inherent in established indigenous systems of resource use need to be built on to achieve sustainability. While States continue to dismiss indigenous resource-management strategies as 'backward' and 'wasteful', environmental and biological devastation will continue at a rapid speed: State environments will remain dominated by State people, "centrifugal economies" and biological impoverishment, while important nation environments - characterised by ecologically adapted and long-standing resident peoples, "centripetal economies" (Nietschmann 1992:3; 1994:259-260; see also Hyndman 1994b) and the world's surviving biological diversity (both land and sea scapes) - will continue to be destroyed to the detriment of all. While it is clear that State-building by nation-destruction is unsustainable, the challenge for the immediate future is how to achieve global environmental security through joint indigenous nation/State co-operation programs (see Hyndman 1994b; Menchu 1994):

If we manage to establish some sort of mutual respect and understanding, and in the process learn to work together toward a set of common goals, we may just succeed in salvaging some of the earth's precious biological and cultural diversity (Chapin 1990:3).

*As the environment of the planet we all share, the source of life which many indigenous people call Mother Earth, continues to deteriorate after centuries of abuse, a philosophy that incorporates all living and nonliving things in its vision is being sought...Long proud of our tradition as "caretakers of the earth," indigenous people are combining energies to raise awareness of the need for everyone to become active defenders of the remaining wildlife and wilderness - a part of the world that has now become totally dependent on human generosity and sensitivity for its continued survival (The Native American Council of New York City 1994:19).*

## **Epilogue**

Much of the political activism of indigenous nations is directed towards the rhetorical issues that underpin their on-going marginalisation. Their demand for inclusion in "global civic discourse" (Wilmer 1993:36) directly challenges and deconstructs the meaning of normative international assumptions and values surrounding the concepts of modernisation, progress and development advanced by the imperialist culture of States:



*In confronting and challenging the legitimacy of policies resulting in forced assimilation, relocation, the introduction of deadly alien epidemics, and the sanctioning of private violence by settlers, indigenous peoples have targeted the source - the meaning of development itself. For instance, representatives of the indigenous Yanomamo people in Brazil travelled to the World Bank in the 1980s and argued before Bank officials that "development can have many meanings. Your interpretation of development is material. Ours is spiritual. Spiritual development is as legitimate as material development." (Wilmer 1993:37; see also Dallam 1991).*

Indigenous nations do not simply oppose modernization or progress. Instead, they assert the right to define and pursue development and progress in a manner compatible with their own cultural contexts. They champion the right to choose the scale and terms of their interaction with other cultures. In order to achieve and secure cultural, political and economic rights, sovereignty and self-determination have become some of the most important values sought by the international movement of indigenous nations. The rise of Fourth World theory offers one of the greatest challenges theorist will have to contend with this century.

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# The Boundaries of Afrikaner Self-Determination

by Dr. Richard A. Griggs

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## Independent Trust Project

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South Africa has long been a veritable laboratory for those interested in the study of boundaries: ethnic homelands, destroyed by tribal wars and European invasion then reinvented by apartheid, were recently dismantled under the new government of national unity; relatively autonomous provinces that numbered four between 1910 and 1994 were largely disempowered under apartheid but recently multiplied to nine and were re-empowered; boundaries that created apartheid cities are now being rearranged to provide for integration. Potentially disrupting or at least affecting all these South African experiments with boundaries has been the quest for an Afrikaner homeland. On May 26, 1994, in accordance with section 184A of the Interim Constitution the Volkstaat Council, a body of twenty persons, was established to seek out the boundaries of an autonomous region for the Afrikaners. (Note 1) In May 1995, the Volkstaat Council released its report. (Note 2) The proposal, if accepted in its entirety, would establish an ethnic homeland, affect the boundaries of all nine provinces, and lead to civic councils for Afrikaners at the municipal scale (Figures One and Two).

While many non-territorial solutions to ethnic conflict are possible ranging from affirmative action to complete assimilation (or technically even genocide), (Note 3) the Volkstaat Council was specifically tasked with finding a territorial solution. This might have included one or some mix of fifteen different kinds of possible arrangements (Note 4):

1. partition (Cyprus)
2. ethnic federalism (Ethiopia)
3. functional federalism (United States)
4. municipal autonomy (Hamburg)
5. municipal independence (San Marino)
6. regional autonomy (Faeroe Islands, Denmark)
7. administrative devolution (Scotland in the United Kingdom)
8. consociation (Switzerland)
9. mixed autonomous arrangements (Spain)
10. special protection (biosphere reserves of the Kuna, Panama)
11. communalism (millet system in the Ottoman Empire)
12. drawing electoral boundaries according to ethnicity (apartheid South Africa)
13. market-based boundaries (voluntary segregation in cities)
14. regional boundaries that mitigate ethnic tensions along state boundaries (EU)
15. confederation or commonwealth status (Federated States of Micronesia)

The Volkstaat Council is suggesting a mixed territorial solution that combines a federated Volkstaat with selected autonomous regions and local councils (2, 9, and 11 above). The Volkstaat Council first seeks a territory with its own system of justice, citizenship, schools, taxation, police, and laws including the power to conclude treaties with other states. The Council sees this as somewhat similar to the German Lander which have wide-ranging powers and can be independently involved in trade negotiations and certain kinds of treaties. Secondly, for areas in which the Afrikaner has no clear majority, some autonomous arrangements are proposed. In sum, the Volkstaat is proposed as an ethnic state with an international identity yet a constituent part of South Africa and some Afrikaners not falling within those boundaries



could be part of certain autonomous areas.

## **The Boundaries of the Volkstaat**

The Volkstaat spatial design centers around Pretoria to include nearly two-million people of which the Afrikaners are now a sixty percent majority. It comprises an area of some 38 000 square kilometers (3,2% of South Africa) split into Eastern and Western halves (Figure Two). The western sector of 23 000 square kilometers includes some 460 000 Afrikaners and offers a majority of 58%. The eastern half of 15 000 square kilometers includes some 715 000 Afrikaners or 61% of the local population. This initial Volkstaat would affect the boundaries of Gauteng, the North West, and the Eastern Transvaal.

The additional autonomous areas number five but involve six sets of boundaries (the South Eastern Cape Autonomous Area is bifurcated). These areas would not be a formal part of the Volkstaat but would include "civic councils" and might be future areas of incorporation. The autonomous areas taken together with the Volkstaat suggest a dispersed and fragmented political geography similar to the former Bophuthatswana (Figure 3) except larger in area. This amounts to a total of 11,5% of South Africa (8,35% for the autonomous areas and 3,2% Volkstaat) or 134 000 square kilometers (about the size of Greece).

The boundaries of the Volkstaat and autonomous areas are perceived in the report as both culturally hard and economically soft. As cultural boundaries, they are perceived as open to the influx of Afrikaners but relatively closed to others who do not meet certain cultural criteria. An exception is made for pre-existing non-Afrikaner residents who may become immediate citizens of the Volkstaat and those who immigrate thereafter and reside in the territory continuously for ten years. In economic terms, the boundaries are perceived as soft and open to full participation in the South African economy.

## **Significance**

This report and reaction to it are of significance to understanding the role of boundaries in conflict resolution. It is typical for many academics to see nation-building by state-destroying (separatism) as a prime source of contemporary war and conflict. (Note 5) Other social scientists have identified state-building by nation-destroying (assimilation) as a principal source of ethnic violence rather than nationalism per se. (Note6) If a territorial resolution to Afrikaner nationalism can be found within a state that has an open and established programme of "nation-building," it has practical and theoretical ramifications for some 170 multinational states. (Note 7) This case may not be typical, however, and this is also important to note with regard to any comparisons that might be made. From an international perspective, the proposed Volkstaat differs in at least three ways: (1) an ethnic group that previously dominated the state through the radical partition of the black population into semi-independent "homelands" is constitutionally required to propose a homeland for itself; (2) the Afrikaner population is dispersed and lacks any easily recognisable majority in any one place; and (3) the boundaries of the proposed Volkstaat are not fixed but mobile: the Council perceives that Afrikaner majorities may develop in certain areas and become an eventual part of the Volkstaat.

The first point is rich with irony and establishes the unique character of the South African situation. While many (most?) Twentieth Century states engaged in assimilationist policies that backfired as oppressed minorities revolted, South Africa engaged in segregationist policies that also backfired but as the majority revolted. Rather than partitioning off the blacks from a white-dominated South Africa, Afrikaners are now attempting to excise a white state from a black-dominated South Africa.



Regarding these second point the lack of any existing demarcated area on the map complicates the Afrikaner basis for territorial claims: a right to self-determination based upon a culture derived within certain territories. The Transvaal, which was once the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek and the Orange Free State both have black majorities making these claims difficult and dubious. In the April 1994 elections the most any of the proposed areas polled for the Freedom Front was in the autonomous zone of Drakensberg-North which claimed around thirty percent of the voters (Phalaborwa has been dubbed the "right-wing capital" of South Africa). (Note 8) On average the proposed areas took ten to twenty percent of the vote including the Freedom Front's designated Volkstaat.

Finally, an expectation of population movement is implied in the Volkstaat proposal although "at the time of the creation of the Volkstaat, Afrikaners must constitute a majority of the population." (Note 9) This does not amount to forced relocation as in the former homelands but the Council provides for the possibility that the self-determination drive of Afrikaner people may see the enlargement of their territorial base through migration to these areas.

## Prognosis

The spatial outcome of political processes is not scientifically predictable but taking into account the discourse of various political parties, the present political climate of reconciliation, and the political power structure set against the actors that shape it, the probability of a powerful Volkstaat is low but the probability of some concession is high. The obstacles to achieving a territorially large and highly independent Volkstaat include a wide variety of legal, political, social, and geographic problems. Chief among these are constitutional conflicts. The first chapter and first principle of the interim constitution plainly states that "the Republic of South Africa shall be one sovereign state." (Note 10) A Volkstaat as a political achievement also seems remote considering that a two-thirds majority of both the state parliament and the parliaments of affected provinces are required to make such drastic boundary changes. (Note 11)

Socially, the idea of a Volkstaat is widely perceived in class terms: setting up areas of white privilege in a country that requires teamwork to rebuild. In effect, the Afrikaners would be excusing themselves from a problem they created. Other social factors relate to popular discourse: the concept of "non-racialism" and the common South African conflation of culture with race (a legacy of Apartheid) has created a majoritarian populist discourse in which ethnicity is regarded as a false consciousness created by either class struggle or ambitious politicians. (Note 12) This discourse has also been coloured by fears of Zulu secessionism and there is widespread fear that to relent to Afrikaner self-determination may mean the beginning of state breakdown and civil war.

Geographically, the staged design of a Volkstaat requires initial alterations to at least three provinces and may eventually affect all nine provincial boundaries--a debate the new government is loathe to re-open given the division and conflict that accompanied the working out of the present boundaries. Furthermore high hopes are unlikely to form the basis for boundary demarcations or constitutional policy. The report's visionary nature even foresees that a region of the Northern Cape, now comprising 17% Afrikaners (if the coloured population is excluded) could become a future point of migration and for this purpose suggests a constitutional "Declaration of Intent" to claim this area.

Despite these complexities, there are reasons that some concessions will be made to the Volkstaat Council. The ANC and Nelson Mandela, in particular, are anxious to illustrate that compromise and negotiation are more effective tools of change than violence. The Volkstaat report was very warmly received by President Mandela who announced before television cameras and news



reporters his intent to show that compromise works. (Note 13) The report, coming amid calls of secret secessionist plans by the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and a recent IFP walkout on constitutional debates may be well-timed. (Note 14) It seems that some Pretoria-based concession, perhaps less than what the Volkstaat Council submitted, is likely. The government is in some ways obligated to reward the Freedom Front for constructive participation in government. The package of constitutional amendments supporting the Volkstaat Council were the result of peace negotiations that brought the Freedom Front into the April 1994 elections. The government is also anxious to illustrate to violent right-wing factions and the IFP that a peaceful and structured approach to ethnic aspirations can work. Stability is recognised by all major political parties as the cornerstone of economic growth, social development, and democratic nation-building.

Given that the dominant party, the ANC, is clearly opposed to ethnic divisions of the country, it is likely to suggest some designated areas for cultural self-determination and economic development by citizen councils. The region around Pretoria as identified by the Volkstaat Council subject to some modifications is a likely candidate. The area of Oranje along the Northern Cape/Southern Free State border is also a possible candidate as a second autonomous area (popular will and an Afrikaner majority). The latter formed part of earlier proposals to include large portions of the Northern and Western Cape where the Afrikaans language is dominant but not necessarily by racial categories. By including Oranje, a greater mix of political aspirations and proposals would be appeased.

## Conclusion

The scenario of an independent Volkstaat on the model of the former homelands is politically, geographically, socially, and legally inconceivable. This means that Verwoed's plans for a "measles geography" of independent Afrikaner territories put forth by organisations such as the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF) will not be taken seriously. In fact, since all ethnically-based Afrikaner parties except the Freedom Front fall outside the constitutional process, it is to the advantage of the Government of National Unity (GNU) to only consider proposals from this one government-sanctioned study. This is the present strategy which makes the Freedom Front proposal the only viable document from which to negotiate a compromise.

Geopolitical pressures upon the GNU to "reward" participation and to serve notice upon those who choose violence or boycotts over negotiation impels the government to offer a counter-proposal or what has been termed in popular lexicon as a "deelstaat." The geographic possibility that creates the least friction and brings the Afrikaners closest to the ideal of national unity while supporting key government programmes such as Reconstruction and Development are cultural councils and economic development zones in areas of Afrikaner concentration. The recent negotiations to send Afrikaner farmers to Mozambique to help rebuild its shattered agricultural sector has already set a precedent for socially constructing an identity of Afrikaners as entrepreneurs of notable value in building the New South Africa. This means that one route to conflict resolution may be through uplifting and bolstering Afrikaner self-esteem by entrusting this minority with a distinct, place-based, and identity-building role in economic development. The areas identified by the Volkstaat Council around Greater Pretoria, Oranje, or even Phalaborwa, could be the geographic starting points for such a political experiment. If successful, it will provide a model of nation-building based on constructing rather than deconstructing territorial identities such that South Africa circumvents both state-building by nation-destroying and nation-building by state-destroying through compromise, rewarding participation, and offering interdependent roles for self-determined "nations" within a recognised state.

# Salmon, Tribes, and Hydropower Dams in the U.S. Puget Sound

by Jovana Brown, Ph.D.

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Western Washington State (in the United States of America) is dominated by the Puget Sound, an inland sea which is the center, literally and figuratively, of the area. Linked to the ocean by the Strait of San Juan de Fuca, the Puget Sound basin extends south for over one hundred miles between the Olympic and Cascade Mountains.

Many rivers of differing lengths and water capacity empty into the Sound. There are two rivers which discharge into the southern part of the Sound which provide an interesting contrast. Both the Nisqually River and the Skokomish River have American Indian tribes living at their entrances to Puget Sound. The tribes, the Skokomish Tribe and the Nisqually Tribe, have depended on the resources, particularly salmon, from these rivers for hundreds of years. Both of these rivers also have hydroelectric developments on them which have impacted these tribes in different ways.

Hydroelectric power has been critical to the development of the Pacific Northwest. Utilizing a swiftly flowing river to generate electricity has been an important resource for this area since the 1880's. As part of the general development of hydropower in the Puget Sound region, dams were built on the Skokomish River in the 1930's and on the Nisqually River in the 1940's. Hydroelectric dams, particularly ones that do not have fish ladders or that divert water out of the river channel, have contributed to the decline of salmon in the Pacific Northwest (U.S., Interior, Elwha Report, 1994). Federally recognized Indian tribes in Western Washington State have treaty protected off-reservation fishing rights to take fish at their "usual and accustomed places" (Kappler, 1904). Thus, the development of the hydroelectric power resource has had a major impact on salmon and on Indian treaty rights.

This chapter looks at the relationship between groups of people of differing cultures and their use of natural resources. It examines in particular how different cultures perceive and use natural resources, in this case rivers. For the Indians the river was a source of salmon, the foundation of their economy and culture. For Euro-Americans preeminent value was placed on the river as an energy source. In pursuing this purpose, Euro-Americans have altered the rivers in various ways. This in turn has led to a decline of salmon, which is so critical a resource for the indigenous populations located on these rivers. Thus the Indians ability to use the salmon resource has been displaced. They no longer have access to the abundance of salmon that they had. They have also been displaced from their control of this resource. In order to ensure that salmon remain in the streams, they must work closely with state and federal agencies. One of these federal agencies is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

This chapter looks at the reasons for the different approaches taken by the two tribes as they participate in the relicensing process for hydroelectric power on these two rivers. Though these rivers are both in the southern Puget Sound region and the tribes are linked linguistically and culturally, tribal involvement in the relicensing process is markedly different. While the Skokomish and Nisqually Indian tribes are both concerned about maintaining water in the rivers (instream flows) for fish habitat, the hydroelectric facilities on the two rivers are quite different. Consequently these tribes are, in fact, taking very different positions regarding relicensing of the respective dams. Thus, this chapter is a case study of the participation of two American Indian tribes in the reauthorization (relicensing) process for these dams on their respective rivers.



The study was carried out by reading of relevant documents, correspondence, observation of the dams, attendance at the scoping meetings (see below), and interviews. In addition, the author has studied tribal natural resource decision making in Washington state for the past decade. When this chapter was written the relicensing process was still underway on both rivers. Thus the issues discussed here had not been resolved.

## **Puget Sound Indian Tribes**

American Indians tribes such as the Suquamish, Tulalip, Skokomish, Nisqually, and many others in the Puget Sound region of what is now Washington State traditionally lived near or at the mouths of rivers. They were and continue to be fishing societies. Fishing for salmon was, and is, central to tribal culture and to their way of life. Tribes depend on salmon as both a food source and as an expression of cultural identity.

When the Indian tribes in the Puget Sound area signed treaties with the federal government in the 1850's they reserved the right to fish as they always had, not only on their reservations, but in their traditional off-reservation fishing locations. The five treaties negotiated by Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens with western Washington tribes contained the following language: "The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory..." (Kappler, 1904, Treaty With the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc., 1854 Article 3).

During the century following the signing of these treaties the tribes were increasingly excluded from their traditional fishing grounds. In the 1960's tribal members began to actively assert their right to fish. In 1970 the federal government filed a lawsuit against the state of Washington to protect treaty fishing rights. In 1974 this treaty right to fish off-reservation was upheld in *U.S. v. Washington* (called the Boldt decision). Following this, subsequent court decisions have stated that the tribes who signed these treaties also have the right to have treaty fish protected from environmental degradation (*U.S. v. Washington* 506 F Supp 203-5 [1980]). Because of the widespread distribution of salmon streams this has provided federally recognized Indian tribes in Western Washington with an important voice in state-wide environmental decision making. This includes co-management, with state fisheries, of the salmon resource, participation in the formulation and implementation of new regulations for forest practices on state and commercial timber lands, and state-wide planning for water resources.

## **Salmon Habitat**

Salmon are anadromous fish. They begin their lives in freshwater streams and rivers, migrate as juveniles downstream to the ocean, and return at the end of their life to their natal stream to spawn. Salmon need clean, flowing streams without human built obstructions such as dams, culverts, or dikes for flood control in order to reproduce and migrate to and from the ocean. Timber harvest in the Northwest with the resulting road building, devastation of riparian (stream side) zones, siltation of streams, and other impacts has also had severe consequences on salmon streams. Withdrawing water from streams and rivers for agricultural, industrial, and domestic use reduces the amount of water in the streams for salmon (instream flow). In addition, development for shipping and industry at the mouths of these rivers has also negatively impacted salmon. All these activities have reduced the amount of good salmon habitat. This has caused a severe decline in the number of wild salmon in the Pacific Northwest in general and in the Puget Sound region specifically.

Hydroelectric dams on the streams running into the Puget Sound are generally

regarded as having been one of the factors leading to the decline of salmon in this region. For the most part these dams were built by private companies in order to produce electric power. Dams built by private companies are licensed and relicensed by the federal government. The agency that is responsible for this is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The next section of this chapter looks briefly at the history of hydropower in the region and at FERC.

## **Hydropower and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission**

In the early part of this century hydropower was considered an important way to harness the nation's rivers for development. Because of the abundance of rainfall and river systems in the Pacific Northwest of the United States, generating electric power from moving or falling water has always been an important source of energy. In fact, "electric power in the Pacific Northwest dates from the early 1880's" (Schwantes, 1989). For example, Washington state's first hydroelectric dam was built in Spokane in 1885 to supply electricity to the town (Schwantes, 1989).

Hydroelectric power remains an important source of energy in this region. Washington state generates nearly half of the nation's supply of hydropower, and state ratepayers pay about half the national average price for electricity. The Pacific Northwest gets 62% of its electricity from hydropower, yet nationwide, hydropower supplies only about 10% of power (Washington's Energy Strategy, 1993)

The use and control of water for the development of the west was an important issue during the progressive era in the United States. Indeed the "movement to construct reservoirs to conserve spring flood waters for use later in the dry season gave rise both to the term 'conservation' and to the concept of planned and efficient progress which lay at the heart of the conservation idea" (Hays, 1959). As a result, promotion and regulation of dams and hydropower occurred in several federal agencies during the early years of this century. The Federal Power Act was passed by Congress in 1920 to "reduce administrative confusion by centralizing the planning and regulation of hydroelectric power in a single agency" (Echeverria, 1989). This became the Federal Power Act in 1935. The Electric Consumers Protection Act, passed by Congress in 1986, amended the 1935 act to include the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife in projects. Thus FERC is now supposed to consider environmental values, i.e., fish and wildlife habitat when issuing licenses and relicenses.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) administers the Federal Power Act, as amended by the Electric Consumers Protection Act. Thus FERC has jurisdiction over non-federal hydroelectric projects proposed or built in the United States. FERC issues licenses for new dams. Licenses are issued for terms of thirty to fifty years. When the license expires FERC decides if the project will be relicensed. This issue is of special concern at the present time. "Over the next several decades, FERC must issue new licenses for hundreds of old dams... designed and built in the 1930s, '40s and '50s" (Grimm, 1990).

The Commission is a five member regulatory body attached to the U.S. Department of Energy. Members are appointed by the President. Much of the actual work and decision making are carried out by the staff of the Commission (Echeverria, 1989). The staff, in turn, often hires outside consulting firms to carry out studies such as environmental impact statements. Thus the staff will schedule a "scoping," i.e., information gathering meeting on licensing or relicensing a dam, and the consulting firm will prepare documents such as the environmental impact statement (EIS).

Observers note that FERC views itself as a quasi-judicial, or court like, body. "Based both on its legislative mandates and on its institutional history, the



Commission's central mission is to decide specific cases - whether or not to permit the construction of a proposed project, or what new terms to impose on a project at the time of relicensing" (Echeverria, 1989). FERC depends on the applicant, other federal and state agencies, Indian tribes, and the general public to submit information for the decision making process. This information is initially collected at the scoping meeting which begins the licensing/relicensing process and continues through the EIS, pre-decision making, and appeal stage.

Thus, the Commission's role is not to actively seek out potential environmental issues or public concerns not already brought to light. As stated above, it relies on the "stakeholders" to supply the information needed for Commission proceedings. Setting the term at fifty years for hydroelectric licenses means that a developer will be able to operate a project for a sufficient number of years to recoup the original investment and to make a reasonable profit. "The fifty year term also means that licenses will automatically terminate and that the Commission is forced periodically to review how a river should be used to serve the public interest" (Echeverria, 1989).

As noted above, the Electric Consumers Protection Act (ECPA) passed in 1986 requires FERC to ensure that older projects are modified to achieve a better balance between power generation and protection of environmental resources. This Act also requires FERC to consider the recommendations of federal and state agencies, as well as Indian tribes, that have jurisdiction over resources that may be affected. Relicensing applicants must include conditions "to adequately and equitably" protect fish and wildlife resources affected by the development, operation, and management of dams. These conditions must be based on the recommendations which are received from state and federal fish and wildlife agencies (Grimm, 1990).

## **FERC and Indian Tribes**

Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act as amended states:

That licenses shall be issued within any reservation only after a finding by the Commission that the license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which such reservation was created or acquired. (16 U.S.C. S 797e)

Thus FERC must take tribal concerns into consideration when issuing a license or relicense for a dam **within** an Indian reservation. However, in the cases being examined here the dams themselves are off-reservation, yet have a profound impact on the tribes' treaty protected fishing rights.

There have been several examples of tribes challenging power companies or FERC in Washington State which included the issue of off-reservation fishing rights. The Yakima Nation sued FERC over the Commission's failure to provide for fish passage facilities on the Rock Island Dam on the Columbia River. The Tulalip Tribes sued FERC about the interpretation of what constituted a dam under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). And the Muckleshoot Tribes sued Puget Sound Power and Light Company, seeking damages for the diversion of water away from its reservation and fisheries.

The principal legacy of the (Tulalip/Yakima cases) will be a curb on FERC's discretion to regulate hydroelectric development, allowing increased participation by other agencies and interest groups... **Yakima** requires the same fishery consideration and environmental procedures in relicensing as in initial licensing (Blumm, 1986)

In fact, the Yakima case and general frustration with FERC's neglect of its environmental obligations led to the 1986 ECPA amendments to the Federal Power Act.

At least two observers, Richard DuBey and Thomas Schlosser see section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act (quoted at the beginning of this section) as a way to improve relations between tribes and hydropower developers and/or FERC. They maintain that we are in a new era with regard to hydropower and the tribes. Hydropower development has had a profound impact on Indian reservations. However, they note that the level of expertise and sophistication of tribal governments is greater than ever before. DuBey and Schlosser recommend a partnership between the project proponent, FERC, and the affected tribe in order to give the tribe a meaningful role in the process. "It is our belief that improved communication between hydropower developers and Indian tribes can provide a timely and effective means of resolving potential conflicts which in the past have posed unforeseen and difficult obstacles in the path of hydropower development" (DuBey and Schlosser, 1983).

In the two examples of relicensing being examined in this chapter, the Nisqually Tribe has achieved this partnership, and the Skokomish Tribe has not. The reasons for these two different circumstances are explored below.

## **The Nisqually River**

The Nisqually River is one of the major western Washington rivers that empties into Puget Sound. It originates in the Nisqually Glacier on Mt. Rainier (thus it begins within a National Park) and flows 81 miles west and northwest to Puget Sound.

The land use in the basin has traditionally been agriculture and timber harvesting. The lower part of the valley is being increasingly developed as a bedroom community for Olympia. The Fort Lewis military reservation occupies the east side of the River. The Nisqually River is one of the most pristine and least developed rivers in Washington State. In its journey to the Puget Sound, the river flows through an amazing variety of habitats - from subalpine meadows and old growth Douglas fir forest in Mount Rainier National Park through forested foothills and across lowland prairies to its estuarine reaches and tidal mudflats (Nisqually River Council, 1991).

For thousands of years, Nisqually Indians have lived along the Nisqually River. The Nisqually Indian Reservation was established by the Medicine Creek Treaty in 1854, which was signed near the mouth of the River. The reservation originally consisted of about 5065 acres on both sides of the Nisqually River, about five and a half miles from the mouth of the River. In 1917 the army condemned approximately two thirds of the reservation on the east side of the River. Today the reservation consists of 1595 acres on the west side of the Nisqually River. There are 450 enrolled tribal members.

The City of Tacoma, Public Utilities Department (hereafter Tacoma Public Utilities) has constructed two hydroelectric dams on the Nisqually River (see Figure 4).

The first dam, located at forty-four river miles is the Alder Dam. It was installed in 1945, has a 285 foot-high dam that created Alder Lake, a 7.1 mile long reservoir. The Alder powerhouse is located at the base of the dam and contains two generating units. Continuing downstream, the Nisqually River reaches the LaGrande diversion dam. A diversion dam was first installed in this location in 1912. The "new" dam, completed in 1944 has a 192 foot-high gravity dam with a small lake behind it. At the LaGrande Dam, the River is diverted downstream, around the natural river bed, for 1.7 miles to the LaGrande powerhouse where the water re-enters the Nisqually River bed. The LaGrande powerhouse has a slightly larger generating capacity than does Alder Dam. Neither of these dams has fish ladders.

Tacoma Public Utilities was issued a license for the Alder and LaGrande dams on the Nisqually River in 1941. The relicensing process is now underway. A



scoping, i.e., information gathering, meeting was held in November, 1993 and FERC and its consulting company are now completing the data gathering stage.

When the Alder/LaGrande complex was completed in 1944, Tacoma Public Utilities began "peaking operations," i.e., releasing additional water for power generation when demand for electricity was the highest in the early mornings and evenings. Operating the dams on this basis continued until the 1970's, rapidly changing the river's flow on a daily basis and harming salmon spawning grounds and the survival of juvenile fish for the entire river downstream. The Nisqually Tribe was concerned about instream flow levels and other downstream water needs.

In 1974 the Nisqually Tribe went to federal district court to ask for sufficient water to be maintained in the River for salmon habitat (instream flows). The judge in the case was Judge George Boldt. Judge Boldt referred the case back to FERC and an administrative law judge. After hearings the administrative law judge established interim minimum water flows and set up the Nisqually River Coordinating Committee (NRCC) made up of the tribe, the state fish and game agencies, and Tacoma Public Utilities to establish instream flows for fisheries. The role of the NRCC was to study the adequacy of the minimum flows and for communication among the parties. "The NRCC was directed to conduct studies to determine adequate fishery flows in the affected section of river..." (U.S., FERC, City of Tacoma, Docket No. P -1862-001, 1993).

The Nisqually River Coordinating Committee successfully established an instream flow regime that is in effect today.

In 1989, the Nisqually Tribe and Tacoma Public Utilities entered into a settlement agreement which resolved all claims and disputes existing between them in the court case. In the agreement, Tacoma Public Utilities assented to providing the minimum flow regime established by the NRCC, and the Tribe agreed to making this minimum flow regime permanent (U.S., FERC, City of Tacoma, Docket No. P -1862-001, 1993). In turn, the Tribe agreed to actively support Tacoma Public Utilities in the FERC relicensing process.

The key part of the settlement agreement, from the Tribe's point of view, was the fact that Tacoma Public Utilities agreed to provide permanent operation and maintenance monies for a new fish hatchery. With this commitment of the monies needed to actually operate the hatchery, the Tribe was able to obtain the capital, i.e., construction costs (eleven million dollars) from Congress (Walter, 1994). The Clear Creek fish hatchery, located on the Fort Lewis side of the Nisqually River, is in operation today and is an important economic resource for the tribe.

Thus the Nisqually Tribe, after this initial court case and the establishment of the NRCC has developed a good working relationship with Tacoma Public Utilities. The NRCC has facilitated this relationship. The Tribe considers that it works in partnership with Tacoma Public Utilities and that it can negotiate in good faith any issues that it wants addressed. Tacoma Public Utilities, in turn, feels that it has a very good working relationship with the Nisqually Tribe.

Interestingly enough, the main intervenors in the current relicensing process are recreational groups that want Tacoma Public Utilities to release water flows into the river gorge immediately below LaGrande Dam for whitewater boating (see 4). A 1992 article in the **Northwest River News** noted that in an effort to ensure that the "fisheries and recreational resources of the Nisqually River are given equal consideration" in the relicensing of the Nisqually Hydroelectric Project, several conservation and recreation organizations are intervening in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) evaluation of the project.

The Northwest Rivers Council (NWRC) filed the intervention in conjunction with

several other recreational groups. The Nisqually Tribe has been very concerned about this intervention. A tribal staff member noted that the NWRC maintained that they were being inclusive, "bringing everyone on-board to find solutions. Yet on the Nisqually they totally ignored all the work the Tribe and others put in on fish habitat over the last fourteen plus years" (Walter, 1992). The Tribe noted that this intervention raised questions about its settlement with Tacoma Public Utilities, would negatively impact fisheries habitat on the River, and questioned the Tribe's "authority as a government to plan for and protect its fisheries resources" (Walter, 1992).

The Nisqually Tribe and the Northwest Rivers Council have subsequently talked about their different positions on the relicensing process. These talks should have occurred before the NWRC intervention, however. The NWRC feels that it was just a lack of communication on its part because it is a volunteer organization (Deschner, 1993). The primary goal of the recreational groups is to increase opportunities for whitewater boating, though they state that they do not want to negatively impact fish habitat with the extra releases of water needed for boating.

Releasing extra amounts of water from the dams on summer weekends in order to accommodate white water rafting and kayaking would decrease the amount of water in the reservoirs that is needed to maintain instream flows in the early fall when the salmon migrate. Essentially the dam fills up with water from the spring and early summer snow melt. There is a finite amount of water available for release during the fall salmon migration period. Additional water in the form of abundant rainfall comes during the fall and winter seasons after the fall salmon migration. Thus, utilizing some of this water for recreational purposes during the summer could mean less water available for fish in the early fall. The Nisqually Tribe remains actively concerned about the recreational groups' intervention in the relicensing process. Though there has been an exchange of views between the recreational interests and the Tribe, the latter continues to feel that the NWRC is not recognizing the Tribe's treaty fishing rights on the River (Walter, 1994).

Tacoma Public Utilities is asking FERC to deny the request to release additional water for whitewater boating. The agency is mainly concerned about their own liability because the specific area that has whitewater rapids is in a steep and inaccessible canyon. In support of their opposition, Tacoma Public Utilities notes that only 200 boaters in the northwestern United States would be qualified to navigate this class V run. This request the agency maintains, should "be balanced against the needs and concerns of the existing natural resources and recreational opportunities" (Nisqually Hydroelectric Project, Aug. 3, 1994).

Thus, the Nisqually Tribe, as part of the settlement discussed above, is actively supporting Tacoma Public Utilities' application for relicensing with FERC. The Tribe feels that it works in partnership with Tacoma Public Utilities and with FERC. This is exactly the kind of partnership that DuBey and Schlosser advocate (see previous section). George Walter, Environmental Program Supervisor of the Nisqually Tribe notes that when FERC staff have any questions about the Nisqually River basin, be it fish runs or bald eagles, they contact Nisqually Tribal staff. "And, most important, the tribe expects to get everything it needs for Nisqually River treaty fisheries resources from the ... settlement (described above) and FERC relicense process" (Walter, 1994). Thus the Tribe is aligned with Tacoma Public Utilities and FERC and has serious concerns about the role of the recreational group in the relicensing process.

## **The Skokomish River**

The Skokomish River is the largest tributary, in terms of volume, in the Hood Canal Basin of Puget Sound in western Washington state. The River begins in



the high rugged Olympic Mountains. The North Fork flows from the Olympic National Park and the South Fork from the Olympic National Forest. The uppermost watershed is temperate rain forest. Mid elevation forests on the South Fork, in federal, state, and private ownership have been heavily logged over many years. The lower river valley is broad, fertile, and extensively farmed. The North Fork of the Skokomish River is thirty-four miles in length, and the South Fork is twenty-eight. The two forks converge some nine miles before the River empties into Hood Canal.

One of the important issues on the Skokomish River is frequent flooding. There is a consensus among all parties that sediment aggradation is occurring in the mainstream of the River. As result of this floods have increasingly impacted property owners and the Skokomish Indian Reservation which is at the mouth of the River. Two factors have caused this stream bed build up: the extensive logging on the South Fork of the River and the diversion of water out of the North Fork (see below).

The People of the River (**squ? squ? bsch**) resided in semi-permanent locations scattered through parts of the Skokomish Basin (James, 1980). What is now the Skokomish Tribe signed the

Treaty of Point-No-Point with Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens in 1855. This treaty created the Skokomish Reservation located at the mouth of the Skokomish River where it flows into Hood Canal. The Reservation, originally 5,000 acres, now occupies 3,000 acres.

It includes tidelands and extensive wetlands. There are 704 enrolled tribal members. The Skokomish River estuary is one of the Tribe's most important cultural and economic resources, and is the Hood Canal's last remaining, relatively unspoiled wetland ecosystem (Skokomish Indian Tribe, 1993).

In 1925-30 the city of Tacoma, i.e., what is now their Department of Public Utilities, developed the Cushman Project on the North Fork of the Skokomish River. The project includes two dams, a power plant on the North Fork, and a power plant on Hood Canal.

Cushman project no. 1 was constructed in 1925-26 and consists of a 260 foot-high dam that created Lake Cushman, which is a ten mile long lake. There is a powerhouse located at this dam which generates some electricity. Cushman project no. 2 is located approximately two miles downstream from this dam. It is at river mile seventeen from the mouth of the Skokomish River. This part of the project was built in 1929-30 and consists of a 230 foot-high dam which created Lake Kokanee which is a very small reservoir/recreational lake. This dam diverts water entirely out of the North Fork of the Skokomish River and into three large pipes (penstocks). These pipe the water directly downhill to Cushman powerhouse no. 2 which is located on the shoreline of Hood Canal (see Figure 7-7). These two dams provide enough power to supply 15% of the city of Tacoma's power needs. Both of these dams were built without fish passage facilities as required by state law. Powerhouse no. 2 and its transmission lines are located within the Skokomish Indian Reservation.

One can see the engineering logic in 1930 of diverting water out of a stream, to drop it 1,350 feet to the generator. The quantity of water and the hydraulic "head," i.e., the height of the water vis a vis the generator, determine the total amount of energy of any given hydropower site (Dowling, 1991). Because the North Fork of the Skokomish River was the most important salmon and steelhead-producing stream on the Hood Canal the Tribe, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and state fisheries agencies opposed the project (Skokomish Indian Tribe, Cushman Project, 1993a). Steve Klein of Tacoma Public Utilities has stated that the only consideration in 1930, however, was power production. There was a disdain for fish, he noted (interview, 1991). Indeed, a Skokomish Tribe spokesperson has noted that Tacoma Public Utilities knew from the beginning that its various proposals for hydroelectric

development of the Skokomish River would affect the Skokomish Tribe by damming and diverting the river out-of-basin and occupying reservation lands. This is clear, he states, from early correspondence with the Department of Interior. "Tacoma was able to develop the Cushman project by continually denying and obscuring project impacts on the Skokomish Tribe and reservation" (Martino, 1994).

In fact, Tribal members opposed the project from its beginnings and attempted to sue the City of Tacoma. Through a series of legal maneuvers these suits were turned aside. Tribal "efforts were frustrated by the City's intransigence and economic and political power, and by the Federal Government's failure to fulfill its trust responsibility" (Skokomish Indian Tribe, Cushman Project, 1993a)

The original FERC license for the Cushman Project was issued in 1924. Thus, this original license expired twenty years ago but the renewal process is still underway. The following chronology of events explains why the proceedings have been so long delayed. Tacoma Public Utilities began the initial relicensing application process in 1975. FERC staff completed the environmental, engineering, and economic analyses of the project by 1978. The Department of Interior intervened in the relicensing proceedings in 1979 on behalf of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Fish and Wildlife Agency, and the National Park Service (these agencies are now called the Joint Resource Parties. In 1981 the Skokomish Tribe filed a motion for a hearing. The motion was opposed by Tacoma Public Utilities and was never responded to by FERC. Therefore, FERC did not appoint an administrative law judge nor hold a hearing for issues on the Skokomish River as it did on the Nisqually.

FERC could not issue a license in this period, however, because the project had not received water quality certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act from the Washington state Department of Ecology (Ecology). Ecology granted this certification in 1985. Passage of the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 required FERC to ask Tacoma Public Utilities to file additional information. FERC did not notify the Tribe nor the federal and state resource agencies about this request. In 1988 Tacoma Public Utilities asked for additional time to respond. In 1990 the federal and state agencies, including the Tribe, the Point No Point Treaty Council (composed of the Puget Sound tribes who signed the Point No Point Treaty in 1855), and the Bureau of Indian Affairs filed a petition requesting that FERC prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) on the process. In December, 1992, FERC held a scoping meeting to "assist the staff in identifying environmental issues to be analyzed in the EIS" (U.S., FERC, Scoping Document 2, Cushman Hydroelectric Project, 1993).

As noted above, the North Fork of the Skokomish was an extremely productive salmon and steelhead stream. This part of the River has had water diverted completely out of the stream bed since 1930. Therefore the Skokomish Tribe maintains that the dams inundated fish habitat, blocked migratory fish from headwaters, and dewatered the North Fork of the River. This resulted in the virtual elimination of several important anadromous fish runs.

The petition filed by the United States Departments of Interior and Commerce in the Cushman relicensing states:

*The Project has severely depleted most of the treaty fisheries of the Tribe,... completely blocked fish access to upstream habitat... severely reduced fish production in the River below the dam due to inadequate flow regimes; flooded or dewatered Indian treaty usual and accustomed fishing places; degraded the biological productivity of the estuary; ...occupied some of the most habitable land on the ... Reservation and extended transmission lines across the ... Reservation's shorefront....* (U.S., FERC, ... Depts of Interior and Commerce, 1994).



The Tribe is asking FERC to address these issues when (and if) a new license is issued to Tacoma Public Utilities. The Tribe states that the projects' more than sixty-five years of severe social and economic impacts on the Skokomish people have not been addressed or mitigated. The Tribe's petition states: "For nearly 70 years the Cushman Project has severely disrupted Skokomish River watershed/ecosystem functions with concomitant adverse environmental, social, economic and cultural effects on the Skokomish people and general public" (FERC, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Cushman Project).

The Tribe and Tacoma Public Utilities remain at odds over the issues involved in the relicensing and have sat down at the table to talk, but have not resolved the issues. The Tribe has stated: "The Tribe and City of Tacoma are major stakeholders in the Skokomish River Basin. To date our relationship has been adversarial and costly to both parties, particularly to the Skokomish Tribe" (Skokomish Indian Tribe, Cushman Project, 1993a)

The Tribe and Tacoma Public Utilities began negotiating about these issues in spring, 1994. The short term objective is to achieve better mutual understanding of the issues, to develop joint studies based upon a watershed planning perspective, and to discuss alternative ways of achieving the FERC-mandated balancing of project benefits. The Tribe believes there are two alternative futures. "The first, and preferable to the Tribe, would be to achieve a fair and equitable settlement of all Cushman related issues, and move forward together as partners to restore and enhance the long-term environmental, social, and economic productivity of the Skokomish watershed and estuary". By default the second alternative would be years, perhaps decades, of costly, divisive conflict (Skokomish Indian Tribe, Cushman Project, 1993a).

It is unfortunate that this negotiation has begun after the relicensing process started. This current relicensing process was formally initiated in 1992. At that time, i.e., 1992, FERC declared that: "Baseline conditions will consist of a description of today's environment including the physical, biological and social processes that exist under current project operations" (FERC, Project 460). This meant that baseline, i.e., the starting point for discussing improving salmon habitat, would be the North Fork of the River without any water in it. However, in 1994 the Chair of FERC, Elizabeth Moler notified the Departments of Interior and Commerce that the environmental impact statement (EIS) will "examine environmental conditions in the Skokomish River Basin prior to construction of the project" (Moler, 1994). This action implies that FERC is willing to consider baseline conditions prior to the dam's construction, i.e., when the North Fork had water and fish in it. She went on to say that the EIS will examine decommissioning the dam and permanently lowering the level of Lake Cushman.

## **How these two cases are different**

These cases are different for a number of reasons. They are distinct because of the kinds of dams installed on the rivers and because of the physical impact the projects have had on the two reservations. The different sitings have created two very distinct sets of options facing the parties in reconciling their conflicting uses of the rivers. This has led to Tacoma Public Utilities' relationship with the two tribes being very different from one another. The rivers and the dams built on them are significantly dissimilar. The Nisqually River is almost twice as long as the Skokomish River. The dam on the Nisqually utilizes the river flow to produce electric power, but it does not divert the river out of its stream bed. Thus, fish habitat areas remain available below the dams on the Nisqually. The dams, powerhouses, and transmission lines are located far from the Nisqually Reservation. More importantly, Tacoma Public Utilities can release water for instream flows without impacting the total amount of power produced. Though they can no longer "peak" their

water releases, water released still flows through the generators and produces electricity. If this power cannot be used by Tacoma Public Utilities, it is transferred to the Bonneville Power Administration grid and used elsewhere.

The North Fork of the Skokomish is entirely different. Water has been diverted out of the natural stream bed for sixty years. Water is dropped down to the power generating plant via penstocks. If Tacoma Public Utilities is required to put some of this water back into the North Fork, they lose significant generating capacity. In addition the power generating plant (powerhouse no. 2) on the Hood Canal was built on tribal land (which was condemned) and power transmission lines cross the Skokomish Reservation.

The Nisqually Tribe went to court twenty years before relicensing to get redress for their instream flows for fish. The Skokomish Tribe, on the other hand, has been frustrated in its attempts to obtain redress. The Skokomish Tribe and Tacoma Public Utilities have had an adversarial relationship that has precluded talking about the issues, although the Tribe states that its strategy for the past five years has been to negotiate the damage done. This inability for the two parties to get together may well be based on the fact that the Cushman Dam on the North Fork of the Skokomish River completely diverts water away from the river. Tacoma Public Utilities has not been willing to discuss giving up any of its power generating capacity to restore fish runs. (It also maintains that this dam is constructed in a way that precludes the release of more water into the North Fork).

U.S. v. Washington, 1974 (the Boldt decision) is now over twenty years old. For the past eleven years, the federally recognized tribes in the state of Washington, and the State have agreed to work cooperatively on issues such as protecting salmon habitat through revised forest practices and water planning. While the tribes thus have an important voice in state policies about the environment and natural resources, the federal agency that regulates hydropower does not yet recognize this off-reservation "environmental right."

## **Role of FERC**

Thus the Federal Energy Regulatory Authority (FERC) is another entity entirely. Statutory language requires that they consult Indian tribes when dams impact reservation lands and that they consider environmental values in the licensing and relicensing of hydroelectric projects. FERC interprets this language very narrowly. Congressional hearings held in 1989 on hydroelectric regulation sought to clarify the meaning of this environmental language, but much confusion remains (U.S. Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 1989). These hearings did not resolve this issue. The Chairman of FERC testified however that FERC was preparing for a major influx of relicensing applications in the next few years. So the question about FERC's responsibility to fish, wildlife, natural, and cultural resources remains open.

The relicensing process on the Nisqually River will probably proceed in a fairly routine manner. The remaining conflict in the process is between use of instream flows for fish habitat or for periodic recreational use of the River. The Nisqually Indian Tribe and Tacoma Public Utilities are in agreement about relicensing the two dams and are presenting a united front to FERC. This means that there are no major opposing issues on the Nisqually River that FERC must decide. It is entirely different on the Skokomish River. In this case FERC must deal with the opposing positions of the Skokomish Indian Tribe and Tacoma Public Utilities. This case will test both FERC's obligation to consult Indian tribes when the dam impacts reservation lands and FERC's responsibility for fish, wildlife, and cultural resources.

## **Conclusion**

Hydroelectric power is an important economic resource in the Puget Sound



area, as it is in the Pacific Northwest. The dams that have been built to generate electric power have contributed to the decline of the salmon in this region. Indian tribes in the Puget Sound area have traditionally lived at or near the mouth of rivers and depend on salmon for food and cultural values. Moreover, federally recognized Indian tribes in Western Washington State reserved the right to fish in their "usual and accustomed places" when they signed treaties with the federal government in the 1850's. Indian tribes have been particularly impacted by dams on the rivers on which they live because of the overall reduction in the number of salmon.

One would expect, therefore, that the tribes would be unilaterally opposed to these dams being relicensed. This case study of the Nisqually and Skokomish Tribes demonstrates that this is not necessarily true. The Nisqually Tribe has been able to work with Tacoma Public Utilities because Tacoma did not lose a great deal by agreeing to the release of water for instream flows. The Skokomish Tribe, on the other hand, has not been able to work with Tacoma because putting water back into the stream means the loss of generating capacity for the utility. Thus one cannot make generalizations about how tribes will act or proceed in a given case, even from one small Puget Sound tribe to another. In order to understand the tribe's positions it is necessary to examine the issues carefully to provide the context and to learn about how the projects impact the tribes.

## Notes

1. Indian Tribes in what is now Washington State signed the following treaties: Treaty of Medicine Creek with the Puyallup, Nisqually, and Squaxin Island tribes (1854), the Treaty of Point Elliot with the Lummi, Muckleshoot, Tulalip, Swinomish, Suquamish, Suak-Suiattle, Stillaguamish, Upper Skagit, and Nooksack tribes (1855), Treaty of Point No Point with the Port Gamble S'Klallam, Jamestown S'Klallam and Skokomish tribes (1855), Treaty of Makah with the Makah Tribe (1855), and the Treaty of Quinalt with the Hoh, Quinalt, and Quileute tribes (1856). In these treaties the tribes reserved the right to fish in their historical, off-reservation, fishing locations.

2. Some dams block anadromous fish runs entirely, preventing salmon from returning to their native spawning grounds. Dams built with fish ladders allow salmon to reach their spawning streams, but often inhibit downstream migration of young salmon. Other dams, such as the one on the Skokomish River discussed in this paper, divert water entirely out of the streambed. For a report recommending the removal of a dam on a river which runs into upper Puget Sound see U.S. Department of the Interior (1994). An important river impacted by dam construction and operation in the Pacific Northwest is the Columbia River. An excellent discussion of issues on the Columbia River can be found in Cone (1995).

3. The Joint Resource Parties now include: the National Marine Fishers Service, U.S. department of the Interior (Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs), Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, Department of Ecology, the Skokomish Indian Tribe and the Point No Point Treaty Council (composed of the Puget Sound tribes who signed the Point No Point Treaty in 1855).

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# Strategies in "Ethnic" Conflict

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*(Editor: Though the term "ethnic" is used throughout this essay, we regard this practice as somewhat misleading though it is sure the author does not intend to mislead. The term arises from a twentieth century ethos that does not accurately inform in the twenty-first century. The Fourth World Journal applies the term "nation" as a matter of practice, but we have chosen to leave the article in tact so the reader has the full benefit of the author's original intent.)*

Violent ethnic conflict becomes one of the most significant threats to global peace (Gurr, 1993; Gurr & Hurff, 1994; Ryan, 1995; van den Berghe, 1990; Cozic, 1994). After the collapse of the USSR, a number of violent ethnic conflicts occurred, and the probability that this trend will continue worries many academics and policy-makers (Kaldor, 1994; Soros, 1992; Eagleburger, 1994; Dobos, 1994; Mason, 1996). In this paper, I examine the most general strategies of the major structural actors in ethnic conflict. I understand ethnic conflict as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups, one of which possesses the actual state power, therefore it is referred to in this paper as state. State is the actor who possesses the legitimate monopoly on violence in the society. This legitimate monopoly is contested by ethnic groups. While types of ethnic conflicts are diverse, I am interested in the most overtly violent ones: the conflict of secession (when an ethnic group wants to secede and create its own state from a part of the territory of the home state--the irredenta conflicts are structurally the same because whether or not the ethnic group creates an independent state or unites with another state, in both cases the home state loses a territory, which remains one of the major indices of the state power), and the conflict of replacement (when an ethnic group wants to replace another ethnic group at the power top of the same state). In the cases where ethnic conflict is between the state and a group whose demand is not independence or the highest power office (i.e., if there is no affiliation between an ethnic group and a territory), the probability of genocide increases. That is why the attention of international community is focused on these cases. One can say that an international global regime of protection against genocide is currently emerging. On the other hand, if there is an affiliation of a group with a territory, the probability of a violent war increases (because groups who "possess" land are able to mobilize, organize and resist to the state attempts to crash them). These cases are at the threshold to be taken seriously by the international system: whether or not the law of self-determination applies to ethnic groups is one of the central issues of the controversy which surrounds ethnic conflict (Tomuschat, 1993); and the political international organs, as the UN, are at the stage of developing mechanisms to intervene or mediate in this type of conflicts.

The eventual aim of all the actors in conflict is peace. Some of them, however, often conceptualize the eventual peace as the result of their victory, and pursue peace by violent means. In this essay the actors are classified in four groups: states, ethnic groups, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental actors. Because ethnic conflict is an asymmetric conflict, states and intergovernmental organizations often regard the achievement of peace differently than non-governmental actors and ethnic groups. Strategy of confrontation sometimes used by states to bring an end to a developing conflict, even though used in order to achieve peace, often have the opposite result. Even if peace is achieved after a confrontational stage, it is likely that



peace is achieved through utilization of violent methods. The memory of violence suffered by ethnic group continues to affect the relationships within and outside the polity. The conflict does not disappear, although it can switch to a latent form once again. But some time in future it may surface. Ethnic conflicts in the territory of the former USSR were extinguished by force after the Bolshevik revolution and the imposition of the Soviet rule. After the collapse of the USSR, they started anew (Karabakh, Chechnya, Abkhazia, etc.). Other conflicts were extinguished with the end of the Second World War (in Moldova, Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia). They started anew after forty years of latent survival. By contrast, such conflicts as South Tyrol, Trieste or the Aaland islands were resolved through compromise: some of the groups' demands were accommodated. As a result, these conflicts do not reappear or, if they do, they are not likely to reach the violent stage.

Strategies in ethnic conflict are interdependent, i.e., one actor's move (or its expectation) determines the other actor's move. If the first actor's move is (or is expected to be) in the direction of increasing violence, the second's move is also likely to be in that direction. After presentation of each strategy, an inference is made whether or not it contributes to the achievement of long-lasting peace and viable order. The resulting picture will suggest that it is unlikely that any of the existing strategies, taken separately, work successfully in every case. In other words, there is no single successful strategy in ethnic conflict resolution among the existing ones. This understanding has two implications. First, this explains why different strategies are used simultaneously and/or sequentially. Second, this explains the necessity of breaking status boundaries between state and non-state actors, and developing new types of relationships between state and non-state actors, an aim continually stressed by several researchers (see, for instance, Elias & Turpin, 1994), and realized to a limited degree by intergovernmental organizations (OSCE Newsletter).

## **State Strategies**

State strategies can be classified into two types: strategies of confrontation and strategies of accommodation.

### **Confrontation**

According to the ideal one nation-one state, states engage in active nation-building: they try to implement the idea of one nation-one state. In the process of nation-building states try to coerce ethnic groups. Ethnic groups become victimized. States adopt the language of the dominant group as the state language. Sometimes they prohibit the use of other languages. They do not allow existence of educational and other institutions based on other ethnic groups' languages and values. This is, however, the least violent policy among state's options. It is identified as the assimilationist policy. If this policy does not succeed in either assimilating ethnic groups or making them invisible on the societal surface, other, more violent policies are used. Assimilation can be a result of deliberate state policy as well as a result of structural inequality in the positions between the dominant and marginalized ethnic groups. In the latter case, there exists a system of incentives and opportunities which makes ethnic groups interested in losing their identity or in acquiring the identity of the dominant group to a degree where they would be apparently non-distinguishable from the dominant group. This does not mean that the members of the group necessarily lose their group identity. They may develop, instead, a double or a complex identity. However, the undermining of boundaries between two identities may be perceived as a threat and contribute to group mobilization.

In the past it was believed that assimilation is, to some extent, a justified policy, because it brings about acculturation--inclusion of ethnic groups previously excluded from the mainstream of progress and civilization. This was the underlying justification of the colonization era, exemplified in the

ideology of civilisatrice. It becomes increasingly clear, however, that if the intervening factors are absent, mere interaction between two ethnies does not necessarily lead to acculturation (in the sense of voluntary abandonment of its values by the marginalized group and adoption of the values of the dominant group) (Ryan, 1995, p. 21).

When acculturation or soft assimilation fail to produce expected results, states resort to forced assimilation. Ethnic groups appear in a situation where it is illegal to be themselves. In Franco's Spain, Basques were banned. Eskedun language was prohibited in public. In Albania a similar condition existed for the Greek minority. In Turkey Kurds were arrested for calling themselves Kurd in the census (Ryan, 1995, p. 10). In the 1987 Bulgaria it was prohibited to be a Turk.

The most violent state policy is genocide, which is murder of the most significant part or all of an ethnic group in order to achieve a Final Solution to the problem of ethnic diversity, and to the power and demands of ethnic groups. The term genocide is introduced by a Polish academic Raphael Lemkin in an attempt to characterize Hitler's policy concerning the Jews. Lemkin referred to the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus, which culminated in 1915, as a result of which 1.8 million Armenians were killed and an equal amount dispersed throughout the world. Once, introducing his idea of the resolution of Jewish question, Hitler has declared: "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians" (quoted from Ryan, 1995, p. 13). The most well-known case of genocide in the twentieth century is the Holocaust. In the Soviet Union, Chechens, Tatars and other nationalities were subject to genocide policies after the Second World War for their alleged collaboration with the Nazis. It is, however, possible to regard the Stalin era as a time of perpetual genocide executed by all Soviet nationalities upon themselves and each other: forty to sixty million people were murdered during Stalin's rule.

In China, a genocide occurred in Tibet. In 1971, during the war which eventually resulted in the secession of Bangladesh, 1.2 to 3 million Bengalis were killed by the West Pakistani army. In 1972, about 200,000 Hutus were killed by Tutsis in what is one of the fastest genocides occurred in the world. Since Indonesia occupied East Timor in 1975, it has killed, according to some sources, up to 200, 000 people (see Ryan, 1995, p.13).

Genocide is a deliberate state policy, organized and implemented from top downward, and executed by the militarized units (army, police, special forces) or by provoked majority population (the "mob"), usually via utilization of modern technological achievements, such as concentration camps and detention centers, death rooms, gas chambers, by spreading poisoned gas, using surveillance and control technique, as well as weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population, including men, women, elderly, children, and handicapped. To be successful, the perpetrator group shall have at its disposal an efficient organization and at least moderately developed technology and infrastructure; other conditions for a genocide to be attempted are communicative isolation of the site from the international community and confidence in good chances that the international community will not be notified early about the events in the area. A genocide's success, therefore, is evaluated by its perpetrators according to two variables: whether or not the whole or the majority of an ethnic group was effectively annihilated, and whether or not it was done in as short as possible time as secretly as possible.

In between the two extremes identified as the softest policies of confrontation (acculturation-assimilation) and the most violent one (genocide), there are several types of mixed or modified policies: cultural genocide (white genocide); forced migration (deportation, or expulsion); ethnic cleansing; relocation (internal displacement); and replacement.

Cultural genocide is a specific policy of destroying the culture of the



marginalized ethnic group, especially material evidence (homes, cemeteries, churches, and other architectural monuments, manuscripts, and other artifacts) indicating affiliation of a certain ethnic group with a certain territory. In its pure form, cultural genocide is exercised after physical genocide has been accomplished, in order to destroy evidence which would allow the suffered group to appeal for retribution. A form of cultural genocide is renaming of the indigenous locations within the habitat of an ethnic group by the names of the dominant culture, and rewriting the history of the territory and of ethnic groups in order to cut off a historical connection between an ethnic group and a territory and to reinforce the historical connection of the dominant group with the territory.

Forced migration is a mild form of ethnic cleansing or a part of the genocide policy. In 1987, about one million of Turks of Bulgaria were forced to migrate to Turkey (this policy was changed in 1989, and the Turks received an opportunity to return). In 1972, 74,000 Asinas were ejected from Uganda. After the Second World War, 9 million Germans were expelled from different states of Europe (Ryan, 1995, p. 12).

The aim of forced relocation is to remove an ethnic group from structurally or strategically valuable or central place of its residence to less valuable and peripheral location within the same polity. The secondary aim of forced relocation is that of cultural genocide--to exclude any future affiliation of a certain ethnies with a certain territory. Ethiopia moved Amhars into Ogaden region, and Javanese in East Timor were relocated by Indonesia. Saddam Hussein moved Iraqi Kurds from isolated mountains to large lowland housing complexes.

Ethnic cleansing is a subtle form of genocide, where forced relocation and migration are accompanied by a cultural genocide--destruction of cultural habitat and monuments. Physical genocide can accompany ethnic cleansing, as the example of Yugoslavia demonstrates. As a result of ethnic cleansing, there appeared 2.2 million refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

Replacement usually accompanies or follows the above-mentioned strategies: it is a policy of moving groups of dominant or loyal population into the area of former residence of a removed ethnic group. After Bangladesh achieved independence, 400,000 Bengalis moved into the tribal areas cleansed from the previous population.

State strategies of confrontation are directed toward resolution of conflict via the removal of one of the parties. Not only this is unjustifiable on ethical grounds and has resulted in the most horrible crimes against humanity; as practice demonstrates, it is also inefficient: usually genocide perpetrators fall short of perfection. They are unable either to annihilate the ethnies absolutely, or to do that quickly and secretly. If the ethnic groups realize the danger in time, they confront the state attempts, and a civil war starts. If the genocide eventually succeeds, the residues of the crucified ethnic group, its generations and international community engage in attempts to achieve retribution. Cultural genocides do not absolutely remove the evidence about the ethnic group. They only add ambiguity to scholarly opinions about whether or not the ethnic group's claim to a certain territory with the remnants of cultural monuments is justified. In addition, suffering ethnic groups develop strong nationalist ideologies based on the idea of historical revanchism (sometimes referred to as "atavistic revanchism", because the members of the group do not have any personal reason to hate the members of another group: the hatred and enemy image are projected through the myths of past massacres). In the future stages of conflict, they may engage in violence against the groups whom they consider collectively (one may say, "primordially") guilty of their past sufferings, or even against other groups with whom they compete at the current stage. The conflict does not disappear, it remains highly politicized, it adds international dimensions, and it becomes even less manageable than it could be otherwise. The classical example is the conflict

between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. The Bosnian Serbs justify their violence against the Croats through references to massacres organized by the ustashi during the Second World War, and they regard the Muslims as a substitute of their ancient enemy--Turks (Thomas, 1994). The allegedly fastest and most effective way of resolving ethnic conflict envisioned by elites and leaders of authoritarian states and dictatorships in their endeavor of nation-building (according to which to build one's nation is to destroy the other's) does not work.

## **Accommodation**

Accommodation is a comparatively rare strategy in state's responses to the demands or mere existence of ethnic groups within its borders. This is so because from the times of Enlightenment, when the ideology of one nation-one state was crystallizing, statesmen and scholars assumed that multinational states are inherently weak. Nationalists made that assumption based on the Hobbesian theory of realism and effectiveness of governance, and their response was to resort to the strategies of confrontation. Liberals, on the other hand, made that assumption based not only on the requirements of effective governance, where nationalist ideology would provide a glue to fill up gaps in the fabric of general will or social contract, but also precisely because they would entitle each nation to a right to statehood. The difference was that according to nationalists only strong nations would have states whereas weak nations would concede and eventually dissolve, meanwhile according to liberals, all nations were ideally entitled to statehood. Even such a classical liberal as J.S. Mill did not believe in the viability of multinational states. Moreover, he doubted the possibility of achieving a liberal polity in a multinational state (see Ryan, 1995, p. 30). The history of the USSR and former Yugoslavia supports the assumption that the type of pluralism where territorial unit corresponds to ethnic unit is possible only under tyrannical regimes. If a regime democratizes, chaotic associations between ethnic groups of higher status directed against federal authorities and against ethnic groups of lower status result in a tendency of the former to grasp the state power and impose a unitary rule, and of the latter to preserve the status quo in alliance with the existing system. As a result, initiated political conflict assumes ethnic form with the perspective of eventual breakdown.

On the other hand, there are some cases of ethnically plural societies, where governance is based on the principle of power sharing among several ethnic groups. These are first of all Switzerland, Canada, Malaya, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands. Recently, Lijphart (1996) argued that even India belonged to this type. He distinguishes four characteristics of consociational democracy: grand coalition of political leaders that represent all the significant communities and allow elite cooperation to develop; veto power for all communities on legislation that affects their vital interests; a system of proportionality in parliament, civil service, and governmental agencies; and a high degree of segmental autonomy so that each community has a desirable degree of freedom to run its own internal affairs (Lijphart, 1996, p. 258). Lijphart's argument is that India better approximated these characteristics during the first two decades of its independence. When it deviated from these characteristics, ethnic conflicts within India escalated.

Consociational arrangements are successful, according to their defenders, because they secure balance of power within the divided society. They are more successful in small states where group elites can know each other personally and develop cooperative contacts (Kimminich, 1993, p. 87). There is no dominant ethnic group which would possess exclusive power of majority in consociations. They also provide a legal framework to de-politicize the emerging conflictual problems and to resolve them through legal means (Ryan, 1995, p. 45).

There exists, however, also a well-developed criticism concerning consociations. First, there are very few consociations in the world, and some



of them have recently collapsed (the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). These were ethnic federations comprised of quasi-nation-states, organized by the principle "one ethnic group-one political unit" (constituent republic, autonomous republic, or cultural autonomy). The other two have failed (Cyprus and Lebanon). These were consociations with mostly mixed population. In Cyprus the failure of consociation resulted in territorial polarization of two groups and division of territory, which was supported by the Turkish army. Another consociation is at the verge of collapse, though through peaceful legal procedures (Canada). If India is consociation, it is not spared of deep ethnic and religious conflicts. These factors are interpreted as impossibility to use consociations as exemplary cases for resolution of ethnic conflicts. Each consociation is, rather, a unique case, a result of specific historical circumstances. It is impossible for such a unique experience to be repeated by another state, just as it is impossible to mimic the United States' model of 'melting pot.'

Another argument against consociations says that they tend to freeze ethnic divisions, making them the basis of political life and structure. Political activity becomes more inflexible, it is channeled along the lines of involuntary association (ethnicity, religious affiliation, etc.) rather than free choice. It is an inferior form of democracy (Eide, 1993, p. 174). Consociations are also unwilling to adapt to changing circumstances and demographic patterns: the "frozen quota pitfall," actually, encourages conflict (Ryan, 1995, p. 45). This is what happened, for instance, in Lebanon, which beforehand had been considered to be one of the most successful and stable consociations.

The critics of direct consociationalism, or quota-consociationalism, suggest creation of political parties on the basis of group identity and, as a second stage, free competition among these political parties for participation in governance (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 16). This, however, may result in a final victory and establishment of a unitary governance by the most powerful ethnic group. In such a situation, other groups will appear in an even less favorable condition than ethnic groups in unitary states which enjoy special rights, because non-discrimination is a pillar of consociationalism, and therefore, if non-discrimination is promoted by a unitary government, it will result in tacit discrimination of all non-dominant ethnic groups. In other words, absence of special legislation makes indirect consociationalism a non-viable option.

Direct consociation may be criticized also as resulting in inefficient government based on slow decision-making. However, other factors being equal, slow government is better than violent conflict.

There exist states which are not consociational but which are so weak that they lack capacity to impose unitary solutions on all ethnic groups. In such states central government is an organ of mediation and facilitation as well as, simultaneously, an autonomous actor, whereas ethnic groups are semi-autonomous. However, they possess a capacity to decline the solutions they consider inappropriate, and the central government provides them with the possibility to bargain with each other. Ryan (1995) considers the Unity agreement signed in Zimbabwe at the end of 1987 such kind of arrangement. He mentions in this context also post-civil war Nigeria, Mauritius, Togo, Ivory Coast, Zambia, and Kenya (p. 48).

Accommodation, if it is possible to achieve in a form of federation or consociation, is a solution. However, the cases of accommodation are rare, and there is no guarantee that accommodation in a society divided by ethnic conflict will result in a long-lasting peace. Moreover, state elites are reluctant to consider accommodation as an option because they believe that a federative arrangement would give ethnic groups an even more legitimate opportunity to break away. This happened in Czechoslovakia. Before 1992, it was only nominally federation. In the 1992 Constitution, it was re-named Czecho-Slovakia, and the federation comprised of two equal republics was

constituted. In less than a year Slovakia seceded. This was the only case of indeed peaceful ('velvet') divorce in the post-Soviet space. All other post-Soviet states, except for Russia and Romania, rather than enhancing the status of their ethnic groups have nominally discarded even the existing political autonomies (in the best case substituting them by a vague cultural autonomy), which, in turn, has become a cause for ethnic conflict escalation (Naumkin, 1994). If states are not liberal by their ideology, if they are not economically secure and politically well-established democracies, they tend to reject the option of accommodation to the demands of ethnic groups.

## **International Organizations**

### **The United Nations**

Boutros-Ghali (1992) distinguished peace-keeping, peace-making, and peace-building. Peace-making in the narrow sense is the process of organizing negotiations between the belligerent parties and participating in the negotiations in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Peace-keeping is military intervention by the community of states into the territory in conflict in order to disrupt the war or to help the sides to preserve a cease-fire. Peace-building is the activity of participating in building civil institutions in the societies after the conflict has ended, as well as of establishing a mechanism to make sure that there will not be any new outburst of violent conflict (at least because of the same issue, or between the same actors). Preventive diplomacy is "action to prevent conflict from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes escalating into conflicts and to limit spread of the latter when they occur" (Ghali, 1992, p. 6).

Ratner (1995) distinguishes the first generation peace-keeping operations from the second generation operations according to the criterion whether they pursue a limited or an expanded purpose. If they adhere to the classical principle of impartiality and of not imposing solutions on the sides, and if they have a limited mandate of strictly monitoring the cease-fire, the operations are grouped under the heading of "first generation." If they, however, have a mandate which allows them to enforce peace under specific circumstances, and if they actively participate not only in monitoring cease-fire but also in reaching a substantial resolution to the conflict in the process of negotiations (peace-making in the narrow sense), and in building new civil institutions in the society, they are of the "second generation." In short, the second generation missions combine peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building with peace-enforcement.

Participation of the UN in any of these aspects of the peace process in an ethnic conflict is difficult because of the requirement to have the consent of the parties involved. In the case of a dyad of states the consent of parties is the matter of their agreement over whether or not they want the help of the international community to achieve an end to the conflict. In the case of an ethnic group and a state, the ethnic group does not possess legitimacy necessary in order to provide consent. States refuse to invite international organizations to be involved in ethnic conflicts, because these are traditionally considered to be an internal affair of the states. Today, however, with the proliferation of ethnic conflicts, the requirement of consent may be applied in a soft form: a state may be persuaded to accept the UN mission. Nevertheless, there is no case that a state would be persuaded to accept the UN military forces with an expanded mandate if the ethnic group demands secession and if the state disagrees to grant this right to the ethnic group. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), merely observes the cease-fire between the Georgian government and Abkhazian separatist forces. The UN Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER), arrived there only after all legal problems of granting independence to Eritrea were already resolved. Both of these missions do not include UN military troops.

After the Gulf War, which was the best precedent of preferring the doctrine of



collective security against aggression to the consent doctrine, there exists a probability that if the international community will consider a matter worth of intrusion, it will disregard the requirement of consent. This is one of the ideas underlying the words 'new world order.' In the case of ethnic conflict, however, collective security doctrine in its conventional form does not work (unless the conflict involves the second state, as in Cyprus); instead, state sovereignty is weakened by a possibility for humanitarian intervention. For humanitarian intervention consent is not required. However, the mandate of humanitarian intervention does not include peace-making in the narrow sense. Humanitarian intervention is about providing relief from suffering rather than about finding a solution to the problem. Nevertheless, in several recent cases humanitarian intervention was combined with peace-enforcement and peace-building (in Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, and former Yugoslavia). Peace-enforcement usually applies to operations aimed to disarm non-governmental military units.

All these cases concern the situations of entrenched and protracted conflicts. The morale is that before a conflict deteriorates, the violation of the consent doctrine as well as peace-enforcement actions are improbable. This is especially true for ethnic conflicts, because ethnic groups' right to provide consent is disregarded. Instead of ethnic groups, either government or the second interested state (as Russia in the case of Abkhazia) provides consent. This may result in the situation where not only the state is not pleased with international involvement, but even the ethnic group, which is supposed to benefit from the involvement, is against that. Insofar as these operations merely supervise implementation of already signed accords or cease-fire, this is not a crucial issue. But if the mission involves peace-enforcement and/or peace-making (organizing negotiations concerning the substantive issues of the conflict), the fact that ethnic group lacks status becomes a major hindrance for the resolution of the conflict. Even though the Karabakh conflict belongs to another group, where a regional organization (OSCE) rather than the UN plays a mediating role, this is a case in point: after several years of fighting, Azerbaijan eventually accepted the Karabakh leadership as a de facto side in conflict, and the cease-fire accord was signed by three sides: Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Military Command of the Nagorno-Karabakh forces. However, after that step the Azerbaijani leadership denies any possibility to negotiate directly with the Karabakh authorities the status of the enclave. Because of that, the mediating group (the OSCE Minsk group) uses the tactics of shuttle-diplomacy. This does not bear fruits insofar as the actual sides in the conflict do not come face-to-face in order to sign an agreement. This issue is one of the most important issues in the UN peace-making, because the selection of correct sides in the conflict determines whether the agreements signed on the paper will be implemented or not. Ethnic groups who demand secession usually possess sufficient power to ruin any agreement where they do not participate as an equal side. On the other hand, the system of authorities of ethnic groups in conflict is complex and ill-defined: their unity, as in the case of all mass movements, is limited to the unity against and does not include the unity for. In common struggle, different subgroups are united, but when the major positive political decision must be made, groups sometimes do not possess enough overall unity to accept them. The same is true for new and/or weakened states.

The UN is involved only in few conflicts which resulted in major disasters. Economic, financial, and other technical difficulties aside, the UN involvement requires clarification of sides in the conflict, solution to the matters of consent, and implementation of achieved accords. All these factors undermine the UN capabilities to influence the actual process of conflict at its violent stage. They make the UN missions, as they exist today, especially suitable for peace-building and peace-keeping. Peace-making in the narrow sense (organizing negotiations and achieving results) in ethnic conflict is so far almost absent from the UN practice.

## Regional Organizations

In order to help the UN and to at least partially share its burden of peace-making, regional organizations become more and more active in conflict resolution, especially in Europe and Eurasia. Through combination of several efforts at different levels, the UN and regional organizations try to create an international regime of conflict resolution. Most important European organizations in this respect are the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU), and NATO. Of these, I will briefly discuss the major achievements of the OSCE, because this is the organization which represents all the states of Europe and Eurasia as well as the US and Canada, and therefore it is the most representative. Also, the OSCE has worked toward a development of specialization in conflict resolution in the areas which fall outside NATO's competence. NATO's Partnership for Peace program may become, in the future, an additional framework for peace-making in ethnic conflict. Currently, however, this is not the case.

The OSCE is the only organization which includes the states of Eurasia and which explicitly requires from the participating states to have democratic type of governance. While other organizations may be based on an implicit or explicit assumption that this is the case (as the CoE and the institutions of EU), the OSCE documents make that requirement binding upon the participants. Some scholars dispute whether these documents are indeed mandatory and argue that they are less mandatory than direct treaties (see the Atlantic Council of the United States, 1995).

The adoption of this requirement, however, implies that in principle, recognition of new states is not discretionary. The result of this requirement was that the newly independent states declared that they were democratic, adopted the formal attributes of democracy, and preserved many or most of their autocratic traits. Even those states which did not adopt these principles and elected life-long presidents, as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, became full-fledged members of the OSCE. The requirement of democracy presupposes a possibility of intervention to put an end to a wrong regime, but hardly can one expect an intervention in Uzbekistan merely because the regime there is not democratic. The approach of the OSCE is to adopt non-democratic states as full-fledged members and to put a pressure on them, reforming their regime incrementally (see Salmon, 1993, p. 270). The second important principle which is designed to facilitate influence of the community on its members is the principle of transparency: the member states must allow presence of international observers and free circulation of information concerning the issues of human rights violations, armaments production, and the rule of law. The OSCE itself, however, does not offer sufficient incentives to the member-states to follow these rules. Its influence would be limited if it would not function in cooperation with other institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Union. The latter use recommendations of the OSCE in offering loans and financing projects. A good record with the OSCE facilitates also entrance of new states in the Partnership for Peace (which is so far important for the Central European states who feel insecure without being protected from possible future offensive of Russia) and in the European institutions (primarily for the states of the Visegrad group: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia).

Besides adopting the international human rights law, the OSCE has adopted specific regional measures for ethnic conflict prevention such as the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities (1991) and creation of a post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (1992). Since the establishment of this office the High Commissioner has been active in efforts to cool some of the ethnic hot-spots in Slovakia, Romania, the Baltic states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Ukraine. Since these conflicts have not become violent, one may assume that the High Commissioner's preventive work,



combined with the incentives in European partnership and financial help by other organizations, has been so far successful.

The OSCE approach, however, is to regard ethnic groups strictly as minorities. The High Commissioner's efforts are directed toward facilitating signing of binding treaties among the dyad and/or triad states some of which host as minority the nation of another state. The most well-known initiative of this kind was the Balladur Plan, called after France's then Prime Minister, endorsed by the OSCE, the EU, and the CoE, to conclude bilateral treaties and to make the boundaries in Europe final (The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1995). Several treaties were concluded, among the most important being Slovakian-Hungarian and Romanian-Hungarian (which is not yet ratified in Romania) ones, concerning significant Hungarian minorities in those countries. These treaties are legally binding, and their implementation is monitored by the OSCE.

The efforts of the OSCE and other European institutions are promising. They have, however, obvious limitations. The OSCE has no peace-keeping forces. Its success is determined by the incentives provided by other European institutions to the states of Eurasia. These incentives are membership or financing. If the Central European states go straightforwardly in the direction of becoming full-fledged members of other European institutions, the states in Eurasia can realistically expect only guest status and financial aid. Even Southern European states, such as Romania and Bulgaria, are declined from the full-fledged membership in the observable future. This weakens the incentive to abide by the OSCE rules. Finally, the OSCE and other European institutions have failed to resolve those conflicts which have reached a violent stage (Yugoslavia, Nagorny Karabakh, Georgia, and Chechnya).

### **Non-Governmental Actors**

Non-governmental actors are Humanitarian Organizations and Movements, Trans-National Corporations (TNC), and prominent individual actors. In this section the activities of international Humanitarian and Human Rights Organizations and Trans-National Corporations will be briefly outlined.

The international Humanitarian and Human Rights Organizations usually work in close cooperation with intergovernmental organizations. They make an important work collecting and distributing humanitarian aid to the populations in disastrous areas, to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). They monitor human rights record in the sites in conflict, collect information on the prisoners of war (POW), send fact-finding missions, and organize exchange missions. They cooperate with the national NGOs and objectively work on strengthening the civil society institutions, thereby indirectly decreasing the probability of further conflict. This type of organizations is represented by Amnesty International, International Red Cross, Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Care Canada, and numerous other non-profit organizations. Although these measures contribute to eventual resolution of conflict, they do not include attempts at peace-making, i.e., at finding solutions to the conflict (Oberg, 1994). The very opportunity which they receive from governments to work on humanitarian issues in a site in conflict is conditioned upon governments' explicit requirement from them not to take sides and not to get involved in political matters, such as conflict resolution. There are, however, certain non-governmental organizations which try to pursue that aim. One can mention in this context the Quaker mediation, Jan Oberg's conflict mitigation group (Oberg, 1994, p. 144), and the Caux Peace-Making Center in Switzerland. Members of these organizations utilize their personal contacts with the elites of states and ethnic groups in conflict and try to propose their visions of conflict resolution. They simultaneously work at the grassroots levels organizing conferences, seminars, simulations, and working directly on field with those who are engaged in a violent conflict. These organizations have so far failed to achieve a visible success in direct involvement in conflict resolution at the level of elites. However, their work at

the grassroots level, in cooperation with the specialized agencies and organs of the international organizations, have made an important contribution to the development of a comprehensive peace strategy. Helsinki Citizens Assembly, for instance, is the only organization today where representatives of civic groups of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorny Karabakh cooperate in their efforts to make the early warning system in the conflict zone a well-functioning mechanism for extinguishing possible provocative actions from each side. The Quaker mediation has played a considerable role in bridging Georgian and Abkhazian communities and developing relations between the intellectuals, women, children, and elderly in both sides.

One of the difficulties these organizations face is caused by their ideological restrictions: their mission is based on the tenet that peace is the highest fundamental value, and they try to disseminate this tenet among the populations in conflict. The result is that they sometimes are trapped in the necessity of justifying peace which is perceived as unjust--and therefore violent--by this or that side. Their tenet of impartiality does not allow them to consistently argue in favor or against the policies of either side. Without offering any guarantees, they ask ethnic groups and states to stop violence merely on the basis of the ideology of nonviolence. Ethnic groups object on the ground that if they concede and adopt a nonviolent ideology, states would easily defeat them.

In order to achieve cooperation with both sides, the NGOs are forced to balance the situation even in those cases where there is a considerable disbalance. For instance, there are more Azeri refugees in Azerbaijan than Armenian refugees in Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia, partly because some groups of Armenian refugees have left for Russia and other countries, and partly because of the demographic pattern (the ratio of Armenians to Azeris in the Transcaucasus is one to three). On the other hand, there are more Armenian prisoners of war in the Azeri jails than the Azeri prisoners in the jails of Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh. In order to remain impartial, public international organizations involved in the conflict organize exchange of exact amounts of prisoners from both sides, and provide humanitarian aid to approximately similar amount of refugees from both sides. As a result, the Azeris complain that they received "less" aid than the Armenians, and the Armenians complain that they received "less" prisoners than the Azeris (because the Azeris received all of their prisoners, and the Armenians only part of them; the 'all-to-all' proposition is usually rejected by the side who possesses more POWs at the moment).

The final problem is the communication of these organizations with the power elites. While they enjoy at least moderately positive attitude from intergovernmental organizations and ethnic groups, which allows them to develop cooperation with these actors, their efforts are usually overtly or covertly resisted by the governments who see their activities in light of intrusion in the sovereign matters. Even worse, these organizations are under the constant threat of being accused in espionage, because their activities develop in the times of war and/or emergency. This severely limits their abilities to have a decisive influence over the process of conflict resolution, and the necessity to find a compromise with the governments corrupts the purity of their purposes (Oberg, 1994; Alger, 1994).

The role of Trans-National Corporations (TNC) in ethnic conflict is an intriguing topic. A well-known example is the Royal Dutch Shell's infamous involvement in the conflict between the Ogoni and the Nigerian government (Lewis, 1996). As a result of this involvement, the company appeared in a situation of helping the military (and therefore, lacking civilian legitimacy) government to violate the group and individual rights of the ethnic group.

Another example of the involvement of TNCs in ethnic conflict is the Caspian Oil Pipeline Project, developed by a Consortium of TNCs under the leadership of British Petroleum and Amoco to export the Caspian oil (Goble, 1996). A



precondition for the implementation of this project is peace in Nagorny Karabakh and stability in the Transcaucasus. The involvement of TNC in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict was supposed to provide an additional incentive to the sides to find a fast resolution to the conflict. The evidence, however, demonstrates that so far the TNCs have been unable to influence the stalemate. Moreover, some analysts conclude that the involvement of the Consortium actually hinders rather than facilitates the resolution (Goble, 1996). First, this project threatens the geopolitical interests of Russia in the Transcaucasus. Russia does not want to merely participate in the Consortium, even with a significant share in the future profits (from twelve to sixteen per cent). She proposes her own route for the pipe-line, which would lie through Northern Caucasus to the Northern part of the Black Sea (Novorossiysk). In this way, Russia would be able to control the pipe-line. Perhaps even the Russian decision to start the war in Chechnya was partly motivated by the desire to control the part of the pipe-line which goes through Chechnya. Insofar as the projects remain on the paper, and the Consortium does not accept Russia's demands, Russia is interested in the protraction of conflict in Nagorny Karabakh, in a regime of "stable instability" (Goble, 1996, p.5).

Turkey, whose oil companies are some of the most active participants in the Consortium, argues that the Black sea straits would not be able to bear the burden of oil transportation, primarily because of ecological and environmental reasons. It proposes another route, one which lies through the Southern part of the Transcaucasus, through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey to the Mediterranean.

Armenia realizes that the development of this project would result in Azerbaijan's becoming an oil republic and considerably gaining in power and influence. Armenia, therefore, proposes to lay the pipeline through Armenia rather than Georgia, in order to become one of the full-fledged participants in the project. This offer is not studied seriously. This means that Armenia has additional reasons to block the final resolution to the Karabakh conflict until her offer is not reconsidered.

This discussion illustrates that non-governmental actors play a limited role in conflict resolution. If non-profit organizations contribute to mitigation of at least some aspects of the conflict, the activities of TNCs may even become an obstacle in the development of the peace process.

## **Ethnic Groups**

Ethnic groups have two options: to comply with the pressure of states or to resist.

If the pressure is strong, they become resilient and resist stronger. When they resist, they usually demand enhancement of their status. The final level of the enhancement of status is the achievement of independent statehood. There are very few cases of ethnic groups who achieve recognition of their right to statehood. Some ethnic groups declare self-proclaimed states (sometimes as a half-way solution toward eventual unification with the mother nation-state). Since the level of mobilization of ethnic groups in a violent conflict is high, their leadership is able to organize referenda and elections and to achieve the declaration of independence and creation of primary state institutions in a legitimate way (of course, this way is not legitimate from the perspective of states). Moreover they find supporters among the parts of majority population which resides dispersed into the ethnic group, in order to legitimize their claim to statehood as a claim made by the whole region rather than only by one ethnicity of the region.

Zunes (1994) argues that some of the African insurgent movements develop democratic governance. He compares the PoLiSaRio movement in the Western Sahara with Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and comes to a conclusion that both have several characteristics of democratic governance.

However, the former is a decentralized democracy and the latter is based on strong centralization. It seems that these organizations have the traits of militarized egalitarian systems which can resemble the Spartan republic or Trotsky's "war communism" in Russia. Their limited democratic traits are unstable, as Zunes agrees discussing changes in the EPLF policy after Eritrea achieved independence.

One of the most well-known self-proclaimed states is the Turkish Cypriot Federative State (TCFS), led by its President Rauf Denktas, and overtly sponsored and officially recognized exclusively by Turkey (Sowerwine, 1994). In the Caucasus one can see at least three cases of declaration of self-proclaimed states after the collapse of the USSR: the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), the Republic of Chechnya, and the Republic of Abkhazia. It is interesting to mention that Chechnya started as an exemplary majoritarian unitary democracy--through a referendum for independence, where the overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence, and through the election of General Dzhokhar Dudayev as a President. They elected also a Parliament, and created other state institutions, in particular military force. However, gradually the contradictions between Dudayev and the Parliament surfaced, and eventually Dudayev dissolved the Parliament by force in 1994. The Russian attack on Grozny in the late 1994 proved once more that the conflicts of secession between a state and an ethnic group are irresolvable by force: the result of this bitter 21 month-long-war was more than 10,000 dead from both sides. However, after Yeltsin's reelection and the appointment of General Lebed as a senior responsible for achieving peace in Chechnya, the sides negotiated a settlement which actually leaves a clear possibility for Chechnya to secede. The most important point of the settlement is that the Russian troops withdraw from Chechnya, and a five-year-long cease-fire starts. At the end of this period, another referendum will be conducted in Chechnya, region by region, and if the majority of the population vote for independence, Chechnya is free to go. Another self-proclaimed state or states exist in the proximity to the Transcaucasian borders--that of the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. The PKK movement in Turkey, led by Abdullah Ojlan, is not even recognized, while the de facto autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds in Northern Iraq is sponsored, at least at the surface, by the US.

Ethnic groups often use the strategy of guerrilla war against the state armies. This allows them to resist to states for decades. In addition, they use international terrorism to focus the attention of the international community on their cause. Finally, they can use the methods of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the areas of mixed or majority population if they believe that eventually these territories can be preserved by them for their own state (the Bosnian Serbs). They can also occupy territories outside the borders of their self-proclaimed state in order to use those territories as a bargaining chip (the Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh). These factors, multiplied by the efforts of state propaganda machines to create an abhorring image of ethnic groups, have contributed to viewing them as irrational adherers to the values of xenophobic nationalism, and resulted in their additional isolation. It is understandable, however, that their use of violent strategies is determined to a certain extent by the very isolation in which they appear. With few exceptions, they mostly do not have access to global communication systems. Having access to communication systems would allow them to influence the behavior of their home states through early warning to the international community, therefore reducing the probability of state violence and increasing the probability of success of non-violent methods of resistance to state violence. They are not members of international organizations, and until recently their leaders were rarely officially invited to express their views in international fora or to communicate with leaders of other states. They have not developed networks of personal connections with elites of other nations, unless these nations represent the same ethnic group. The only official communication with ethnic groups is possible through the state channels. If the groups are in a conflict with the states, the states blockade these



channels. As a result, violence (as terrorist actions) becomes a possible symbolic means of communication. Simply put, in order for their statehood to be recognized, ethnic groups start to behave as cruelly as, they believe, behave the recognized states.

International organizations or disinterested states become involved in these conflicts if a conflict has resulted in an involvement of another state, and therefore its issue of self-determination is or may be substituted by the issue of territorial dispute. It is due to involvement of Russia in Abkhazia that the UN had a legitimate reason to satisfy Shevardnadze's request and to send a mission to Georgia; due to involvement of Armenia in the Karabakh conflict the OSCE Minsk group was created; by contrast, the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) in Turkey has not yet been able to achieve a participation of the international community in the peace-making efforts at a level other than mere declarations and warnings to Turkey to follow the Human Rights Law, in spite of 20,000 dead in the 12 years of conflict with the Turkish authorities (Bezanis, 1996).

Recently, ethnic groups (particularly self-proclaimed states) started to establish contacts with each other. The neutral states are mostly reluctant to host conferences or representations of non-recognized entities. The leaders of ethnic groups, however, succeed in establishing their unofficial embassies in some liberal states.

New possibilities for the development of cooperation between ethnic groups in conflict are opened through the Internet worldwide communication systems, insofar as the Internet communications are not censored by the state authorities. In many countries, however, such a censorship (either political, or economic, or both) exists, as for instance in all the newly independent states of Eurasia.

An additional difficulty of making alliances and developing a common front for ethnic groups is that their interests are often in a direct contradiction with each other. Both Northern Cyprus and Nagorny Karabakh are self-proclaimed states, and certainly their leadership would have common problems to discuss. However, the Northern Cyprus is a Turkish group, and Nagorny Karabakh is in a conflict with the state which represents the same ethnics--the Azeri Turks. Therefore, instead of creating a common front, these entities would work against each other provided an opportunity arises. For another example, the Chechens are Muslims in a conflict with the Christians, and Nagorny Karabakh is a Christian entity in a conflict with the Muslims. Again, cooperation is too difficult to develop. The Chechens are structurally in the same situation as the Bosnian Serbs: both fight for their independence; but culturally they are opposed to each other. Russia is an ally for one and a foe for another. If there is no cultural inconsistency between the groups, there are other intervening reasons hindering cooperation. Self-proclaimed states have an inclination to adopt the state-centric approach on international issues so that to get accepted, by their behavior, by the international community. Also, they realize that their acceptance would be a complicated process running in contradiction with the tendencies to stabilize the amount of existing states. If too many states apply for recognition, chances of individual states to be accepted in the club are reduced. Therefore, the self-proclaimed states tend to overemphasize the exclusive characteristics of their case which would make them to sound more fit for recognition, and underemphasize similarities between their case and other cases. They demonstrate a tendency to ideologically denigrate the efforts of other self-proclaimed states or ethnic groups. Their efforts to convince their adversaries (states) that they are capable of independence distract their friends, because the only means they possess for the achievement of their aims is demonstration of power, and violence is the most straightforward way for demonstration of power. This makes the external policy of ethnic groups inconsistent and floating: while internally they are seemingly able to secure a system of governance in the form of a viable

polity, externally they exist in an even more perfect state of nature than states, because states at least have status and can develop bilateral relations, whereas ethnic groups do not have any external status.

However, even their behavior can be rationalized within the framework of the theory of marginal utility (Plous, 1993, p. 80), which states that if somebody has a million dollars and afterwards receives a hundred dollars, the utility of the sum of a hundred dollars is subjectively less than the utility of the same hundred dollars in a condition of not having previously one million dollars. Ethnic groups are not numerous in numbers, and the life of every member of the community is therefore considered more valuable than the life of the members of the major communities. On the other hand, ethnic groups adhere to group values rather than to individual values, they pursue a group cause, therefore their members are more capable to a voluntary self-sacrifice for the group cause than the members of the majority community. In our example, they believe that if they lose a hundred dollars, they lose more than the same hundred dollars lost by a member of a major community; if they gain a hundred dollars, they believe that they gain more than the same hundred dollars gained by a member of the major community--therefore they are prepared to take more risks than the members of the major community for gains which would be considered relatively moderate from the perspective of the members of the major community, and simultaneously they are reluctant to accept compromise solutions which would be viewed as justified from the perspective of the major community.

Major strategies directed toward achieving peace in ethnic conflict either by means of force or coercion or by means of negotiations have several deficiencies. One deficiency, however, is universal for all of them: ethnic groups are excluded from international relations. They cannot be directly addressed by the appeals of international organizations. They do not have a status to participate in conflict resolution where the issue is their fate, and even less to formally, officially, and overtly participate in the world or regional processes at large.

### **The Causes of Failures**

On the basis of the discussion above, some of the major causes of failures in ethnic conflict resolution are identified below (in no particular order).

Non-recognition and concealment of conflict at the latent stage, where there is no overt violence, is one of the causes of failures. The Chechen Republic was declared even before the collapse of the USSR, in 1991. However, the Russian authorities did not make any significant effort to reconciliation up until the large-scale military attack in late 1994.

States choose the path of confrontation instead of trying to accommodate demands of ethnic groups. The confrontational strategies lead to escalation of conflict, because ethnic groups react by even further mobilization and adopt violence as a means to compete with the state.

States do not request help from international organizations. They try to cope with the conflict alone because of the possible damage to their respectability and sovereignty if other actors will be involved in the conflict resolution and, moreover, if they by any chance succeed.

International organizations intervene only after the conflict becomes extremely violent, deteriorates, and there appears a pretext (victims of conflict) to provide humanitarian relief; or, they become involved if the effect of spillover occurs and other states take a side in the conflict. This delay becomes an additional cause which hinders conflict resolution. In this respect, the first-generation UN operations are most remarkable. Usually they develop along the following path: the UN issues one or several resolutions with a call to cease fire and start negotiations. The conflicting sides continue to fight until



they are exhausted or nearly exhausted. Then they accept the call (i.e., the state authorities accept the call), and after the violent stage is over, peace-keeping forces arrive to monitor the preservation of the cease-fire. The cease-fire may continue indefinitely without any legal resolution.

If there is another state involved (the irredenta cases), international organizations are able to intervene earlier and with a more powerful mandate; however, in these cases there exists a consistent pattern of replacing demands of the ethnic group by the demands of the second state. It was due to Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus conflict that the UN missions were relatively quickly dispatched to the island. But Cyprus and Greece claim today that any final decision to the conflict would be illegitimate because it would be dictated by Turkey's influence rather than pure self-determination of Turkish the population of the island. Azerbaijan claims that it is actually Armenia who wages the war rather than the forces of Nagorny Karabakh, therefore the decision depends on Armenia rather than on the leadership of Karabakh. The same pattern is obvious in the case of Bosnian Serbs and Croats: during the Dayton negotiations, these groups were not officially represented. The representatives of Serbia and Croatia were playing double representation--for their states and for their respective ethnic communities.

Until recently, peace-keeping remained the major aim of international organizations; they tended to contain the ethnic conflict rather than to become actively involved in peace-making. Even though certain efforts are made to overcome this outdated approach, international organizations of the traditional type still do not possess sufficient mechanisms to situate the representatives of states and ethnic groups within the framework of the peace process.

States are obligated to supervise the implementation of their own obligations (Tomasevski, 1994). Ethnic groups are doubtful that after the conflict is over, states will implement a fair arrangement; they therefore block the possibility of any final arrangement, and the conflict continues as a low-intensity protracted conflict.

Hasty recognition of non-viable entities becomes another cause of ethnic conflicts and hinders the possibility of resolving them. As the experience of the chain-recognition of the former USSR and Yugoslav republics demonstrates, recognition of new states without solid preparatory work results in ethnic conflict.

Non-recognition of status of ethnic groups, apparent in almost all strategies except for the strategies of accommodation of individual states, becomes a major obstacle to the possibility of resolving ethnic conflicts. International organizations are reluctant to suggest to states enhancement of status of their ethnic groups. Instead, they prefer to require from states to follow the human rights and minority treatment international standards. However, without the ultimate security of being recognized as at least an autonomy, ethnic groups with compact residence do not consider these measures sufficient.

Individual states become more involved in the conflict than international organizations, thereby pushing the resolution toward scenarios beneficial for themselves rather than toward scenarios which would result in a long-lasting peace. International organizations recognize the right of certain states, especially regional powers, to have special interests in an ethnic conflict in another state. For instance, Russia plays a prominent role of a peace-maker in the conflicts in Georgia and Karabakh. However, it is in the interest of Russia to postpone any long-lasting resolution to these conflicts in order to preserve its influence over the states in conflict.

Belief in irrational substance of ethnic nationalism justifies coercion and force in ethnic conflict resolution and undermines necessity in elaborating legal procedures. The propaganda of this belief contributes to further justification of

non-intervention doctrine, on one hand, and of state's having a carte-blanche to suppress the ethnic insurgency, on the other hand. The myth of violent nature of the Chechen people and of terrorist nature of the Kurd people have contributed to the fact that so far international organizations have not tried to intervene in these conflicts except in the form of appeals and few human rights monitoring missions. As the recent research demonstrates (Kriesberg, 1994; Goldstein, 1994), violence, including ethnic violence, has no irrational psychological causes, and is usually motivated by the underlying interests of the aggressors or of the organizers among the groups of aggressors.

There are also secondary causes which restrain the capabilities of peace-makers rather than directly contribute to failures, such as material and financial constraints; the gap between achieved accord and its implementation; protraction and establishment of a tradition of conflict, or "entrapment"; and low speed of collective decision-making in international organizations in less-than-emergency situations.

Some of these causes could probably be removed through the development of non-traditional ways of conflict resolution, as preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, track-two diplomacy, peace-building, peace-enforcement, and others discussed in this paper. It will remain, however, as difficult as it is to prevent ethnic conflicts from occurring and deteriorating as well as to resolve the ongoing ones, unless some of these causes are removed through necessary changes in conceptualization, normative support, and practice of ethnic conflict resolution. For this, a combined systematic effort of international organizations, states, non-governmental actors, and ethnic groups is necessary. Such an effort will result in the development of a comprehensive peace strategy in ethnic conflict resolution. The major rejoinder to my argument, however, remains valid: it states that the very possibility for ethnic groups to legally have an access to international dimension, may in fact drive states to more violent practices. Therefore, the peace strategy being proposed must obviate the need of ethnic groups to struggle for state independence. The proposals must provide an institutional framework for the states to have guarantees that ethnic groups would not secede and for the ethnic groups to have guarantees that their sovereign rights to their culture, land, and development would not be violated by their home states. As a concluding section to this essay, I will present how such a change could be organized in practice in one of the world regions where ethnic conflicts are intense.

## **A Mechanism for Ethnic Conflict Resolution**

### **in the Caucasus**

This proposal is based on the proposition that ethnic conflicts must be dealt with systematically. Because they are interconnected and the probability of their mutual influence is high (Vasquez, 1992), the most suitable framework for peace-making are well-defined geopolitical regions rather than particular states where conflicts develop. An example of such a region is the Caucasus. The Caucasus is a jigsaw puzzle of ethnic groups. There are about forty ethnic groups here with the population more than 10,000 (see Naumkin, 1994). After the collapse of the USSR, in the Caucasus developed numerous ethnic conflicts. Most of them are discussed in Raymond & Hofman (1994). The Soviet successor states are less inclined to respect demands of ethnic groups than a federative empire, which the USSR was. Discriminated ethnic groups demand enhancement of their collective rights and recognition of their autonomy and even sovereignty. Some of them demand independent statehood. The successor states try to oppress ethnic movements by coercion or, when this approach fails, by force. Ethnic groups resist. States send their armies. Both sides resort to violence. Conflicts escalate into full-scale civil wars. In some instances they involve the neighboring states and erupt in international wars. The leading centers of conflict by the levels of violence and protraction are Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Chechnya. In



the neighboring Turkey there is a similar conflict between the governmental army and the military movement of Kurds. In addition, each ethnic group with compact residence is a "security hostage"--a lever of influence or a buffer zone for one of the neighboring states.

All states in the Caucasus fail to recognize the rights of their ethnic groups and to provide them with the opportunity to pursue their aims in a legal constitutional way, which would ameliorate their drive to independence. All sides are already tired of conflicts which proved to be irresolvable by force. Ethnic nationalism and the ideology one nation-one state proved to be extremely costly from the national security and national interest perspectives. It is only a matter of courage to recognize this state of affairs, overcome the bias of xenophobic nationalist ideology, and find a compromise solution which would be new (thus there would be no resistance of past memories and historical hostilities) and would be systematically beneficial for the whole of the Caucasus. The newly recognized states with low level of legitimacy of their rulers will never be able to develop individually, in isolation from each other, both politically and economically, if locked in the continuing ethnic wars. They will never become democratic and wealthy enough in isolation from each other to be able to provide their ethnic groups with sufficient incentives to enhance their loyalties toward the home states. The only way out is the development of a new type of international organization, where states will be represented along with ethnic groups.

This is a challenging proposition, because the international community is decisively against creation of new international organizations and consistently works for the enhancement of the efficiency of the existing ones (The Atlantic Council..., 1995). The Eastern and Central European states have a good chance to be incorporated in the European integration process. This perspective provides them with the incentive to accommodate at least some of the demands of their ethnic groups. In addition, they are more prosperous, and their ethnic groups have an incentive to accept the rules of the game rather than to engage in a costly conflict. For the states of European periphery, however, this chance is remote. It does not provide an incentive to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups. Therefore, if for the Eastern and Central Europe the existing international institutional arrangements could be considered sufficient, this is not so for the Caucasus.

Take, for instance, the Nagorny Karabakh conflict. One of the causes that it remains unresolved is that the ethnic group (a self-proclaimed state) seeks very strong security guarantees. It does not believe in the assertions of the Azeri authorities that Azerbaijan and Armenia could conclude an agreement and Karabakh would be secured if it would step back from its independence demand and disarm. The Azeri leadership failed to recognize Karabakh as a side in the conflict for a very long time. It even abolished the autonomous status which Karabakh enjoyed during the Soviet times, and declared Azerbaijan a unitary state. Since Armenia was helping the Armenians in Karabakh, Azerbaijan declared the Karabakh movement an aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan. However, the new Azeri President Heidar Aliiev made the first step toward recognition of reality, and a common working document on the cease-fire was signed by three sides: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh, under the pressure from Russia. But after that step Heidar Aliiev has been reluctant to go one step further and to recognize the Karabakh authorities as a side in negotiations over the status of this enclave, since this would be an indirect recognition of justifiability of their aspiration to independence.

The OSCE, which mediates in this conflict, is an organization of sovereign states. These states do not agree to accept full participation of the Karabakh authorities in the negotiations over the destiny of this enclave. Unlike the case of the Aaland islands, where both home state (Finland) and the contending state (Sweden) agreed to a special status for the inhabitants of the islands,

Azerbaijan is extremely inflexible and considers all the possible arrangements of this type threats to its territorial integrity. The framework of the OSCE is not suitable to persuade Azerbaijan to partly concede to the demands of the Karabakh Armenians and to agree to a special arrangement. If there would be created another type of international organization, where by the very intent of the organization independent state governments would be represented with an equal status with the leadership of ethnic groups, some of these difficulties would be overcome. Such an organization, an "Organization of Transcaucasian Nations," could be composed of the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council could be composed of five or six major states in the region, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, and possibly Iran, as permanent members, and of one or two ethnic groups as rotating members. Each nation and ethnic group would be equally represented in the General Assembly, regardless of possessing or not possessing a recognized political configuration (cultural or political autonomy, status of federative unit or independent statehood). Ethnic groups would have the opportunity to express their grievances against states within the borders of which they are included and to seek common systematic solutions to their problems. Ethnic groups would increase their bargaining power: they would be able to make coalitions both among themselves and with the states. At the same time, this arrangement would placate their strive to independent statehood, since they would be fully recognized decision-making sides in a respectful organization, within the framework of which they propose and implement solutions to their problems. The Security Council would initiate acts, and the General Assembly ratify them. Ethnic groups currently member to the Security Council would have special opportunities to greatly influence decisions of the states. States would be less embarrassed being represented equally with ethnic groups, since they would not be alone vis-a-vis their ethnic groups. They would be in a multilateral environment, where every state is represented equally with every minority within or outside that state in the Caucasian region. Such an organization would complement rather than alter the existing international arrangements, and eventually it would develop in an institution of cooperation for all the nations in the region.

The major obstacle to this scenario is the necessity to change the value systems of the states in the region: the state leaders of the region think that by such a concession they would compromise the sovereignty of their states, and as a result they would lose power. In fact, such an arrangement would require concessions from all sides: ethnic groups would cease their movement for independent statehood in exchange for the opportunity to become recognized as sovereign members of the Organization, with relatively stable population and internal territorial borders assigned to them. Any attempt of a state to alter the recognized borders of an ethnic group's residence would be precluded by the system of collective security which would work within the framework of the Organization. The Organization would provide the necessary level of transparency to monitor the ethnic processes in every state. It would become a major tool of preventive diplomacy and an early warning system, being an open channel of communication with the outside world for the ethnic groups, and a mechanism for participation of all ethnic groups in the regional political and economic processes.

Such an organization is possible since there are common interests which all the actors in the Caucasus share. Besides the negative interest--to bring an end to violence, there exists also a system of positive interests--to develop industry, trade, and cooperation.

Such a solution would become plausible, however, only if certain changes in the international law are finalized. It is necessary, for instance, to recognize right of ethnic groups to self-determination, which means at least recognition of sovereignty of ethnic groups concerning the aspects of their culture, history, territory, education, and the like. In the cases where these aspects of their sovereignty become politicized, their limited political sovereignty ought



to be recognized. But sovereignty would not coincide with formal state independence, unless the group is threatened by genocide. Ethnic groups want recognition of their status as relatively independent cultural and political entities. They would receive such a recognition through participation in the organizations like one proposed here as the Organization of Transcaucasian Nations. States are concerned with their territorial integrity. In exchange for recognition of their ethnic groups with the exact territorial boundaries, states would receive a guarantee that external borders among the existing states would remain intact. The Organization would provide an international environment and collectively worked out principles to decide the particulars of interactions of ethnic groups with states where they are included, such as an ethnic group's participation in the state governance in exchange for taxation and for the obligation to provide members of ethnic groups for the conscription purposes.

The creation of such an Organization would become plausible if the international community and civil organizations within the states would pressure the states in the region to adopt such an arrangement. The international organizations such as OSCE could regard this Organization as another tool in their track-two diplomacy efforts and could provide their guidance, consultation, and surveillance to secure that the Organization develops in order to serve its declared purposes and to balance the interests of different actors in the region rather than as an umbrella for a regional superpower to exclude alternatives to its hegemony. This possibility could be avoided through the inclusion in the Organization of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, who would balance each other's influence. The advantage of this project over any other from the perspective of the existing international organizations is that if such an Organization would start to function, the need in expensive military assistance of peace-keeping forces for an unspecified time would be likely to decrease. Instead, the intergovernmental organizations would be asked to provide only limited help for professional expertise and monitoring.

Such an organization, as a collective decision-making body, would make decision-making in the region "less effective" (i.e., slower). This would mean, however, the enhancement of the overall sovereignty of the region concerning its relations with other states and international actors. Giving up a part of their sovereignty individually, the states would enhance the level of their "collective sovereignty." Such a process could become an epicenter of stabilization, another example of integration side-by-side with the European Union, which would influence even the remote conflictual processes in other global regions.

As the discussion of the strategies of states, ethnic groups, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental actors demonstrates, even the best strategies are likely to succeed only if they are applied in combination rather than in isolation. In order to help the international community in its efforts of conflict prevention and peace-building, the assumptions that there is no need in a new type of international organizations, and that there is no need in providing a legal loophole for ethnic groups striving for self-determination, must be revised. By combining the efforts of governmental and non-governmental actors it is possible to modify these assumptions so that, perhaps, through development of new types of international organizations ethnic groups would less demand secession.

## **Conclusion**

States alone rarely have incentives to accommodate demands of ethnic groups. The existing patterns of accommodation of individual states depend on the goodwill of the governments. States must be provided with new incentives to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups, and such incentives are easier to be found in the external influence of international organizations and powerful international actors than inside the states, if the latter have not yet developed domestic liberal democratic regimes and healthy and wealthy

economies.

Ethnic groups' demands to enhance their status are not merely a result of irrational proliferation of the ideology of nationalism; rather they are a reaction to the inability and inflexibility of the nation-states' framework in guaranteeing a fair distribution of power and rights among all the significant group actors within the states.

Intergovernmental organizations are able to intervene in ethnic conflicts mostly after the conflicts become violent. A comprehensive peace strategy requires the development of mechanisms which would preclude the escalation of ethnic conflicts. These mechanisms require cooperation of non-governmental actors with intergovernmental organizations, to a certain extent at the expense of the narrowly defined interests of individual states. If, however, such a cooperation develops successfully, the overall sovereignty and viability of resulting international arrangement would increase rather than decrease. By thoroughly dividing functions and powers among intergovernmental organizations, states and ethnic groups while resolving or preventing ethnic conflicts, long-lasting arrangements can result. Their dynamism in reacting to changing circumstances could contribute to the increase in regional stability. Therefore the effective power of all the actors, including states, would actually increase rather than decrease. An example of the possible way of such a regional arrangement is an organization where states and ethnic groups are represented with equal status.

Ethnic groups must be recognized as legitimate actors at the international level. For this, it is more realistic to give their representatives an opportunity to directly express their concerns in the international fora rather than to require from their home states to satisfy their demands and to negotiate compromises with them in isolation, insofar as their home states are not well-functioning liberal democracies.

The international recognition of ethnic groups within the states as cultural and political entities with exact territory and population which cannot be altered without mutual consent of the ethnic group and the state can become a major principle which would allow to prevent ethnic conflicts from deteriorating and reaching the level of violent clash.

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# Reinterpreting Europe through the Eyes of Catalunya

Review by Rudolph C. R yser  
  1999 Center for World Indigenous Studies

(**The Distorted Past**, A Reinterpretation of Europe, Josep Fontana. Translated by Colin Smith. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. Pp. 220.)

**Europe**—the place, the history and the people—has been the envy and the object of scorn of peoples throughout the world for five hundred years and more. Europe is one of those mysteries of the mind that comforts many, pails into irrelevance for still others and for a few of us it stands as a disturbingly incomplete yet imposing consciousness. Europe is an attitude, a consciousness and a way of thinking, but it remains an undefined place still unformed. For scholars like Josep Fontana Europe is a modern distortion that obscures the diverse cultures of the region.

The eminent Catalan historian Josep Fontana challenges the conventional image and idea of Europe as the dominant, and the superior reality for modern life. From the Catalan perspective, steeped in an ancient culture reaching three thousand years into the history of the western Mediterranean, Fontana draws on his thirty years as an historian to examine the many ways Europe as a consciousness and Europe as an identity has been distorted only to tarnish and diminish the identity of ancient cultures throughout the continental peninsula. He describes how a fictive European identity has repeatedly been attempted as if to submerge the identity of ancient cultures like the Catalans, the Alsacians, Firzians, Irish, Wallacians and Slovenians. Fontana describes how the Christian Church has played a role in creating the fiction of European identity and repeats his assertion that all such efforts are distortions of the past and the present. These efforts at distortion worked to conceal the existence of the true cultural identity of peoples throughout the land.

The evidence of Fontana's thesis is revealed through the author's examination of the many ways that a "Europe" has been reflected in mirror images throughout the ages. In some instances a "Europe" is reflected as a culture that is superior to other peoples in the world, yet Fontana demonstrates that the cultures of distinct nations are confiscated and then offered as a single European culture. This distortion of fact only helped create an illusion that stood as a reflection without substance. In yet other instances a "Europe" is reflected as a spiritually superior collectivity projecting a Christian image. Fontana sees this as one of the most grievous distortions because of the rich non-Christian spiritual traditions rooted in the depths of ancient cultures throughout the region.

Catalunya, a country in Spain's northeastern and France's southeastern regions on the Mediterranean Sea stands as a powerful witness to the childish assertion of European identity. An ancient nation predating virtually all states in the area, Catalunya has been occupied by Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Goths, surrounded by the Moors and occupied by the Castilians as well as outlawed by the Francisco Franco dictatorship. In the face of all these occupations Catalunya would repeatedly submerge and then reemerge when the occupations were over. Sometimes 400 years and 700 years would pass as outsiders would claim Catalunan territory. Despite their subordination to invading peoples Catalans preserved their culture hidden away in the caves of Catalunya. Just as Catalans had done before, when the occupation came to an end, the country of Catalunya reemerged in 1980 after the death of Dictator Franco and began to resume its identity.

Fontana is clearly conscious of this powerful tradition among the Catalan. He projects this consciousness throughout his analysis of the **Distorted Past** and the fictive Europe. He reveals the illusion of European identity, and consequently reveals the re emergent identity of the ancient cultures of the region. He reveals what this writer would call the Fourth World nations of the



region.